

**STATE OF NEW JERSEY**  
**BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITIES**  
**BPU Docket No. EM05020106**  
**OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW**  
**OAL Docket No. PUC-1874-05**

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**In The Matter of the Joint Petition of  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
and Exelon Corporation  
For Approval of a Change in Control of  
Public Service Electric and Gas Company  
and Related Authorizations**

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**Direct Testimony**

on Behalf of the  
New Jersey Division of the Ratepayer Advocate

Prepared by:  
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November 14, 2005

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Exhibit BFS-1	Resume of Bruce E. Biewald
Exhibit BFS-2	Resume of Robert M. Fagan
Exhibit BFS-3	Resume of David A. Schlissel
Confidential Exhibit BFS-4	Analysis of economic versus pro-rata allocation of transmission import capacity into PJM East
Exhibit BFS-5	Analysis of FTRs across the PJM East Interface
Exhibit BFS-6	Results of Synapse HHI Analyses
Exhibit BFS-7	August 2005 Presentation by President of Exelon Power Team
Exhibit BFS-8	Description of ELMO Model
Confidential Exhibit BFS-9	Results of Synapse strategic bidding analyses
Exhibit BFS-10	Quantification of one percent increase in wholesale prices
Exhibit BFS-11	August 2005 Presentation by Exelon Vice President, Finance and Markets

1 **I. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS**

2 **Q. Mr. Biewald, please state your name, position and business address.**

3 A. My name is Bruce E. Biewald. I am the President of Synapse Energy Economics,  
4 Inc., 22 Pearl Street, Cambridge, MA 02139.

5 **Q. Mr. Fagan, please state your name, position and business address.**

6 A. My name is Robert M. Fagan. I am a Senior Associate at Synapse Energy  
7 Economics, Inc., 22 Pearl Street, Cambridge, MA 02139.

8 **Q. Mr. Schlissel, please state your name, position and business address.**

9 A. My name is David A. Schlissel. I am a Senior Consultant at Synapse Energy  
10 Economics, Inc., 22 Pearl Street, Cambridge, MA 02139.

11 **Q. On whose behalf are you testifying in this case?**

12 A. We are testifying on behalf of the New Jersey Division of the Ratepayer Advocate  
13 (“Ratepayer Advocate”).

14 **Q. Please describe Synapse Energy Economics.**

15 A. Synapse Energy Economics ("Synapse") is a research and consulting firm  
16 specializing in energy and environmental issues, including electric generation,  
17 transmission and distribution system reliability, market power, electricity market  
18 prices, stranded costs, efficiency, renewable energy, environmental quality, and  
19 nuclear power.

20 **Q. Mr. Biewald, please summarize your educational background and recent**  
21 **work experience.**

22 A. I graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1981, where I  
23 studied energy use in buildings. I was employed for 15 years at the Tellus  
24 Institute, where I was Manager of the Electricity Program, responsible for studies

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1 on a broad range of electric system regulatory and policy studies. I have testified  
2 on energy issues in more than eighty regulatory proceedings in twenty-five states  
3 and two Canadian provinces and in state and Federal courts. I have co-authored  
4 more than one hundred reports, including studies for the Electric Power Research  
5 Institute, the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Environmental Protection  
6 Agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, the New England Governors'  
7 Conference, the New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners, and  
8 the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. My papers have  
9 been published in the Electricity Journal, Energy Journal, Energy Policy, Public  
10 Utilities Fortnightly and numerous conference proceedings, and I have made  
11 presentations on the economic and environmental dimensions of energy  
12 throughout the U.S. and internationally. I also have consulted for federal  
13 agencies, including the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of  
14 Justice, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Trade  
15 Commission and National Renewable Energy Laboratory. My resume is  
16 provided here as Exhibit BFS-1.

17 I have analyzed electricity market power issues in numerous markets throughout  
18 the Eastern, Central and Southern United States, including, but not limited to,  
19 PJM, New York, and New England. I have presented the results of these analyses  
20 as testimony on market power issues before the Connecticut Department of Public  
21 Utility Control, the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, the Arkansas Public  
22 Service Commission, the West Virginia Public Service Commission, the  
23 Maryland Public Service Commission, the Mississippi Public Service  
24 Commission, the New York Public Service Commission, and the New Hampshire  
25 Public Utilities Commission. I also have submitted affidavits and testimony to the  
26 FERC in Dockets Nos. EC98-40-00, et al., EC97-46-000, OA97-237-000, and  
27 ER97-1079-000.

28 I have co-authored a number of studies on market power issues. These studies  
29 included The New England Experiment: An Evaluation of the Wholesale

1 Electricity Markets, June 2003; Best Practices in Market Monitoring: A Survey of  
2 Current ISO Activities and Recommendations for Effective Market Monitoring  
3 and Mitigation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, November 2001; Competition  
4 and Market Power in Northern Maine Electricity Market, November 1998;  
5 Analysis of Market Power in the APS and Duquesne Service Territories, February  
6 1998; and, Horizontal Market Power in New England Electricity Markets:  
7 Simulation Results and a Review of NEPOOL's Analysis, March 1997.

8 I have been invited to speak on market power issues by the National Association  
9 of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the New England Conference of Public  
10 Utility Commissioners, the National Consumer Law Center, and the National  
11 Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates.

12 **Q. Mr. Fagan, please summarize your educational background and recent work**  
13 **experience.**

14 A. I am an energy economics analyst and mechanical engineer with 19 years of  
15 experience in the energy industry. My work has focused primarily on electric  
16 power industry issues, especially economic and technical analysis of competitive  
17 electricity markets development, electric power transmission pricing structures,  
18 and assessment and implementation of demand-side resource alternatives.

19 I have analyzed wholesale transmission system issues for numerous clients over  
20 the past nine years. This work has included: valuation of FTRs; examination of  
21 FTR and ARR auction and allocation mechanisms in New England, PJM, New  
22 York and the Midwest; study of alternative transmission rights models, including  
23 physical vs. financial paradigms; analysis of GE MAPS modeling results; review  
24 of LMP price data in PJM, NY, NE and the MISO ISO regions; and review and  
25 critique of transmission system embedded cost recovery issues including tariff  
26 design and the impacts of FERC's 888 open access transmission tariff.

27

1 I have testified before State regulatory commissions in Indiana, Illinois, Texas  
2 and Maine, and before provincial regulatory commissions in Ontario, Alberta and  
3 Nova Scotia on various retail and wholesale electricity market issues.

4 I hold an M.A. from Boston University in Energy and Environmental Studies and  
5 a B.S. from Clarkson University in Mechanical Engineering. Details of my  
6 experience are provided in Exhibit BFS-2.

7 **Q. Mr. Schlissel, please summarize your educational background and recent**  
8 **work experience.**

9 A. I graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1968 with a  
10 Bachelor of Science Degree in Engineering. In 1969, I received a Master of  
11 Science Degree in Engineering from Stanford University. In 1973, I received a  
12 Law Degree from Stanford University. In addition, I studied nuclear engineering  
13 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology during the years 1983-1986.

14 Since 1983, I have been retained by governmental bodies, publicly-owned  
15 utilities, and private organizations in 24 states to prepare expert testimony and  
16 analyses on engineering and economic issues related to electric utilities. My  
17 recent clients have included the U.S. Department of Justice, the Staff of the  
18 Arizona Corporation Commission, the General Staff of the Arkansas Public  
19 Service Commission, cities and towns in Maine, Connecticut, and Illinois, and the  
20 Attorneys General of the States of New York and Rhode Island and the  
21 Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

22 I have testified before state regulatory commissions in Connecticut, Arizona, New  
23 Jersey, Kansas, Texas, New Mexico, New York, Vermont, North Carolina, South  
24 Carolina, Maine, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Massachusetts, Missouri, and Wisconsin  
25 and before an Atomic Safety & Licensing Board of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory  
26 Commission.

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1 I have analyzed market power issues in PJM and New York State. I have  
2 presented the results of market power analyses in testimony before the New  
3 Jersey Board of Public Utilities.

4 A copy of my current resume is attached as Exhibit BFS-3.

5 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

6 A. Synapse was retained by the Ratepayer Advocate to examine market power and  
7 nuclear issues related to the proposed merger between Public Service Enterprise  
8 Group (“PSEG”) and Exelon Corporation (“Exelon”) (collectively “the  
9 Petitioners”). This testimony presents the results of our investigations and  
10 analyses of these issues.

11 **Q. Please explain how you conducted your analyses.**

12 A. We have reviewed the testimony and exhibits filed by the Petitioners at the FERC.  
13 We also have reviewed the comments, protests, reply protests, and requests for  
14 rehearing submitted by a number of parties including the New Jersey Board of  
15 Public Utilities (“BPU” or “the Board”). In addition, we have reviewed the  
16 FERC’s July 1, 2005 Order approving the merger.

17 At the same time, we have reviewed the testimony and exhibits filed by the  
18 Petitioners at the BPU. We also have examined the responses that the Petitioners  
19 have provided to the more than one hundred and fifty data requests that the  
20 Ratepayer Advocate and other active parties have submitted to the Petitioners on  
21 market power and related issues. We also have participated in a telephone  
22 conference call with the Petitioners’ market power witness, Mr. Rodney Frame,  
23 and members of his support staff.

24 In addition, we have performed some independent modeling of our own using Mr.  
25 Frame’s HHI model and the Electric Market Optimization Model (“ELMO”).  
26 ELMO is a computer model developed to simulate the strategic pricing behavior  
27 of participants in wholesale electricity markets. ELMO can be used to assess the

1 extent to which market power will be a problem in specific situations, and the  
2 extent to which various policies will be effective at mitigating the market power  
3 of dominant firms. ELMO was developed by Bruce Biewald and Dr. David  
4 White from Synapse. The ELMO model is described in more detail in Exhibit  
5 BFS-8 and Confidential Exhibit BFS-9.

6 **II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND**  
7 **RECOMMENDATIONS**

8 **Q. Please summarize your findings.**

9 A. Our findings include the following:

- 10 1. The proposed merger would create a new company, Exelon Electric & Gas  
11 Corporation (“EEG”), that would own approximately 40,475 MW of  
12 capacity in Expanded PJM, pre-mitigation, and 34,000 MW of capacity if  
13 the Petitioners’ mitigation plan is approved and carried out.
- 14 2. EEG would own more than 11,900 MW, or 29 percent, of the capacity in  
15 PJM East even if the Petitioners’ mitigation plan is approved.
- 16 3. The Administrative Law Judge and the New Jersey BPU should not rely  
17 on the FERC’s findings concerning the impact of the proposed merger on  
18 the ability of EEG to exercise market power.
  - 19 ▪ The FERC applied a different standard than the BPU will apply in  
20 its evaluation of the proposed merger. The BPU will apply a  
21 positive benefits standard. The FERC does not apply this same  
22 standard. Indeed, the FERC’s guidelines allow a proposed merger  
23 to increase the extent of concentration in the markets being  
24 examined, as long as the increases fall within prescribed limits.
  - 25 ▪ The FERC does not address potential market power problems that  
26 could arise at the retail level as opposed to wholesale markets.

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- 1                   ▪       The FERC relied solely on idealized concentration measures in  
2                    approving the proposed merger.
- 3                   ▪       As the BPU convincingly argued in its filings at the FERC, the  
4                    record before the FERC was inadequate to determine whether EEG  
5                    will be able to exercise market power in the PJM energy and  
6                    capacity markets and in the New Jersey BGS auction.
- 7                   ▪       The FERC’s decision to approve the merger relies on its ability to  
8                    address market power problems in future years.
- 9           4.       The Petitioners have not presented in their testimony, exhibits or data  
10            responses in this proceeding any of the evidence that was lacking in the  
11            record at the FERC.
- 12           5.       Evaluation of the effects of a merger requires modeling the hourly  
13            behavior of the market under a wide variety of external conditions and  
14            bidding behaviors. A realistic energy simulation model would provide  
15            better insight into potential market power concerns than idealized  
16            concentration measures. However, the Petitioners did not present such an  
17            analysis in their filings before the BPU or the FERC.
- 18           6.       The modeling presented by Petitioner witness Frame does not accurately  
19            represent the pre-merger levels of concentration in the PJM East energy  
20            market.
- 21           7.       Data published by the PJM Market Monitoring Unit indicate that the PJM  
22            East energy market is substantially more concentrated than the results of  
23            the modeling presented by Petitioner witness Frame.
- 24           8.       The significant differences with historical PJM data on pre-merger market  
25            concentrations call into question the validity of all of Mr. Frame’s  
26            modeling of the PJM system post-merger and post-mitigation market  
27            concentrations. Moreover, these differences lead Mr. Frame to understate

1 the amount of capacity that must be divested by EEG in order to satisfy  
2 the FERC Appendix A market screen criteria that Mr. Frame is attempting  
3 to satisfy.

4 9. The results of Petitioner witness Frame’s market power modeling are  
5 rendered unrealistic by a number of serious flaws that cause him to  
6 understate the post-merger and post-mitigation levels of concentration in  
7 the PJM East energy market:

- 8 ▪ Mr. Frame does not even attempt to address actual market power  
9 but instead relies on only a single idealized estimate of market  
10 concentration.
- 11 ▪ The use of an inappropriate methodology for allocating the limited  
12 transmission import capability across PJM’s Eastern Interface.
- 13 ▪ The assumption that all of the capacity from the generating units  
14 being modeled will be available to serve load in his targeted  
15 geographic areas and ignores the fact that some capacity would  
16 already be committed to serving other load or be diverted to other  
17 areas for economic reasons.
- 18 ▪ The failure to reflect transmission system outages or deratings.
- 19 ▪ The unrealistic treatment of forced and planned generating unit  
20 outages.
- 21 ▪ The inappropriate use of industry-average [ REDACTED  
22 ].
- 23 ▪ The failure to reflect the expected improved output from the Salem  
24 and Hope Creek nuclear units that the Petitioners have cited as a  
25 benefit of the proposed merger.

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- 1           ▪       The failure to reflect future capacity uprates at Hope Creek and  
2                        Salem.
- 3           ▪       The failure to model purchases of capacity from other PJM  
4                        participants.
- 5           10.     Mr. Frame does not use an economic methodology to allocate the limited  
6                        transmission capability across the PJM East interface. Such an economic  
7                        allocation would assign limited transmission capability to the suppliers  
8                        with the lowest delivered costs. Instead, Mr. Frame used a pro-rata  
9                        allocation methodology. The use of the pro-rata methodology causes Mr.  
10                      Frame to understate the amount of capacity that Exelon, PSEG and the  
11                      combined company created by the merger, EEG, will be able to import  
12                      into PJM East. It is reasonable to expect that the low-cost nuclear, hydro  
13                      and, to a lesser extent, coal capacity that would be retained by the  
14                      combined company will represent a large portion of the capacity imported  
15                      into PJM East. For this reason, an economic allocation methodology will  
16                      more realistically represent EEG’s share of imports.
- 17           11.     Our analysis of the PJM Annual Auction of Financial Transmission Rights  
18                        for the 2005-2006 planning period shows that Exelon and PSEG currently  
19                        use significantly more of the limited transmission capability into PJM East  
20                        than is suggested by Mr. Frame’s pro-rata methodology.
- 21           12.     Mr. Frame’s unrealistic representation of planned and forced generating  
22                        unit outages in his modeling tends to overstate system reliability. He fails  
23                        to consider situations that are “worse than average” at all. In fact, during  
24                        “tight” conditions market power will tend to be much worse than it is  
25                        during average conditions.
- 26           13.     The results of Mr. Frame’s modeling are distorted by his use of generic  
27                        industry nuclear unit forced outage rates [                        REDACTED  
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2 ] The  
3 inappropriate use of these generic, industry-average forced and scheduled  
4 outage rates for Exelon’s nuclear units leads Mr. Frame to understate the  
5 amount of capacity that would be owned by Exelon pre-merger and by the  
6 combined company post-merger and post-mitigation. It also leads Mr.  
7 Frame to understate the combined company’s post-merger and post-  
8 mitigation market shares.

9 14. Mr. Frame ignores the proposed power increase proposed for the Hope  
10 Creek nuclear unit in 2006. This leads him to further understate the  
11 amount of capacity that would be owned by the combined company if the  
12 merger is closed or by PSEG if there is no merger.

13 15. Mr. Frame fails to model the increased performance of the Salem and  
14 Hope Creek nuclear units that the Petitioners claim will result from the  
15 proposed merger.

16 16. We have recalculated Mr. Frame’s modeling to reflect: (1) the proposed  
17 power uprate at Hope Creek in 2006, (2) the nuclear improvements in  
18 performance at both Salem and Hope Creek that the Petitioners claim will  
19 result from the merger, (3) the recent performance of Exelon’s nuclear  
20 units, and (4) the use of an economic allocation of the transmission import  
21 capability across the PJM East interface.

22 17. Making just the above four realistic corrections, all three of Mr. Frame’s  
23 Mitigation Scenarios would fail the FERC Appendix A Screening  
24 Analyses performed by Mr. Frame. In some hours, Mr. Frame’s Mitigation  
25 Scenarios would fail the FERC Appendix A Screening by significant  
26 margins.

- 1           18.    Mr. Frame’s modeling does not reflect the potential for the combined  
2                    company to make forward capacity purchases that would enhance its  
3                    ability to exercise market power.
- 4           19.    Mr. Frame’s modeling does not accurately represent the pre-merger and  
5                    post-mitigation levels of concentration in the PJM East capacity market  
6                    because he unrealistically and unreasonably assigns none of the 7,300  
7                    MW of transmission import capability across the PJM East interface to  
8                    Exelon, PSEG or the combined company that would be created by the  
9                    proposed merger.
- 10          20.    PJM recently filed at the FERC a proposal for new capacity markets,  
11                    called the Reliability Pricing Model. The Reliability Pricing Model will  
12                    involve a complicated series of four capacity auctions for each twelve  
13                    month delivery year for each appropriate locational sub-areas within PJM.  
14                    Eventually, there could be as many as 23 sub-areas within PJM, eleven of  
15                    which would be within PJM East. New Jersey alone would have five of  
16                    these sub-areas. It is possible that the FERC may require substantial  
17                    revisions to the PJM proposal.
- 18          21.    The Petitioners have not filed any analyses in this proceeding to show that  
19                    EEG would not be able to exercise market power within the locational  
20                    capacity markets that would be created under the Reliability Pricing  
21                    Model.
- 22          22.    EEG clearly would be the dominant firm within the Northern PSEG  
23                    locational capacity sub-area of PJM East that would be created under the  
24                    Reliability Pricing Model proposal.
- 25          23.    The Petitioners have not provided a complete analysis of the potential  
26                    impact of the proposed merger on the Northern New Jersey energy market.



- 1           27.    In order to test the impact of the proposed merger in a wider range of  
2                    possible mitigation scenarios, we have modeled the changes in  
3                    concentration levels in PJM East in three realistic scenarios in which  
4                    parties that are currently substantial participants in PJM purchase the  
5                    capacity that would be divested by the combined company. In the three  
6                    new mitigation scenarios that we have modeled, the changes from pre-  
7                    merger to post-mitigation market concentrations fail the FERC Appendix  
8                    A Screening Analysis in all ten hours studied under both Mr. Frame’s  
9                    assumptions and our more realistic inputs assumptions concerning future  
10                   nuclear performance and the allocation of the limited transmission  
11                   capability across the PJM East interface.
- 12           28.    The Petitioners have not presented any analysis of the ability of the  
13                   company created by the merger, EEG, to exercise market power in the  
14                   New Jersey BGS auctions.
- 15           29.    Our modeling shows that there already exists a significant potential for  
16                   market power in PJM East because of PSEG’s substantial market share.  
17                   However, the proposed merger can be expected to make the situation  
18                   worse, even with the Petitioners’ proposed levels of virtual and actual  
19                   divestiture. The amount by which the proposed merger will increase the  
20                   ability of EEG to exercise market power will depend on the identities of  
21                   the parties that actually purchase this divested capacity.
- 22           30.    The merged company could earn additional revenues in the electric energy  
23                   markets to the detriment of ratepayers if it were able to exercise market  
24                   power in gas markets.
- 25           31.    PJM only has a limited ability to ensure that market price outcomes are  
26                   competitive and that participants are not exercising market power through  
27                   strategic bidding or the withholding of otherwise available capacity.  
28                   Therefore, the BPU cannot rely on PJM to effectively mitigate the exercise

1 of market power by the combined company that would be created by the  
2 merger.

3 32. The Petitioners have estimated that the merger would result in  
4 approximately \$170 million of additional pre-tax earnings annually due to  
5 nuclear synergies and improved nuclear performance. Of the \$170 million  
6 of additional nuclear-related earnings projected by the Petitioners as  
7 resulting from the proposed merger, approximately \$100 million would be  
8 savings from nuclear cost reductions and roughly \$70 million would be  
9 from nuclear production improvements. However, given current electricity  
10 forwards prices, the Petitioners may earn another \$20-30 million more  
11 each year, based on anticipated nuclear production improvements in 2006  
12 and 2007.

13 33. It is possible that wholesale prices could be raised by more than one  
14 percent through the increased market power resulting from the proposed  
15 merger. This one percent increase in wholesale prices would amount to  
16 approximately \$64 million per year in higher rates for New Jersey  
17 consumers.

18 34. Petitioners' claimed \$12 million average annual savings from the  
19 proposed merger for the years 2006-2009 for New Jersey electric utility  
20 consumers could be wiped out if wholesale market prices were raised by  
21 approximately one-fifth of one percent as a result of the increased market  
22 power from the merger.

23 35. The BPU has the opportunity to consider all aspects of the proposed  
24 merger in the immediate proceeding. However, as filed by the Petitioners,  
25 the merger proposal allows many variables that are critically important to  
26 market power analysis to be settled after regulatory approvals have been  
27 issued and the merger is completed. If it approves the merger, the BPU  
28 may be forced to take a fragmented and narrow approach to mitigation. A

1           petition by the BPU to the FERC to review the situation and take  
2           necessary and appropriate action, such as determining whether appropriate  
3           generating units were divested or ordering divestment of different or  
4           additional generating facilities, would certainly be less effective than  
5           preventing the damages that could result from the exercise of merger-  
6           related market power in the first place.

7   **Q.    What is your overall conclusion?**

8   A.    Under the Petitioners' proposed mitigation plan, it is reasonable to expect that the  
9         combined company created by the proposed merger will be able to exercise  
10        market power in the relevant energy and capacity markets. For this reason, we  
11        recommend that the BPU reject the proposed merger.

12 **Q.    If the merger is approved, what actions should the BPU take to mitigate the**  
13 **potential exercise of market power by EEG in the Northern New Jersey and**  
14 **PJM East energy and capacity markets?**

15 A.    If it decides to approve the proposed merger, the BPU should require the  
16        following:

- 17        ▪       There should be no virtual divestiture. All divestiture should involve the  
18                actual sale of ownership of capacity and energy.
- 19        ▪       The amount of capacity that would have to be divested as part of the  
20                merger should be based on Synapse input assumptions and a strategic  
21                bidding analysis.
- 22        ▪       The amount of capacity that would have to be divested also should be  
23                based on the actual units to be divested.
- 24        ▪       The BPU should set limits on the parties that could purchase the divested  
25                capacity.
- 26        ▪       The PJM Market Monitoring Unit's suggestions about expanding the  
27                application of bid capping and/or bidding at marginal cost should be  
28                adopted.

- 1           ▪       The Petitioners should agree that after the merger is closed, the BPU  
2                    would retain the same jurisdiction to address market power issues as it has  
3                    before the merger.
- 4           ▪       The BPU should conduct more detailed oversight of the BGS auction  
5                    process in order to permit a meaningful investigation of whether any post-  
6                    merger bidders, including EEG, exercise market power in the annual BGS  
7                    auctions.

8   **III. THE PROPOSED MERGER WILL CREATE A**  
9   **DOMINANT NEW COMPANY IN PJM AND PJM**  
10 **EAST**

11 **Q.   Please describe the size of the combined company that would be created by**  
12 **the proposed merger.**

13 A.   The proposed merger between Exelon and PSEG is enormous in its scope and in  
14       its implications for the PJM markets generally and for customers in PJM East in  
15       particular. According to Petitioners' Exhibit RF-8, Exelon and PSEG currently  
16       own 26,437 MW and 14,037 MW, respectively, in Expanded PJM. These  
17       amounts of capacity represent 15.0 percent and 8.0 percent of the total capacity in  
18       Expanded PJM.<sup>1</sup> Post-merger, the combined capacity of the new company, EEG,  
19       would total approximately 40,475 MW.<sup>2</sup> As shown in Exhibit RF-8, this would  
20       give EEG approximately 23.0 percent of the total capacity in Expanded PJM,  
21       during the summer of 2006.<sup>3</sup>

22       As we will explain later in this testimony, the company created by the merger,  
23       EEG, would still maintain control over the nuclear capacity that would be  
24       virtually divested as part of the Petitioners' proposed mitigation. However, even if  
25       the Petitioners' divested 6,600 MW as they claim they will do as part of their  
26       revised mitigation plan, EEG would still own 34,000 MW, or approximately 19.2  
27       percent, of the total capacity in Expanded PJM. Thus, even if EEG actually

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<sup>1</sup> Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame, Exhibit RF-8 (Revised), page 2 of 2.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

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1 divested 6,600 MW of capacity, it would remain the largest capacity owner in  
2 Expanded PJM and, depending on the parties that purchased the divested  
3 capacity, could still be 50 percent larger than any other generation supplier in  
4 PJM Expanded.<sup>4</sup>

5 The capacity shares owned by Exelon and PSEG in PJM East are even higher.  
6 Prior to the merger, Exelon owns 18 percent and PSEG owns 25 percent of the  
7 capacity in PJM East, putting their combined capacity share at 43 percent.<sup>5</sup> Even  
8 if the Petitioners divest 5,500 MW in PJM East as they claim they will do as part  
9 of their revised mitigation, the EEG still would own 11,900 MW of capacity, or  
10 approximately 28.7 percent, of the capacity in PJM East, during the summer of  
11 2006. Depending on which parties purchase the divested capacity, EEG could  
12 still be three times as large as the next largest competitor in PJM East.

13 **IV. THE BPU SHOULD NOT RELY ON THE FERC'S**  
14 **MARKET POWER FINDINGS**

15 **Q. Does the FERC's approval of the merger on July 1, 2005 eliminate the need**  
16 **for the BPU to review market power issues?**

17 A. No. The BPU is still required, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 48:2-51.1, to examine the  
18 impact of the proposed merger on competition, rates, service and employees.

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame, Exhibit RF-8 (Revised), page 1 of 2.

1 **Q. Should the BPU nevertheless rely on the FERC’s finding concerning the**  
2 **impact of the proposed merger on the ability of the combined company to**  
3 **exercise market power?**

4 A. No. For the following reasons, the BPU should not rely on the FERC’s finding  
5 that the merger, even with the mitigation proposed, will not harm competition in  
6 any relevant energy market.<sup>6</sup>

- 7 • The FERC applied a different standard than the BPU will apply in this  
8 proceeding.
- 9 • The FERC’s decision to approve the merger relies on its ability to address  
10 market power problems after they occur. The BPU’s ability to redress  
11 damages that will likely result from the proposed merger and that may not  
12 be recoverable at a later time is uncertain; hence, it cannot afford to adopt  
13 the FERC’s reactive approach. The BPU should address all of the  
14 implications of the merger before such costs are incurred.
- 15 • The FERC does not address potential market power problems that could  
16 arise at retail.
- 17 • The FERC relied solely on Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (“HHIs”), an  
18 approximate and contested measure of market concentration and market  
19 power (discussed in more detail below).
- 20 • The record before the FERC was inadequate to determine whether the  
21 combined company created by the merger would be able to exercise  
22 market power in the PJM energy and capacity markets and in the New  
23 Jersey BGS auction.

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<sup>6</sup> *FERC July 1, 2005 Order Authorizing Merger Under Section 203 of the Federal Power Act, Docket No. EC05-43-000, (“FERC Order Authorizing Merger”)* at Paragraph 120. Several parties, including the Ratepayer Advocate, have filed motions for rehearing of the FERC’s Order of July 1, 2005. These motions are pending at the FERC.

1 **Q. Please describe the different standards being applied by the FERC and the**  
2 **BPU in evaluating the proposed Exelon-PSEG merger.**

3 A. The BPU has stated that it will apply a positive benefits standard for reviewing  
4 the proposed merger.<sup>7</sup> Under that standard, the BPU must find that the proposed  
5 merger will provide a positive benefit for ratepayers. In addition, there must be a  
6 minimum of no adverse impact on the criteria used in the evaluation of the  
7 merger.<sup>8</sup>

8 The FERC, on the other hand, does not apply a positive benefits standard when  
9 evaluating whether a proposed merger is in the public interest. In fact, the  
10 FERC's merger guidelines specifically allow a proposed merger to increase the  
11 extent of concentration in the markets being examined, as long as those increases  
12 fall within prescribed limits. Consequently, the FERC is essentially concerned  
13 that proposed mitigation restores the concentration in the markets being examined  
14 to "near pre-merger levels" and has approved proposed mergers even if they make  
15 the relevant market(s) more concentrated.<sup>9</sup>

16 **Q. If the proposed merger is consummated, would the FERC retain jurisdiction**  
17 **over the new merged company to address market power issues?**

18 A. Yes. The FERC would continue to have the authority over EEG under Section  
19 203(b) and 309 of the Federal Power Act to address market power issues. In fact,  
20 the FERC's July 1, 2005 Order approving the proposed merger noted that the  
21 FERC specifically retained jurisdiction over market power issues and specifically  
22 directed the Petitioners to submit a number of compliance filings to address  
23 certain issues raised in the Order:

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<sup>7</sup> Transcript of BPU Session of June 22, 2005, at pages 8-9.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> *FERC Order Authorizing Merger*, at Paragraph No. 132, on page 45, and Paragraph No. 139, on page 48.

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- 1           ▪       Petitioners must agree that, if the virtual divestiture does not in fact  
2                   mitigate the problems identified, Petitioners will propose to the  
3                   Commission mitigation that will mitigate the problems identified.<sup>10</sup>
- 4           ▪       Moreover, Petitioners have committed to provide an Appendix A analysis  
5                   of the merger’s effect on competition, based on the actual acquirers of the  
6                   actual divested assets, once they are known. We rely on that commitment  
7                   in making our finding that the divestiture adequately mitigates any  
8                   merger-related harm to competition in the relevant energy markets. If the  
9                   analysis shows that the merger’s harm to competition has not been  
10                  sufficiently mitigated, we will require additional mitigation at that time,  
11                  pursuant to our authority under FPA.<sup>11</sup>
- 12          ▪       We reject arguments that we should address in this proceeding whether  
13                  Petitioners will pass the Commission’s market-based rates screen. Any  
14                  issues regarding Petitioners’ generation market dominance will be  
15                  addressed in the pending proceeding on Exelon’s triennial review filing,  
16                  and in future similar proceedings.<sup>12</sup>
- 17          ▪       Therefore, when the Commission approves a new capacity market for  
18                  PJM, we will require Petitioners to submit a new analysis of the merger’s  
19                  effect on the PJM capacity market and, if the analysis shows that the  
20                  merger-related harm to competition is not fully mitigated, propose a new  
21                  mitigation plan for the Commission’s approval within 30 days of such  
22                  approvals.<sup>13</sup>
- 23          The FERC also would retain the jurisdiction under Section 205 of the Federal  
24          Power Act to authorize the new company to sell power at market based rates.

25   **Q.    What evidence did the Petitioners present at the FERC on market power**  
26   **issues?**

- 27   A.    The Petitioners presented two analyses at the FERC through the testimony of Dr.  
28           Hieronymus and Mr. Frame, which attempted to show that the proposed merger  
29           will meet the FERC’s Appendix A guidelines in terms of post-merger  
30           concentration. They did so by examining pre-merger, post-merger and post-  
31           mitigation HHIs. The HHI is the sum of the squares of individual firms’ market

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<sup>10</sup>       Ibid., at paragraph no. 134, at page 46.

<sup>11</sup>       Ibid., at paragraph no. 142, at page 49 and paragraph no. 178, on page 61.

<sup>12</sup>       Ibid., at paragraph no. 145, at page 50.

<sup>13</sup>       Ibid., at paragraph no. 167, at page 57.

1 shares. The higher the index number, the greater the level of concentration and  
2 the more likely that market power will be a problem.

3 **Q. What are the FERC Appendix A guidelines?**

4 A. The FERC guidelines address three ranges of HHIs. If the post-merger HHI is  
5 below 1000, regardless of the change in HHI, the FERC will find that the merger  
6 is unlikely to have adverse competitive effects. If the post-merger HHI lies  
7 between 1000 and 1800 (considered a moderately concentrated market by the  
8 FERC's standards), the FERC will approve a proposed merger even if it increases  
9 HHIs by 100 points or less. Finally, if the post-merger HHI is greater than 1800  
10 (considered a highly concentrated market), the FERC will approve a proposed  
11 merger even if it increases HHIs by 50 points or less.<sup>14</sup>

12 **Q. What are the weaknesses in HHI analyses?**

13 A. Although HHIs are a useful measure that can serve as a starting point in analyses  
14 of market power, they are only rough illustrations of relative market  
15 concentration. HHI calculations are based on a limited set of snapshots of the  
16 markets examined in terms of load, resources, and transmission capacities. It can  
17 reasonably be expected that there will be situations during a typical year when  
18 loads and transmission capacities differ from those studied and actual post-merger  
19 market shares will be higher than the HHI analysis predicted. Moreover, HHIs do  
20 not take into account the many complexities that can exist in the current electric  
21 energy and capacity markets. The most significant failure of HHI calculations is  
22 their inability to recognize strategic bidding or the withholding of otherwise  
23 available capacity in order to increase market clearing prices.

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<sup>14</sup> FERC Order No. 592, Issued December 18, 1996, at page 61.

1 **Q. Are there any factors specific to this proposed merger that make reliance**  
2 **upon HHIs as a measure of market concentration a particular concern?**

3 A. Yes. In this case, because the post-merger market will be dominated by a single  
4 huge company, the focus on HHIs as a measure of market concentration in  
5 judging the merger is problematic. In our testimony, we do calculate and present  
6 HHI results in order to provide context for and rebuttal to Mr. Frame's analysis,  
7 and we also present some simulation modeling results of our own that illustrate  
8 the possible impact upon prices. However, in the case of this particular merger it  
9 must be noted that the commonly used concentration measure may be even more  
10 limited than usual, and perhaps quite misleading. Specifically, the HHI is defined  
11 as the sum of the squares of the market shares of individual companies in a  
12 market. Where there are several large companies they will all contribute  
13 significantly to the HHI calculated for the total market, and they will compete  
14 with each other. In this case, the post-merger market (e.g., in PJM East) will be  
15 characterized by one large firm (EEG) and many significantly smaller firms. In  
16 this sort of market it is possible that the single large firm could dominate the  
17 market, with the smaller firms unable to provide an adequate competitive threat to  
18 the dominant firm.

19 Consider the following concentration figures for capacity in PJM East from Mr.  
20 Frame's Exhibit RF-8 (revised). Mr. Frame shows pre-merger that Exelon and  
21 PSEG have 17.2 percent and 24.6 percent capacity market shares, respectively. In  
22 the next tier of firms are PEPCO, PPL and Reliant, at 7.5 percent, 6.4 percent, and  
23 5.9 percent, respectively. Companies of this size are competitors with the two  
24 large firms, but they simply don't compare in size to either Exelon or PSEG, and  
25 certainly not with a post-merger EEG. Market dynamics can be quite complex  
26 and in general, lower levels of concentration as measured by the HHI are  
27 preferable. There is, however, a sense in which a market with a single mega-firm  
28 and second tier of smaller firms could be subject to problems not reflected in the  
29 HHI measure. For example, the large firm could have knowledge of market

1 transactions and prices that is not available to the smaller competitors. There  
2 could be market leader and follower dynamics, in which the large firm is able to  
3 influence the market price to an extent that would not be possible in a market with  
4 two similarly sized large firms but an equivalent HHI.

5 **Q. Did the FERC’s approval of the proposed merger based on the Petitioners’**  
6 **HHI analyses conflict in any way with its prior statements concerning relying**  
7 **solely on HHI concentration ratios?**

8 A. Yes. The FERC had previously noted that the HHI screening tool was “not  
9 infallible” and “in some cases may not detect certain market power problems.”<sup>15</sup>  
10 The FERC also has stated that the HHI Guidelines are “just that, guidelines” and  
11 that “It is reasoned analysis, not blind faith in the [HHI concentration] thresholds,  
12 that must carry the day.”<sup>16</sup>

13 These cautious statements contrast starkly with the FERC’s complete reliance on  
14 HHI concentration figures in its review of the proposed Exelon-PSEG merger, its  
15 approval of HHI-determined mitigation, and its refusal to even hold hearings to  
16 examine in detail the validity of the Petitioners’ HHI analyses.

17 **Q. Has the BPU reached any conclusions regarding whether the record before**  
18 **the FERC was adequate for determining that the proposed merger was in the**  
19 **public interest?**

20 A. Yes. The comments and testimony filed at the FERC by the BPU found that the  
21 evidence that had been presented by the Petitioners was inadequate for  
22 determining that the proposed merger was in the public interest. For example, the  
23 BPU’s May 27, 2005 Comments to the FERC noted the following deficiencies in  
24 the record:

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<sup>15</sup> *FERC Policy Statement Establishing the Factors the Commission will Consider in Evaluating Whether a Proposed Merger is Consistent with the Public Interest, December 18, 1996*, at page 25.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, at page 76.

**Biewald-Fagan-Schlissel Direct Testimony**  
**BPU Docket No. EM05020106**  
**OAL Docket No. PUC-1874-05**

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- 1           •       The Petitioners have proposed a variety of complicated and novel  
2                   mitigation measures, the exact shape and results of which, as explained  
3                   below and in the accompanying testimony, cannot be known on the  
4                   current record.<sup>17</sup>
- 5           •       Record evidence raises troubling concerns that the Petitioners may be able  
6                   to exercise market power in the electric generating capacity market.<sup>18</sup>
- 7           •       The Petitioners have provided very little analysis of their market power or  
8                   the state of the market post-transaction in the electric generating installed  
9                   capacity (“ICAP”) market.<sup>19</sup>
- 10          •       Record evidence raises troubling concerns that the Petitioners may be able  
11                   to exercise market power in the electric energy market.<sup>20</sup>
- 12          •       The BPU does not believe a determination can be made that the  
13                   Transaction is in the public interest without much more data and  
14                   investigation concerning the impacts the merger could have on the energy  
15                   markets under each outcome permitted by the Petitioners’ flexible  
16                   proposal.<sup>21</sup>
- 17          •       The BPU urges the Commission to set the issue of whether the Petitioners  
18                   sliding scale divestiture can be made to effectively address market power.  
19                   The existing record is simply not sufficient to take a leap of faith on  
20                   virtual divestiture combined with substituted retirements.<sup>22</sup>
- 21          •       The record is not adequate to determine that Petitioners would be unable  
22                   to exercise vertical market power through the use of electric transmission  
23                   or natural gas pipeline capacity.<sup>23</sup>
- 24          •       The Petitioners fail to address the concerns of the BPU, among other  
25                   intervenors, that the Petitioners will be able to use their possibly dominant  
26                   position in upstream gas pipeline capacity and electric transmission  
27                   ownership and control to raise barriers to entry, to raise rivals’ costs or to  
28                   cause other competitive harm.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> *New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Comments in Support of Hearing and in Response to the Petitioners’ Answer and Supplement to their Section 203 Application*, FERC Docket No. EC05-43-000, dated May 27, 2005, at page 2.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., at page 10.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., at page 10.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., at page 13.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., at pages 14 and 15.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., at page 18.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., at page 18.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., at page 18.

**Biewald-Fagan-Schlissel Direct Testimony**

**BPU Docket No. EM05020106**

**OAL Docket No. PUC-1874-05**

**REDACTED VERSION**  
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- 1           •       When the BPU, however, reviews those points in the Petitioners’ market  
2           power mitigation proposal that may be exploited, the BPU is concerned  
3           that more evidence must be developed to determine whether the  
4           Petitioners’ proposal satisfies the public interest standard. For instance,  
5           the Petitioners don’t propose divestiture of specific units, but of several of  
6           many units; the Petitioners don’t propose straight forward divestiture, but  
7           instead of sliding scale including real divestiture, “virtual divestiture,” and  
8           retirements; in response to concerns over their dominant position in  
9           upstream gas pipeline capacity, the Petitioners answer that short-term,  
10          interruptible transportation service will be available. Perhaps one item  
11          requiring a leap of faith by itself would not raise the same degree of public  
12          interest concern. These less than plenary responses to legitimate market  
13          power concerns taken together with the Petitioners’ dominant position in  
14          electric transmission within PJM raise numerous alarms and should be  
15          explored.<sup>25</sup>
- 16          •       The record is inadequate to determine the sufficiency of the Petitioners’  
17          claim that the Transaction would produce competitive efficiencies that  
18          will benefit the public interest.<sup>26</sup>
- 19          •       There are many permutations that the Petitioners’ novel, shape-shifting  
20          proposal would permit. Based on the record before the Commission, these  
21          myriad permutations have not been adequately defined and need to be  
22          explored through discovery, testimony and cross-examination at  
23          hearings.<sup>27</sup>

24       **Q.    Have the Petitioners presented in their testimony, exhibits or data responses**  
25       **in this proceeding any of the evidence that the BPU has said was lacking in**  
26       **the record at the FERC?**

27       A.    No. In their testimony in this proceeding the Petitioners have ignored the BPU’s  
28       desire to see such additional information. Instead, the Petitioners have merely  
29       filed an HHI analysis by Mr. Rodney Frame that is similar to the HHI screening  
30       analysis that they presented at the FERC. The Petitioners have not provided in  
31       their testimony or data responses any of the specific information identified by the  
32       BPU in its Comments on the merger Application before the FERC or any analyses  
33       showing that EEG will not be able to profitably exercise market power in the PJM

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., at pages 19-20.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., at page 20.

1 energy and/or capacity markets or the New Jersey BGS auctions through strategic  
2 bidding or physical withholding.

3 **Q. What evidence does the Board need to determine if EEG will be able to**  
4 **profitably exercise market power in the PJM energy and/or capacity markets**  
5 **or in the New Jersey BGS auctions?**

6 A. Horizontal market power in electricity can arise from horizontal concentration in  
7 generation. A key mechanism for exploiting horizontal market power is for a  
8 large firm to raise market prices by withholding capacity from the market, raising  
9 the market price and thereby increasing profits over competitive-market levels.  
10 The withholding can be "physical," such as declaring a unit to be out of service,  
11 or "economic," such as bidding some capacity at high prices that effectively  
12 remove it from the dispatch. Sophisticated strategies can be developed in which  
13 bidding generation into the market is done in order to maximize profits -- with  
14 bids differing by hour and tailored to create and exploit transmission constraints.

15 A proper analysis of the market power implications of the proposed Exelon-PSEG  
16 merger would require an energy simulation model to look at the hourly behavior  
17 of the market under a wide variety of external conditions and bidding behaviors.  
18 Such a more realistic model would provide better insight into potential market  
19 power concerns than just the idealized HHI calculations presented by Mr. Frame  
20 on behalf of the Petitioners.

21 Simulation models can be useful in directly analyzing market power, given the  
22 specific characteristics of a market such as the number of suppliers and their  
23 production facilities and cost structure. Such models help us to understand likely  
24 market behavior in particular cases, and to examine the ability of firms in the  
25 market to profitably raise prices. If a simulation model shows that it is not  
26 profitable for any individual firm to raise its prices significantly above its

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., at page 22.

1 marginal costs, that finding would offer some comfort that the market will be  
2 adequately competitive. If, on the other hand, simulations show that it is  
3 profitable for individual large firms to increase prices significantly above  
4 marginal costs, then there is cause for concern. In this case, models can be  
5 helpful for understanding the extent of the market power problem and exploring  
6 the effectiveness of various remedies.

7 **Q. What specific analyses should be undertaken with such a simulation model?**

8 A. The analyses that need to be performed prior to any approvals of this  
9 proposed merger include the following:

- 10 • Simulation with an hourly model that would represent generating unit  
11 outages probabilistically rather than as simple deratings of capacity.
- 12 • Analysis of a full range of input assumptions for system conditions such as  
13 generating unit and transmission line outages, loads, and markets prices.
- 14 • Consideration of possible strategies for the dominant firms to exercise  
15 market power by the physical and/or economic withholding of capacity of  
16 different types in different time periods.
- 17 • Analysis that includes the specific details of current (and possible future)  
18 market mitigation procedures and bid capping.
- 19 • Examination of a longer time frame than calendar year 2006 in order to  
20 reflect such changed circumstances as planned power plant additions and  
21 retirements, load growth, transmission system enhancements, and the  
22 addition of increased transmission links to New York State such as the  
23 proposed 600 MW HVDC Neptune Project from New Jersey to Long  
24 Island.
- 25 • Examination of divestiture scenarios in which the implications of  
26 divesting different sets of generating units are explored.
- 27 • Detailed analysis of specific constrained areas, including Northern New  
28 Jersey.
- 29 • Detailed analysis of the capacity markets recognizing that PJM has  
30 recently proposed a new capacity market structure. This analysis should  
31 include specific mitigation plans for addressing the market power of the  
32 merged companies in the proposed PJM capacity markets.

- 1           •       A rigorous analysis of the effectiveness of the Petitioners’ proposed  
2                   “virtual divestiture” that would consider the distinctions between  
3                   ownership and control, and the likely effects of power sales of different  
4                   durations.

5       **Q.    Have you seen any instances in which the results of simulation modeling have**  
6       **been submitted to the FERC and a state regulatory commission in support of**  
7       **a proposed merger?**

8       A.    Yes. In support of their request for approval to merge, Allegheny Power System  
9           and Duquesne Light Company presented the results of their simulation modeling  
10          of bidding behavior to the FERC and the Pennsylvania Public Utilities  
11          Commission.<sup>28</sup> This modeling used the GE MAPS model to analyze cases in  
12          which generators offered their power at bid prices above marginal cost.

13      **Q.    Have you seen any instances in which Mr. Frame has used a simulation**  
14      **model to examine the potential for strategic bidding?**

15      A.    Yes. In testimony submitted to the Missouri Public Service Commission in  
16          February 1998 and the Mississippi Public Service Commission in August 1998,  
17          Mr. Frame used production cost analyses to conduct a behavioral analysis, which  
18          sought to assess whether a company acting unilaterally might be able to exercise  
19          market power in energy markets.<sup>29</sup>

20      **Q.    Would the BPU have the ability to redress the exercise of market power by**  
21      **EEG in the annual BGS auctions?**

22      A.    Not really. It is not reasonable to expect that the BPU will be able to identify the  
23          exercise of market power by EEG and act within the very limited time in which it  
24          has to review and approve the results of each year’s BGS auction.

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<sup>28</sup> Testimony of Dr. Pifer in FERC Docket No. EC97-46-000, at pages 54 and 55.

<sup>29</sup> *Report of Ameren to the Public Service Commission of Missouri on Market Power Issues*, dated February 27, 1998, at pages 64-67, and , dated February 27, 1998, at pages 64-67, and *Report to the Mississippi Public Service Commission on Retail Market Power Issues*, dated August 1998, at page 65-69. Both of these documents were provided in PSEG’s response to RAR-MKT-81(b).

1 **V. DEFICIENCIES IN MR. FRAME’S ANALYSIS**

2 **Q: Do you have any concerns with the market concentration analysis submitted**  
3 **on behalf of the Petitioners?**

4 A: Yes. Mr. Frame’s modeling results misrepresent the current state of the PJM East  
5 energy market as well as the likely state of the market after the merger.

6 **V.A. Mr. Frame’s Modeling Understates the Level of Concentration in**  
7 **the PJM East Energy Market**

8 **Q. Does Mr. Frame’s modeling in this proceeding accurately represent the pre-**  
9 **merger levels of concentration in the PJM East Energy Market?**

10 A. No. Mr. Frame’s modeling understates the pre-merger levels of concentration in  
11 the PJM East Energy market.

12 Table 1 below compares the pre-merger HHIs for the PJM East energy market  
13 developed for the year 2006 by Mr. Frame to the historical market concentration  
14 data published by the PJM Market Monitoring Unit for 2003 and 2004. (“PJM  
15 MMU”).

16 **Table 1: PJM East Energy Market – Mr. Frame’s HHI Results vs. Historical**  
17 **PJM Data**

	Frame-Projected HHI for the Year 2006 <sup>30</sup>	PJM MMU Data for the Year 2003 <sup>31</sup>	PJM MMU Data for the Year 2004 <sup>32</sup>
High	1531	2500	1980
Low	989	1300	1156
Average		1935	1568

18

19 Thus, the PJM MMU data in Table 1 indicate a substantially more concentrated  
20 market than Mr. Frame’s HHI results imply. In fact, the high ends of the PJM

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<sup>30</sup> Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame, Exhibit RF-6 (Revised).

<sup>31</sup> PJM Market Monitoring Unit, *2003 State of the Market Report*, at page 42.

1 MMU data suggest that the PJM East energy market was very highly concentrated  
2 for some hours during the years 2003 and 2004.

3 As shown in Table 1, the *average* historical HHIs for the PJM East Energy market  
4 for 2003 were higher than the *high* ends of the pre-merger HHIs calculated by Mr.  
5 Frame. The average historical HHI for the PJM East Energy market for 2004 was  
6 approximately the same as the high end of Mr. Frame's calculated pre-merger  
7 HHIs.

8 **Q. Do any scheduled increases in transmission system import capability into**  
9 **PJM East or planned new generation facilities explain or justify the**  
10 **differences between the actual PJM East 2003 and 2004 energy market**  
11 **HHIs and the substantially lower level of market concentration in PJM**  
12 **East suggested for 2006 by Mr. Frame's analyses?**

13 A. No.

14 **Q. Has the BPU expressed concern about the existing levels of concentration in**  
15 **the PJM markets?**

16 A. Yes. In its comments to the FERC, the BPU noted that the data presented in the  
17 PJM 2004 State of the Market Report already raised red flags on market power  
18 issues before the merger.<sup>33</sup>

19 **Q. What is the significance of the differences between Mr. Frame's pre-merger**  
20 **modeling results and actual historical PJM data?**

21 A. The significant differences with historical PJM data on pre-merger market  
22 concentrations call into question the validity of all of Mr. Frame's modeling of the

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<sup>32</sup> PJM Market Monitoring Unit, *2004 State of the Market Report*, at page 58.

<sup>33</sup> *New Jersey Board of Public Utilities Comments in Support of Hearing and in Response to the Petitioners' Answer and Supplement to their Section 203 Application*, FERC Docket No. EC05-43-000, dated May 27, 2005, at page 13.

1 PJM system post-merger and post-mitigation market concentrations. Moreover,  
2 these differences lead Mr. Frame to understate the amount of capacity that must  
3 be divested by EEG in order to satisfy the HHI market screen criteria that Mr.  
4 Frame is attempting to satisfy.

5 **V.B. Flaws and Weaknesses in Mr. Frame’s HHI Modeling**

6 **Q. Has Synapse identified any specific flaws in the HHI modeling presented by**  
7 **Mr. Frame?**

8 A. Yes. We have identified a number of serious flaws in Mr. Frame’s modeling that  
9 render the results of his HHI analyses unrealistic and that cause him to understate  
10 the post-merger and post-mitigation levels of concentration in the PJM East  
11 energy market:

- 12 ▪ Mr. Frame’s analysis relies on an idealized estimate of market  
13 concentration using one measure, the HHI, which fails to recognize  
14 strategic bidding or the withholding of otherwise available capacity in  
15 order to increase market clearing prices (as noted in the previous section).
- 16 ▪ The use of a proportional methodology for allocating the limited  
17 transmission import capability across PJM’s Eastern Interconnection tends  
18 to understate EEG’s share of capacity imports and its total market  
19 presence.
- 20 ▪ Mr. Frame assumes that the capacity from all of the generating units being  
21 modeled will be available to serve load in his targeted geographic areas  
22 and would not already be committed to serving other load or because it is  
23 being diverted to other areas for economic reasons. Market concentration  
24 measures based on this assumption will not accurately reflect the amount  
25 of capacity that can actively compete in the market.
- 26 ▪ Mr. Frame’s failure to reflect transmission system outages or deratings  
27 misrepresents the amount of capacity that can reach markets or loads.
- 28 ▪ The treatment of forced and planned outages as a reduction of capacity in  
29 all hours tends to minimize the effect of outages during peak hours.

30 ▪ [

31 REDACTED

32 ]

- 1           ▪       The analysis fails to fully reflect the expected improved output from the  
2                   Salem and Hope Creek nuclear units as a result of the proposed merger  
3                   and hence understates market concentration.
- 4           ▪       Likewise, the failure to reflect proposed nuclear unit capacity uprates<sup>34</sup>  
5                   understates EEG's market share.
- 6           ▪       EEG's purchases of capacity from other PJM participants should be  
7                   reflected in the market concentration analysis, because under certain  
8                   circumstances these purchases can enhance a firm's ability to exercise  
9                   market power. Mr. Frame fails to model these purchases.

10           Each of these points will be addressed below.

11   **V.B.1 Mr. Frame Uses a Methodology to Allocate Limited Transmission Import**  
12   **Capability that Leads Him to Understate the Concentration of the PJM East**  
13   **Energy Market**

14   **Q.     Why should the BPU be concerned about the methodology used by Mr.**  
15   **Frame to allocate the limited transmission capability into PJM East?**

16   A.     The BPU should be concerned because the potential ability of EEG to exercise  
17           market power will depend not only on the generating resources that it would own  
18           within PJM East. It also would depend on how much of the limited transmission  
19           import capability into PJM East that the merged company will be able to use to  
20           effectively flow power from its low cost nuclear facilities located elsewhere in  
21           PJM. As we will show below, the pro-rata allocation methodology used by Mr.  
22           Frame in his analyses of the proposed merger understates the amount of power  
23           that the Petitioners can be expected to be able to import effectively into PJM East  
24           as compared to an economic allocation methodology in which the lowest cost  
25           power would be expected to gain preferential access to the limited transmission  
26           into PJM East.

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<sup>34</sup> An uprate is an increase in a generating unit's Net Dependable Capacity.

1 **Q. What methodology does Mr. Frame use in his energy market analyses to**  
2 **allocate the limited transmission import capability into PJM East?**

3 A. He uses what he calls a “proportional” method to allocate limited transmission  
4 import capability. This means that he allocates to each supplier a share of the  
5 limited capability equal to the supplier’s share of all generation deemed to be  
6 competing to use the path.<sup>35</sup>

7 **Q. Does Mr. Frame use the same methodology to allocate other limited**  
8 **transmission import capability within PJM?**

9 A. Yes.

10 **Q. What other methodology could be used to allocate limited transmission**  
11 **import capability?**

12 A. Mr. Frame identified the “economic” allocation method as an alternative that  
13 would assign limited transmission capability to the suppliers with the lowest  
14 delivered costs.<sup>36</sup>

15 **Q. Does Mr. Frame acknowledge that it would be more realistic to use such an**  
16 **economic allocation methodology?**

17 A. Yes. In his testimony he acknowledges that the economic methodology is  
18 “perhaps more realistic in terms of which suppliers ultimately will gain access to  
19 limited transmission capability.”<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame, at page 36, lines 4-9.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., at page 36, lines 11-13.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., at page 36, lines 13-15.

1 **Q. In other proceedings, has Mr. Frame actually used an economic methodology**  
2 **to allocate limited transmission capability in other market power analyses?**

3 A. Yes. Mr. Frame used an economic methodology to allocate transmission  
4 capability in at least three merger-related pieces of testimony that he filed in  
5 1997.<sup>38</sup>

6 **Q. What reasons did he provide in those cases for using an economic allocation**  
7 **of transmission capability?**

8 A. Mr. Frame explained that “when qualifying supplies exceed the [transmission]  
9 interface limits, interface capability was assigned first to lower priced supplies on  
10 the assumption that those owning the lower cost supplies will be able to price  
11 their output in a fashion to win the sale over the limited tie capability.”<sup>39</sup>

12 **Q. What explanation has Mr. Frame given in this case for not using an economic**  
13 **allocation of the limited transmission into PJM East?**

14 A. Mr. Frame claims that while an economic allocation is perhaps more realistic, it  
15 overlooks entirely all suppliers other than those that gain an allocation of the  
16 limited transmission capability even though those other suppliers also can deliver  
17 energy into the destination market at a price lower than 1.05 times the competitive  
18 price.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, according to Mr. Frame, the economic method ignores the  
19 competitive pressures from those suppliers.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Prepared Supplemental Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame in FERC Docket No. EC97-5-000, at page 39; Additional Direct Testimony and Exhibits of Rodney W. Frame in FERC Dockets Nos. EC96-13-000, ER96-1236-000, and ER96-2560-000, at page 31; and Direct Testimony on Reopening of Rodney Frame, in Illinois Commerce Commission Docket No. 95-0551, at page 60.

<sup>39</sup> Additional Direct Testimony and Exhibits of Rodney W. Frame in FERC Dockets Nos. EC96-13-000, ER96-1236-000, and ER96-2560-000, at page 31; and Direct Testimony on Reopening of Rodney Frame, in Illinois Commerce Commission Docket No. 95-0551, at page 60.

<sup>40</sup> Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame, at page 36, lines 13-20.

<sup>41</sup> Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame at page 36 lines 13-20.

1 **Q. Do you agree that applying the proportional method to allocate the limited**  
2 **transmission capability into the PJM East market is reasonable?**

3 A. No. As explained below, we believe that the use of an economic allocation would  
4 be more realistic and reasonable.

5 **Q. What capacity does Mr. Frame model as competing to serve load in PJM**  
6 **East?**

7 A. Mr. Frame assumes that all of the capacity that meets his delivered price test  
8 would compete to serve load in PJM East. This includes capacity from  
9 throughout PJM Expanded and 7,500 MW of imports into PJM.

10 **Q. Is it reasonable to assume that all of this capacity would be available to serve**  
11 **load in PJM East subject to the limited transmission import capability?**

12 A. No. In the real world, much of the capacity that Mr. Frame assumes would be  
13 available to serve load in PJM East might not be available because of planned or  
14 forced outages or because it might already be committed to serving other load  
15 outside PJM East. It is highly unrealistic that all of the capacity in the remainder  
16 of PJM beyond the Eastern Interface would be competing to serve loads in PJM  
17 East instead of being used to serve loads in Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Columbus,  
18 Ohio, Washington, D.C., or Chicago, to name a few large urban centers in PJM.

19 **Q. What impact does the assumption that all of this capacity is competing to**  
20 **serve load in PJM East have on the results of Mr. Frame's HHI analyses?**

21 A. It unrealistically reduces the HHIs produced by Mr. Frame's model because it  
22 assumes that capacity will be provided by numerous other suppliers which, in the  
23 real world, might not be able to serve loads in PJM East because of other  
24 commitments.

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1 **Q. Does Mr. Frame make any adjustment to reflect the fact that any of this**  
2 **capacity would not be available because it would already be committed to**  
3 **servicing other load outside PJM East or because it would be diverted to other**  
4 **areas for economic reasons?**

5 A. No.

6 **Q. How much of the 7,300 MW of import capability into the PJM East energy**  
7 **market is allocated to Exelon and PSEG in Mr. Frame’s analyses?**

8 A. In Mr. Frame’s pre-merger modeling of the PJM East energy market, between  
9 [ REDACTED ] of the Eastern Interconnection transmission import capability  
10 is allocated to PSEG and Exelon-owned units.

11 **Q. What would be the results if you applied an economic allocation methodology**  
12 **to Mr. Frame’s data?**

13 A. The results are shown in Table 2 below and in greater detail in Exhibit BFS-4.

14 **Table 2: PSEG and Exelon Shares of Transmission Import Capability into**  
15 **PJM East - Mr. Frame’s Pro-Rata Transmission Allocation**  
16 **versus an Economic Allocation<sup>42</sup>**

<b>Transmission Allocation (MW)</b>		
	<b>Pro-Rata</b>	<b>Economic</b>
<b>PSEG</b>	<b>REDACTED</b>	
<b>Exelon</b>		<b>REDACTED</b>

17  
18 Thus, significantly more of the imports into PJM East will be allocated to PSEG  
19 and Exelon using economic allocation methodology than the pro-rata  
20 methodology used by Mr. Frame.

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<sup>42</sup> The confidential pro-rata transmission import figures in Table 2 are taken from Mr. Frame’s workpapers. The confidential economic allocation transmission import figures are taken from our Exhibit BFS-4.

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1 The same conclusion results from an examination of the data for individual hours  
2 studied by Mr. Frame. Exhibit BFS-4 shows, for example, that during Mr.  
3 Frame's Summer 3 period, a pro-rata allocation of transmission would  
4 [

5  
6 REDACTED

7  
8 ] under an economic allocation.

9 **Q. What generating capacity would EEG retain in the remainder of PJM Pre-**  
10 **2004 outside of PJM East if the proposed merger is consummated?**

11 A. As shown in Exhibits RF-3 and RF-4, Exelon and PSEG together currently own  
12 more than 5,500 MW of low cost nuclear (3,010 MW), coal-fired (1,476 MW)  
13 and hydro (1,077 MW) capacity west of the PJM Eastern transmission interface.  
14 This capacity includes the nuclear units at Peach Bottom and Three Mile Island,  
15 the baseload coal-fired capacity at Conemaugh and Keystone, and hydro capacity  
16 at Muddy Run. EEG would retain approximately 4,400 MW of this capacity  
17 under the revised mitigation plan proposed by the Petitioners.

18 **Q. Is it reasonable to expect that this capacity would be allocated across the**  
19 **interface if an economic methodology were used to allocate the limited**  
20 **transmission import capability into PJM East?**

21 A. Yes. Mr. Frame has said that an economic method assigns limited transmission  
22 capability to the suppliers with the lowest delivered costs. That would certainly  
23 apply to the low-cost nuclear, hydro, and, to a lesser extent, coal capacity that  
24 would be retained by EEG.

1 **Q. Have you seen any evidence that suggests how much of the limited**  
2 **transmission import capability into PJM East actually is being effectively**  
3 **used by Exelon and PSEG?**

4 A. Yes. We have analyzed the results of the PJM Annual Auction of Financial  
5 Transmission Rights (“FTR”) for the 2005-2006 planning period. This analysis is  
6 focused on FTRs bought or self-scheduled and sinking in the PJM East market  
7 area, i.e., the PJM sink nodes east of the PJM East transmission interface.

8 **Q. What are the results of this analysis?**

9 A. Allocating import capacity across the PJM East interface based on FTR  
10 ownership suggests that Exelon and PSEG currently use significantly more of the  
11 limited transmission import capability into PJM East than is suggested by Mr.  
12 Frame’s pro-rata methodology. Using FTR ownership results in an allocation to  
13 EEG in the range of 32 to 42 percent. The results of this analysis provide direct  
14 evidence of the actual economic allocation of transmission rights. They confirm  
15 our conclusion that it is more appropriate to allocate the limited transmission  
16 import capability into PJM East using an economic allocation methodology  
17 instead of the pro-rata methodology used by Mr. Frame in his analyses.

18 **Q. Please describe how you conducted this analysis.**

19 A. The results of PJM’s 2005-2006 Annual FTR Auction were analyzed to determine  
20 the makeup of auction winners who procured or self-scheduled FTRs across the  
21 PJM East interface. Auction winners or FTR self-schedulers hold transmission  
22 rights across the PJM East interface that entitle them to congestion payments from  
23 PJM, effectively hedging almost all of the costs of congestion associated with  
24 transferring energy across the interface.

1 **Q. Please describe the way in which ownership of FTRs represents an**  
2 **alternative allocation method for transmission import capability into the**  
3 **PJM East market.**

4 A. Market participants can no longer obtain physical transmission rights across the  
5 PJM East interface. FTRs are the form of transmission rights that now exist. FTRs  
6 allow for a market participant to almost fully hedge against all congestion costs  
7 associated with imports flowing across a constrained PJM East interface. While  
8 FTRs are not physical transmission rights, they do place a market participant  
9 “financially” into the PJM East market by allowing the holder to effectively  
10 obtain PJM East market prices for generation located outside of PJM East that is  
11 dispatched by PJM.

12 **Q. Please describe what this analysis shows.**

13 A. Exhibit BFS-5 presents our analysis of the allocation of FTRs across the PJM  
14 Eastern interface. The FTR allocation is composed of FTRs bought at auction, or  
15 self-scheduled by the holder of auction revenue rights. (“ARR”) ARR are a form  
16 of entitlement to the value of transmission interfaces.

17 Page 1 of Exhibit BFS-5 lists the forty-six (46) entities that bought or self-  
18 scheduled FTRs in the annual auction and now hold a hedge against congestion  
19 across the interface during the 2005-2006 planning period (June 1, 2005 through  
20 May 31, 2006). These entities paid a combined total of almost \$300 million to  
21 obtain these transmission rights.

22 The exhibit also contains a listing of the “counterflow” FTRs bought at auction,  
23 i.e. those FTRs that source in the PJM East region and sink in the regions to the  
24 west of PJM East. The presence of counterflow FTRs allows the PJM RTO to  
25 essentially auction off more FTRs in the west-to-east direction than they  
26 otherwise would be able to. Thus, a total of 8,991.5 MW of FTRs were sold or  
27 self-scheduled at auction across the PJM East interface, which has a nominal  
28 capacity of 7,300 MW, based on the information used in Mr. Frame’s testimony.

1 A total of 2,186.9 MW of “counterflow” FTRs were also sold. Thus, the “net”  
2 FTRs sold or self-scheduled across the interface was 6,804 MW, within the limit  
3 of the interface.

4 **Q. How many FTRs across the PJM East interface are held by Exelon and**  
5 **PSEG?**

6 A. Exelon holds 2,152 MW of FTRs, and PSEG holds 692 MW of FTRs, for a total  
7 of 2,844 MW of FTRs. This corresponds to somewhere between a 31.6 percent  
8 and a 41.8 percent share of the total import capacity when considered using FTR  
9 ownership. If the west-to-east FTRs across the interface are the only ones  
10 considered, then the merged company holds a 31.6 percent share. However, when  
11 the counterflow FTRs are also considered, the total share held by these companies  
12 increases to 41.8 percent. Using yet a third allocation method, the FTRs held by  
13 the merged companies can be compared to the total 7300 MW physical limitation  
14 of the PJM East interface. That computation results in a share of 39 percent.

15 **Q. Why should counterflow FTRs be considered when computing the share of**  
16 **import capacity?**

17 A. The only way in which the total of 8,991 MW of FTRs could be sold for an  
18 interface nominally rated at 7300 MW is if counterflow FTRs are also sold.

19 **Q. Which FTRs across the PJM East Interface are held by Exelon?**

20 A. As shown on page 2 of Exhibit BFS-5, Exelon holds 2,152 MW of FTRs sourced  
21 at nuclear, hydro and fossil generating plants in PJM – west of the PJM East  
22 interface - in which Exelon holds ownership or output rights. The FTRs sink in  
23 the PECO service territory, located in the PJM East market.

24 **Q. Which FTRs across the PJM East Interface are held by PSEG?**

25 A. As shown on page 3 of Exhibit BFS-5, PSEG holds 692 MW of FTRs sourced at  
26 nuclear, hydro and fossil generating plants in PJM in which PSEG holds

1 ownership or output rights. The FTRs sink in the PJM East region, primarily in  
2 the PSEG, AECO, and JCPL zones. The FTRs also sink at a number of discreet  
3 nodes also located in the PJM East region.

4 **Q. How did you determine if a FTR sinks in the “PJM East” region?**

5 A. We examined the PJM LMP bus model and related information provided on the  
6 PJM website. From that information, we were able to map the source and sink  
7 node data from the FTR auction results and assign aggregate sinks and sources,  
8 allowing for a “PJM East” sink designation, and similar aggregations for source  
9 nodes and non-PJM East sink nodes.

10 **Q. In conclusion, what is the significance of using an economic allocation**  
11 **methodology for import capacity instead of a pro-rata methodology?**

12 A. Mr. Frame’s use of a pro-rata allocation method tends to understate EEG’s share  
13 of capacity imports, its total market presence in PJM East, and its ability to  
14 exercise market power. As our analysis of FTRs shows, the use of an economic  
15 allocation methodology will provide a more realistic assessment of how much  
16 capacity EEG can be expected to import across the PJM East Interface.

17 **V.B.2. Mr. Frame Unrealistically Ignores Transmission Outages or Deratings**

18 **Q. Does Mr. Frame reflect any transmission outages or deratings in his HHI**  
19 **modeling?**

20 A. No. Mr. Frame does not reflect any transmission system outages or deratings. He  
21 merely assumes that the calculated amounts of transmission import capability,  
22 subject to the determined simultaneous import limits, will be available during  
23 each of the hours that he examines.

24 **Q. Is this a realistic assumption?**

25 A. No. Transmission systems do have planned and unscheduled outages and  
26 deratings. These outages and deratings impact the ability of the electric system to

1 import power and/or to deliver power from individual generating facilities. The  
2 occurrence of these outages and deratings will limit the amounts of capacity that  
3 can be imported into PJM East, Northern New Jersey or any other constrained  
4 areas and, thereby, affect the ability of EEG to exercise market power. For this  
5 reason, transmission outages and deratings need to be considered.

6 **V.B.3 Mr. Frame Models Planned and Forced Generating Unit Outages in an**  
7 **Unrealistic Manner**

8 **Q. How does Mr. Frame treat planned and forced generating unit outages in his**  
9 **analyses?**

10 A. Mr. Frame’s modeling assumes that scheduled generating unit maintenance  
11 outages occur only during the non-peak (shoulder) seasons. Forced outages are  
12 assumed to occur uniformly throughout the year.

13 **Q. Is this a reasonable way to represent planned and forced generating unit**  
14 **outages?**

15 A. No. Mr. Frame’s model represents an idealized and over-simplified world that  
16 doesn’t accurately represent conditions and market behavior of participants in the  
17 system being modeled.

18 In the real world, planned outages sometimes occur, at least in part, during the  
19 summer and winter peak months. At the same time, forced outages do not occur in  
20 a smooth manner throughout the year. In other words, capacity availability on the  
21 actual PJM system is far more “lumpy” than Mr. Frame’s model reflects. In the  
22 real world, generating units are often completely out of service for planned or  
23 forced outages – although in some circumstances units may be partially derated  
24 for maintenance. In Mr. Frame’s modeling, all generating units are represented as  
25 running at lower than maximum capacity in all hours to reflect planned and forced  
26 outages, and are never assumed to be off line completely.

1 **Q. Please give an example of the way in which Mr. Frame’s modeling represents**  
2 **planned and forced outages.**

3 A. Let’s assume that there is a 1,000 MW (both summer and winter ratings) baseload  
4 nuclear unit that is offline for 36.5 days per year for scheduled refueling and  
5 maintenance and another 36.5 days for forced or unplanned outages. This plant  
6 then has a ten percent scheduled outage factor and a ten percent forced outage  
7 factor.

8 Instead of representing this baseload nuclear plant as being online for 80 percent  
9 of the year and offline for the remaining twenty percent, Mr. Frame unrealistically  
10 models the plant as being on line for the entire year but at a reduced capacity  
11 level. Because he assumes that forced outages occur smoothly throughout the  
12 year and planned outages occur only in the fall and spring off-peak seasons, he  
13 would model this hypothetical nuclear plant at 700 MW in the fall and spring and  
14 900 MW in the summer and winter.

15 This is not the way that planned and forced outages affect the capacity and  
16 availability of generic units, particularly nuclear and coal-fired facilities.

17 **Q. What is the effect of Mr. Frame’s unrealistic modeling of planned and forced**  
18 **generating unit outages?**

19 A. The overall effect of Mr. Frame’s “smooth” and unrealistic representation of  
20 outages is that the model tends to overstate system reliability and not consider at  
21 all situations that are “worse than average.” System operators would be ecstatic  
22 to have a system in which generating unit outages were so predictable and well-  
23 behaved. Unfortunately, the actual system does not operate like that. Generating  
24 units do fail and go off-line entirely; outages do sometimes bunch in terms of  
25 timing and location. This lumpiness has very important implications for market  
26 power and for analysis of market power.

1           In fact, market power tends to be asymmetrical. In other words, during “tight”  
2           conditions market power will tend to be much worse than it is during average  
3           conditions. Stated specifically for outage rates we might say that compared to  
4           average conditions, the degree of market power during those hours when there are  
5           fifty percent more generating unit outages than average will tend to be much  
6           worse than average. However, the degree of market power during those hours  
7           when there are fifty percent fewer outages than average will tend to be only  
8           slightly better than average. Of course, this also depends on the specific  
9           generating units that are out of service and which companies own them. By  
10          treating all of the outages as simple deratings in all hours, Mr. Frame entirely  
11          overlooks conditions in which the amount and distribution of outages will be  
12          worse than average, and so understates the overall degree to which market power  
13          will be a problem.

14          The discussion about the treatment of outages in Mr. Frame’s model and the  
15          model’s resulting tendency to understate market power applies to PJM conditions  
16          pre-merger and post-merger. It also has implications for the magnitude of the  
17          increase in market power caused by the merger. Because the ability to exercise  
18          market power is not symmetrical around the average conditions, a merger that  
19          worsens market conditions will tend to have proportionally greater effects during  
20          the “worse than average” conditions that are ignored in Mr. Frame’s HHI  
21          analyses.

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1 **V.B.4 The Nuclear Unit Scheduled and Forced Outage Factors Used by Mr. Frame**  
2 **Cause His Analyses to Understate the Amount of Capacity Owned by Exelon**  
3 **and PSEG in PJM East**

4 **Q. Does Mr. Frame use unit-specific or generic industry scheduled and forced**  
5 **outage factors in his modeling?**

6 A. Mr. Frame uses generic industry outage rates from the North American Electric  
7 Reliability Council’s Generating Availability Data System (“GADS”) database.  
8 [ REDACTED ]

9 **Q. Can you give some examples of how the generic industry outage rates used**  
10 **by Mr. Frame compare to [ REDACTED ] for plants owned by Exelon**  
11 **and PSEG?**

12 A. As shown in Table 3 below, [  
13  
14

15  
16 REDACTED  
17  
18  
19 ] The use of these

20 [ REDACTED  
21  
22 ] of baseload nuclear capacity from his HHI calculations.





1 **V.B.5 Mr. Frame Fails to Reflect the Improved Performance of Salem and Hope**  
2 **Creek Claimed as a Result of the Proposed Merger**

3 **Q. Does Mr. Frame model the increased performance of the Salem and Hope**  
4 **Creek nuclear units that the Petitioners claim will result from the proposed**  
5 **merger?**

6 A. No. He uses the same generic industry performance data for the pre-merger, post-  
7 merger, and post-mitigation scenarios he examines. Consequently, he does not  
8 reflect the increased nuclear performance at Salem and Hope Creek that the  
9 Petitioners claim as a significant benefit from the proposed merger.

10 **Q. Does Mr. Frame himself claim that the improved performance at Salem and**  
11 **Hope Creek resulting from the proposed merger would have benefits for**  
12 **customers in the market?**

13 A. Yes. Mr. Frame claims in his Additional Testimony that:

14 one of the expected benefits from the proposed merger will be an  
15 increase in the output from the more than 3,300 MW of nuclear  
16 generation now operated by PSEG. Increased output from low  
17 cost nuclear generators will lower the market-clearing prices  
18 during all seasons and time periods, benefiting all customers in the  
19 market, including BGS customers, in a fashion that is not picked  
20 up in the market concentration studies that I have provided.<sup>44</sup>

21 Similarly, Petitioner witness Christopher Crane at the FERC, began his testimony  
22 by explaining that his purpose “is to explain how we at Exelon expect the  
23 performance of the nuclear power plants operated by PSEG to improve  
24 significantly when fully assimilated into the Exelon [nuclear] Fleet through the  
25 proposed merger of Exelon and PSEG.”<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Additional Testimony of Rodney Frame, at page 13, lines 15-20.

<sup>45</sup> Testimony of Christopher Crane in FERC Docket No. EC05-43-000, at page 3, lines 3-6.

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1 **Q. What improvements in forced and scheduled outage factors are predicted for**  
2 **Salem and Hope Creek from the merger?**

3 A. Table 5 below compares the Petitioners' projections as to the most likely  
4 operating performance of Salem and Hope Creek based on the unit's historical  
5 performance with the performance that would be expected if the merger is closed.  
6 The scheduled and forced outage factors in this Table were developed from the  
7 Petitioners' projected annual capacity factors in outage and non-outage years.

8 **Table 5: Petitioners' Expected Post-Merger Performance of Salem and Hope**  
9 **Creek versus Projected Performance Based on Recent History**

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10

11 **Q. Have you re-calculated Mr. Frame's HHIs to reflect this improved**  
12 **performance of the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear units and the economic**  
13 **allocation of the transmission capability across the PJM East interface?**

14 A. Yes. As discussed in more detail in Section IX of this testimony and presented in  
15 Exhibit BFS-6, we have recalculated Mr. Frame's HHIs for his Mitigation  
16 Scenarios 1 through 3 to reflect (1) the proposed [ ] MW power uprate at Hope  
17 Creek in 2006, (2) the claimed improvements in operating performance at both  
18 Salem and Hope Creek, (3) the use of the recent performance of Exelon's nuclear  
19 units, and (4) the use of an economic allocation of the transmission import  
20 capability across the PJM East interface.

1 **Q. What are the results of recalculating the pre-merger to post-divestiture HHI**  
2 **changes in Mr. Frame’s Mitigation Scenarios 1 through 3 to reflect these**  
3 **corrections?**

4 A. As shown on page 2 of Exhibit BFS-6, as a result of just these realistic changes,  
5 the merger would fail the FERC Appendix A Screening Analysis due to HHI  
6 changes greater than 100 in six of the ten hours studied in Mitigation Scenario 1;  
7 in all ten of the hours studied in Mr. Frame’s Mitigation Scenario 2; and in seven  
8 of the ten hours studied in Mr. Frame’s Mitigation Scenario 3. Indeed, in some of  
9 the hours studied in these Scenarios, the pre-merger to post-mitigation HHI  
10 changes would be significantly higher than 100.

11 **V.B.6. Mr. Frame Does Not Reflect Capacity Purchases from Other PJM**  
12 **Participants**

13 **Q. Did Mr. Frame reflect any forward capacity purchases by EEG from other**  
14 **PJM participants in his analyses?**

15 A. No.

16 **Q. Is it important to consider such forward capacity purchases when evaluating**  
17 **the ability of the merged company to exercise market power and the**  
18 **incentive to do so?**

19 A. Yes. Depending on the magnitude of the purchases, the additional capacity could  
20 noticeably increase the merged company’s market shares and HHIs. Also, the  
21 merged company’s ability to exercise market power might be enhanced by such  
22 purchases, depending on the location, fuel and operating costs of the capacity  
23 being acquired.

24 **Q. Have you seen any evidence that Exelon or PSEG has engaged in such**  
25 **forward capacity purchases in recent years?**

26 A. [ REDACTED

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5 **Q. Have Exelon or PSEG made such forward capacity purchases for 2006?**

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A. [ REDACTED

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8

**Q. Have you seen any recent evidence that suggests that Exelon may be**

9

**intending to make such a forward capacity purchase for 2006?**

10

A. Yes. A slide used in a presentation given in early August 2005 to an investor conference by the President of Exelon's Power Team noted that for 2006 Exelon is "acquiring load-following capability from bilateral market to better match assets with the load obligation."<sup>48</sup> The same slide indicated that Exelon is developing strategies for 2007 and beyond "for potential mitigation scenarios associated with merger."

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## 16 **VI. PJM CAPACITY MARKETS**

17

**Q. Have you reviewed Mr. Frame's analysis of the PJM East Capacity Market?**

18

A. Yes. Mr. Frame's Exhibit RF-8 (Revised) is his analysis of the Capacity Market concentration in PJM East for the summer of 2006. He lists capacity by owner, including the 7,300 MW of imports over the transmission into PJM East, and then based upon those capacity figures, he calculates market shares and HHI. Mr. Frame's conclusion from this analysis is a "mitigation requirement" of 4,659 MW of capacity.

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<sup>46</sup> Provided in Response to RAR-MKT-25, at pages 29 and 38 of the December 12, 2004 Presentation.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

1 **Q. Does Mr. Frame’s analysis accurately represent the pre-merger levels of**  
2 **concentration in the PJM capacity market?**

3 A. No. As we have explained earlier in this testimony, we have identified a number  
4 of ways in which Mr. Frame’s modeling assumptions are unrealistic. One factor  
5 that certainly leads him to seriously understate the pre-merger and post-mitigation  
6 levels of concentration in the PJM capacity markets is the totally unrealistic  
7 assumption in preparing Exhibit RF-8 (Revised) that the 7,300 MW of  
8 transmission import capability into PJM East is evenly assigned to four suppliers  
9 that do not currently own generating facilities in PJM East. This assumption  
10 means that Mr. Frame assigns none of the 7,300 MW of import capability to  
11 Exelon, PSEG or EEG. This leads Mr. Frame to understate the level of  
12 concentration in this capacity market and causes him to severely understate the  
13 amount of capacity that must be divested to mitigate the levels of market  
14 concentration that would result from the proposed merger.

15 **Q. Did you have any other observations concerning Mr. Frame’s Exhibit RF-8**  
16 **(Revised), page 1 of 2?**

17 A. Yes. We have several important observations concerning the analysis of the PJM  
18 capacity market presented in Exhibit RF-8 (Revised).

19 First, Exhibit RF-8 (Revised) misrepresents the effect of the Petitioners’ proposed  
20 mitigation plan. In that Exhibit, Mr. Frame notes that he has allocated none of the  
21 7,300 MW of import capability into PJM East to either Exelon or PSEG.  
22 However, instead of reflecting just the 3,100 MW of the actual capacity  
23 divestiture proposed for PJM East, Mr. Frame uses all 4,000 MW of the proposed  
24 actual capacity divestiture proposed for the entire PJM Expanded. This is  
25 misleading and understates the amount of additional actual divestiture, above and

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<sup>48</sup> Exhibit BFS-7, at page 9 of 14.

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1 beyond that proposed by the Petitioners, that would be necessary to bring the HHI  
2 to within the screening limits permitted by the FERC.

3 Second, even if you accept the figures presented in Exhibit RF-8 (Revised), which  
4 as we have noted are misleading, an additional 659 MW of actual capacity  
5 mitigation is required beyond that proposed by the Petitioners. However, as we  
6 have noted above, Mr. Frame's analysis more correctly suggests that at least  
7 1,559 MW of additional mitigation would be required. This 1,559 MW figure  
8 represents the difference between the 4,659 MW Mitigation Requirement shown  
9 on Exhibit RF-8 (Revised) and the 3,100 MW that the Petitioners actually are  
10 proposing to divest in PJM East.

11 Third, even if you accept the analysis in Exhibit RF-8 (Revised), the new  
12 company created by the merger, EEG, would be by far the most dominant  
13 participant in PJM East, with 13,430 total MWs (after divesting 4,000 MW) and a  
14 32.3 percent share of the market. EEG would be more than four times larger than  
15 the next largest companies in the market. EEG's dominance in the anticipated  
16 PJM capacity markets would be even more shocking if Exhibit RF-8 (Revised)  
17 appropriately reflected the allocation of some of the 7,300 MW of transmission  
18 import capability to Exelon and PSEG.

19 **Q. Is Mr. Frame's assumption in Exhibit RF-8 (Revised) that none of the**  
20 **transmission import capability into PJM East should be assigned to PSEG,**  
21 **Exelon or EEG consistent with the results of his own modeling of the PJM**  
22 **East energy market?**

23 A. No. As we have noted previously, in Mr. Frame's pre-merger modeling of the  
24 PJM East energy market, which uses a proportional allocation methodology,  
25 between [ REDACTED ] of the 7,300 MW Eastern Interconnection  
26 transmission import capability is allocated to PSEG and Exelon-owned units.  
27 Thus, Mr. Frame's assumption in his analysis of the PJM East capacity market  
28 that none of the transmission import capability should be allocated to Exelon,

1 PSEG or EEG contradicts his own assumption regarding the allocation of  
2 transmission capability into the PJM East energy market.

3 **Q. What would EEG's post-merger market shares be if the import capacity**  
4 **shown in Exhibit RF-8 were allocated to EEG using Mr. Frame's pro-rata**  
5 **allocation methodology or an economic allocation methodology?**

6 A. Using the data from Exhibit RF-8 (Revised) and assuming that 3,100 MW of  
7 capacity in PJM East is divested, EEG's capacity market share would be 34.4  
8 percent if none of the 7,300 MW of imports is allocated to the company. EEG's  
9 market share would increase to [ ] percent if [ ] MW were allocated to the  
10 company to reflect a pro-rata allocation of the 7,300 MW of imports. EEG's  
11 capacity market share would increase further to [ ] percent if approximately [ ]  
12 MW of imports were allocated to the company to reflect an economic allocation  
13 of the PJM East interface transmission capability.

14 **Q. Have the Petitioners filed any proposed long-term mitigation for potential**  
15 **market power in capacity markets?**

16 A. No. The Petitioners have proposed to make a filing at the FERC to mitigate  
17 whatever Appendix A screen violations are suggested by any new capacity  
18 obligation paradigm adopted by PJM.<sup>49</sup> They also have proposed some interim  
19 mitigation until new PJM capacity markets are approved by the FERC.<sup>50</sup>

20 **Q. Has the FERC accepted this proposal?**

21 A. Yes. In its July 1, 2005 Order approving the proposed merger, the FERC stated  
22 that when it approves a new capacity market for PJM, it would require the  
23 Petitioners to submit a new analysis of the merger's effect on the PJM capacity  
24 market and, if the analysis shows that the merger-related harm to competition is

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<sup>49</sup> Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame, at page 19, lines 13-18.

<sup>50</sup> Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame, at page 20, line 15, to page 21, line 2.

1 not fully mitigated, propose a new mitigation plan for approval within 30 days of  
2 the FERC's approval of the new PJM capacity market.<sup>51</sup>

3 **Q. In fact, has PJM recently filed a new proposal at the FERC that would**  
4 **drastically change the capacity market construct?**

5 A. Yes. On August 31, 2005 PJM filed a proposal at the FERC to adopt a Reliability  
6 Pricing Model ("RPM") to address what it considers to be serious inadequacies in  
7 the existing capacity rules.

8 **Q. What does PJM consider to be the serious inadequacies in the current**  
9 **capacity markets?**

10 A. PJM has said that the current capacity construct has the following serious  
11 shortcomings:

- 12 ▪ it does not look far enough into the future to secure capacity in time to  
13 meet reliability needs;
- 14 ▪ it lacks an important locational element;
- 15 ▪ it is not providing sufficient financial incentives for supply additions; and
- 16 ▪ without revision, it will not ensure the future reliability of the region.<sup>52</sup>

17 **Q. Please describe the main features of this proposed Reliability Pricing Model.**

18 A. According to PJM's filing to the FERC, the RPM's primary features would  
19 include:

- 20 ▪ valuing capacity resources by location;
- 21 ▪ use of a downward-sloping variable resource requirement curve;
- 22 ▪ four-year-forward commitment of capacity resources;
- 23 ▪ recognizing the added value of capacity resources that preserve  
24 operational aspects of reliability; and

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<sup>51</sup> FERC Order Authorizing Merger, at Paragraph 167, at page 57.

<sup>52</sup> PJM August 31, 2005 submission in FERC Dockets Nos. EL05-148-000 and ER05-1410-000, at page 5.

**Biewald-Fagan-Schlissel Direct Testimony**  
**BPU Docket No. EM05020106**  
**OAL Docket No. PUC-1874-05**

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1           ▪       allowing planned generation, planned and existing demand resources, and  
2                   planned transmission upgrades to compete on an equal basis with existing  
3                   generation resources to meet capacity requirements.<sup>53</sup>

4           The RPM also will have explicit market mitigation rules to address market-  
5           structure concerns of capacity markets.<sup>54</sup>

6           The RPM will include a complicated series of four capacity auctions for each  
7           twelve month delivery year for each appropriate sub-region within PJM. The first  
8           of these auctions will be held four years before the start of each delivery year.

9           There also will be three later incremental auctions, at 23 months, 13 months, and  
10           4 months before the start of each delivery year.<sup>55</sup> These auctions would be  
11           conducted to match the region's need for capacity with offers to sell capacity, to  
12           determine the clearing prices to be paid to capacity resource sellers, and to  
13           determine the reliability charges to be paid by load serving entities.<sup>56</sup>

14   **Q.    What areas within PJM would be considered for separate locational auctions**  
15   **and prices?**

16   A.    The capacity areas to be used in RPM would be called Locational Deliverability  
17           Areas ("LDAs").<sup>57</sup> The LDAs would be those areas that have a limited ability to  
18           import capacity due to physical limitations of the transmission system, voltage  
19           limitations, or stability limitations.<sup>58</sup>

20           According to PJM, there would be two LDAs for the first year under RPM, i.e.,  
21           June 1, 2006 through May 31, 2007. Another two LDAs would be added in the  
22           second year, 2007-2008. In the third (2008-2009) and fourth (2009-2010) years,

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<sup>53</sup> PJM August 31, 2005 submission in FERC Dockets Nos. EL05-148-000 and ER05-1410-000, at page 3.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> PJM August 31, 2005 submission in FERC Dockets Nos. EL05-148-000 and ER05-1410-000, at page 52.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> PJM FERC Electric Tariff, Sixth Revised Volume No. 1, at Original Sheet No. 552, included in the PJM August 31, 2005 submission in FERC Dockets Nos. EL05-148-000 and ER05-1410-000.

1 PJM would implement a full complement of LDAs, based on the areas analyzed  
2 in the [Regional Transmission Expansion Planning] process.<sup>59</sup> For these two  
3 years (2008-2009 and 2009-2010) there would be 23 LDAs.<sup>60</sup>

4 PJM would determine and post the LDAs applicable to subsequent years (beyond  
5 2009-2010) at least four months before the start of the first RPM auction for each  
6 such year. However, changes are not currently expected from the above list.<sup>61</sup>

7 **Q. How many separate LDAs would there be in PJM East?**

8 A. PJM proposes to include ten LDAs within PJM East. These would be the MAAC  
9 region; Eastern MAAC region; PSEG; PSEG northern region; JCPL; PECO; AE;  
10 DPL; Southern Delmarva; and RECO.<sup>62</sup> New Jersey alone would have five  
11 distinct LDAs: PSEG, PSEG northern region; JCPL; AE and RECO.

12 There would be a complicated set of four capacity auctions in the RPM proposal  
13 for each of these LDAs for every twelve month delivery year.

14 **Q. When does PJM want to implement the new RPM?**

15 A. PJM wants to implement the new RPM beginning on June 1, 2006.<sup>63</sup> In order to  
16 do so, PJM says that it needs an Order by the FERC no later than January 31,  
17 2006.<sup>64</sup>

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58 PJM August 31, 2005 submission in FERC Dockets Nos. EL05-148-000 and ER05-1410-000, at page 57.

59 Ibid.

60 These include: MAAC region; ComEd, AEP, Dominion, Dayton, and Duquesne; Virginia Power; eastern MAAC region; southwestern MAAC region; the western MAAC region consisting of the Pennsylvania Electric Company zone; RECO; ComEd; AEP; Dayton; Duquesne; APS; AE; BGE; Delmarva; PECO; PEPCO; PSEG; JCPL; Metropolitan Edison Company; PPL; PSEG northern region; Delmarva southern region. Source: PJM August 31, 2005 RPM submission to the FERC, at page 58.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid., at page 58.

63 PJM August 31, 2005 submission to the FERC in Dockets Nos. EL05-148-000 and ER05-1410-000, at page 2.

64 Ibid.



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6 **Q. Should the BPU approve the proposed merger before evaluating the ability**  
7 **of EEG to exercise market power in whatever new capacity market structure**  
8 **ultimately is approved by the FERC?**

9 A. No. The BPU should not approve the proposed merger until it has had a  
10 reasonable opportunity to review concrete proposals from the Petitioners  
11 identifying the amounts and locations of capacity that would have to be divested  
12 in order to mitigate market power concerns under the proposed RPM or whatever  
13 new or revised market construct is ordered by the FERC. In addition, the BPU  
14 should review the market power mitigation rules that PJM has proposed for its  
15 RPM approach and determine that they will address any concerns regarding the  
16 Exelon-PSEG merger that have been identified in this proceeding,

17 **VII. THE NORTHERN NEW JERSEY MARKETS**

18 **Q. Is northern New Jersey a highly concentrated market?**

19 A. Yes. According to the PJM MMU, the PSEG North<sup>67</sup> market was congested for  
20 1,059 hours in 2003 and 456 hours in 2004. The average, minimum and  
21 maximum HHIs for the PSEG North area for 2003 and 2004 are shown in Table 6  
22 below.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Mr. Frame uses the term “Northern New Jersey” in his testimony (e.g., page 26 of his Exhibit JP-6 in this case) while the PJM Market Report uses the term “PSEG North.” We believe that these are synonymous.

<sup>68</sup> PJM MMU 2004 *State of the Market Report*, at page 57 and PJM MMU 2003 *State of the Market Report*, at page 42.



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1 **Q. Does Mr. Frame find that the northern New Jersey market is highly**  
2 **concentrated both before the merger and after the Petitioners' proposed**  
3 **mitigation?**

4 A. [  
5 **REDACTED**  
6  
7 ]

8 **Q. Does Mr. Frame's analysis suggest the need for additional divestiture of**  
9 **capacity in northern New Jersey in order to bring the changes in HHIs below**  
10 **the 50 point increase permitted by the FERC's merger guidelines?**

11 [  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16 **REDACTED**  
17  
18  
19  
20 ]

21 A. No. Mr. Frame's testimony was silent on this point.

22 **Q. Was the testimony filed by the Petitioners at the FERC also silent on the need**  
23 **for some divestiture of capacity in northern New Jersey?**

24 A. No. The testimony filed by the Petitioners at the FERC noted a screen analysis  
25 of the northern New Jersey market would show screen failures. Although the  
26 Petitioners claimed that this did not reflect a market power problem, they offered  
27 to mitigate the northern New Jersey screen failures by the divestiture of 100 MW

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1 of coal-fired generation and 100 MW of mid-merit generation.<sup>71</sup> Mr. Frame's  
2 BPU testimony does not offer similar divestiture if the BPU is concerned about  
3 the impact of the merger on the northern New Jersey market.

4 **Q. Did the FERC accept the Petitioners' commitment to divest 100 MW of**  
5 **generation within northern New Jersey?**

6 A. Yes. The FERC relied on statements by the Petitioners to find that there was a  
7 commitment by the Petitioners to divest 100 MW of generation located within  
8 Northern PSEG.<sup>72</sup>

9 **Q. Does Mr. Frame's analysis show that the proposed merger would have a**  
10 **positive benefit in terms of reducing the market concentration in northern**  
11 **New Jersey?**

12 A. [

13 REDACTED

14 ]

15  
16 If the BPU is concerned about concentration in the northern New Jersey market,  
17 as we believe it should be, then it should work with PJM to identify potential  
18 actions to actually reduce the levels of concentration, not approve a merger that  
19 will increase the level of concentration. Such actions could include the  
20 development of demand response programs, the siting of distributed generation  
21 facilities, or transmission system enhancements.

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<sup>71</sup> Testimony of William Hieronymus, FERC Docket No. EC05-43-000, Exhibit J-1, at page 54, lines 5-13.

<sup>72</sup> *FERC Order Authorizing Merger*, dated July 1, 2005, Paragraph No. 122, at page 41.

<sup>73</sup> Mr. Frame's confidential workpapers.

<sup>74</sup> Mr. Frame's confidential workpapers.

1 **Q. Does Mr. Frame’s analysis of the northern New Jersey market suffer from**  
2 **the same problems as you have found in his analyses of the PJM East**  
3 **market?**

4 A. Yes. Mr. Frame’s analysis of the northern New Jersey area suffers from the same  
5 weaknesses as we discussed earlier regarding his analyses of the PJM East energy  
6 market. Specifically, Mr. Frame’s analysis of Northern New Jersey is unrealistic  
7 and oversimplified, and the mitigation is not defined. In addition, Mr. Frame’s  
8 analysis of Northern New Jersey does not even include the level of detail that his  
9 other destination market analyses (e.g., the analysis of PJM East) do.

10 **Q. Consequently, is it reasonable to expect that additional capacity might have**  
11 **to be divested in northern New Jersey to bring the HHIs changes from the**  
12 **proposed merger to within the 50 points permitted by the FERC Merger**  
13 **Guidelines?**

14 A. Yes. Because of the flaws that we have identified in his assumptions and analytic  
15 methodology, we are concerned that the 100 MW of capacity that the FERC has  
16 ordered the Petitioners to divest in northern New Jersey is inadequate even to  
17 satisfy the FERC Merger Guidelines.

18 **VIII. THE PETITIONERS’ PROPOSED MITIGATION**  
19 **PLAN IS INADEQUATE TO PREVENT EEG FROM**  
20 **EXERCISING MARKET POWER**

21 **Q. Please describe the Petitioners’ proposed mitigation plan.**

22 A. The Petitioners have proposed a mitigation plan to offset the FERC Appendix A  
23 competitive screen failures identified by Mr. Frame.

24 The revised mitigation plan proposed by the Petitioners includes the actual  
25 divestiture of 3,100 MW of non-nuclear capacity in PJM East and another 900

1 MW in the remainder of PJM-Pre 2004 outside of PJM East.<sup>75</sup> This capacity  
2 would consist of coal-fired, mid-merit and peaking facilities.

3 The plan also would include the untested concept of the virtual divestiture of  
4 2,600 MW of nuclear capacity, 2,400 MW of which would be in PJM East.<sup>76</sup>  
5 According to the Petitioners, the virtual divestiture of this nuclear baseload  
6 capacity would be accomplished through a combination of annual auctions of  
7 rolling three-year firm contracts and long-term energy sales contracts or swaps  
8 with the buyers.<sup>77</sup>

9 In the Petitioners' proposed virtual divestiture plan, EEG would retain the  
10 capacity associated with the virtually divested units while selling only the  
11 energy.<sup>78</sup> Notably, the Petitioners have not proposed a mitigation plan to address  
12 the ability that EEG would have to exercise market power through strategic  
13 bidding or through the physical withholding of capacity.

14 **Q. Would the Petitioners be selling energy from any specific nuclear units as**  
15 **part of the virtual divestiture?**

16 A. No. The virtual divestiture by auction would not be provided by any specific  
17 nuclear units owned by the Petitioners.<sup>79</sup> Only in one of the 15 year options  
18 would the sale be based on the historical performance of a specific unit from  
19 which energy is being sold.

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<sup>75</sup> Supplemental Testimony of Rodney Frame, Table 1, at page 6.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Testimony of Rodney Frame, at page 17, lines 16-21.

<sup>78</sup> Testimony of Rodney Frame, at page 17, line 18, to page 18, line 10.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

1 **Q. Is the Petitioners’ revised mitigation plan adequate to offset the market**  
2 **power problems that would be created by the merger?**

3 A. No. The Petitioners’ revised mitigation plan has a number of critical weaknesses  
4 that render it inadequate for offsetting the market power problems that would be  
5 created by the merger.

- 6 • The plan does not identify the specific units to be divested.
- 7 • Under the proposed virtual divestiture EEG still would maintain control  
8 over operations of the “divested” nuclear capacity.
- 9 • Under the proposed virtual divestiture EEG would have an incentive to  
10 exercise market power as that would indirectly increase the prices in the  
11 yearly nuclear capacity auctions.
- 12 • As proposed, the virtual divestiture is not symmetric because there would  
13 be no provision for increasing the amount of nuclear capacity to be  
14 divested if EEG constructs or acquires additional nuclear capacity.

15 **Q. Please explain why it is essential that the proposed mitigation plan identify**  
16 **the specific units to be divested?**

17 A. The location, fuel type, marginal operating costs, operating characteristics, age,  
18 and economic viability of the divested units will have a significant impact on the  
19 ability of the merged company to exercise market power in both the short-term  
20 and the long-term.

21 **Q. Is it also essential to know the specific parties who will be purchasing each**  
22 **divested asset?**

23 A. Yes. The post-mitigation market concentration indices will be very different if  
24 the purchasers of the divested capacity are new participants in the market or  
25 already own substantial generating assets. Therefore, it is essential to know the  
26 specific purchasers and the capacity that they are acquiring.

1 **Q. Has the PJM Market Monitoring Unit similarly concluded that it is not**  
2 **possible to determine whether the Petitioners’ proposed mitigation plan is**  
3 **adequate without knowing which specific units will be divested and what**  
4 **parties will purchase the divested capacity?**

5 A. Yes. The PJM Market Monitoring Unit issued a report on the proposed merger  
6 titled “Exelon/PSEG Merger Analysis,” dated May 24, 2005. The key conclusions  
7 in this Merger Analysis included the following:

- 8       ▪ The proposed merger would significantly increase concentration in the  
9       Energy, Capacity and Regulation markets and therefore raises concern  
10      about potential adverse competitive effects, absent mitigation.<sup>80</sup>
- 11      ▪ Whether the Guidelines are met by the proposed mitigation depends on the  
12      specific units to be divested, the specific purchasers of the divested  
13      capacity and the nature of the divestiture.<sup>81</sup>
- 14      ▪ For the Locational Energy Markets (i.e., PJM East, Western Interface and  
15      Central Interface), it is not possible to determine whether divestiture will  
16      in fact mitigate the issues without knowing the exact units and their  
17      distribution factor impacts on the identified constraints.<sup>82</sup>
- 18      ▪ It is not possible to make a meaningful assessment of the effectiveness of  
19      the proposed divestiture in remedying structural market problems in the  
20      Locational PJM Energy Markets resulting from the proposed merger in the  
21      absence of the actual identification of specific units. A supplemental  
22      analysis must be performed once a definitive declaration of divested assets  
23      has been developed.<sup>83</sup>

24 In Part Two of its Exelon/PSEG Merger Analysis, dated October 14, 2005, the  
25 PJM Market Monitoring Unit reaffirmed its earlier conclusions regarding the  
26 importance of identifying the specific units to be divested and the nature of the  
27 companies purchasing the divested capacity. For example, the Market Monitoring  
28 Unit noted the following concerning the need to consider the companies  
29 purchasing the divested capacity:

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<sup>80</sup> May 24, 2005 PJM Market Monitoring Unit “*Merger Analysis*,” at pages 14, 35, and 47.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., at pages 4.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., at pages 19, 21, and 25.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., at pages 19, 21, 25 and 26.

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1 In fact, the conclusions about the required level of divestiture in  
2 the Energy Market depend on the nature of the companies  
3 purchasing the divested assets. The initial analysis assumes that the  
4 purchasing company has no capacity ownership in the relevant  
5 market. If the divested assets are sold to a company with a market  
6 share of from 16 percent to 35 percent, the proposed divestiture  
7 results in HHI levels that exceed the levels reached when the  
8 divested assets are sold to a company with a market share closer to  
9 five percent. In some cases the results after divestiture are worse  
10 than the results without divestiture. Conclusions about the required  
11 level of divestiture in the Locational energy markets also depend  
12 on the nature of the companies purchasing the divested assets.<sup>84</sup>

13 The PJM Market Monitoring Report reaches similar conclusions with regard to  
14 the capacity and regulation markets.<sup>85</sup>

15 **Q. What did the PJM Market Monitoring Unit’s Part Two Merger Analysis**  
16 **conclude regarding the need to consider the specific units to be divested when**  
17 **assessing the effectiveness of the Petitioners’ proposed mitigation plan?**

18 A. The Part Two Merger Analysis noted that the Market Monitoring Unit had  
19 evaluated the Petitioners’ mitigation proposal:

20 The analysis performed by the [Market Monitoring Unit] was  
21 designed to determine whether a return to pre-merger HHI levels  
22 was achievable given the candidate facilities and total volume of  
23 CT capacity to be divested... For the Eastern Interface, there was  
24 sufficient CT capacity available within the list of candidate  
25 facilities to return the post-merger HHI to pre-merger levels when  
26 such units are divested to a company with no generation assets in  
27 the market. There are two critical caveats to this conclusion:  
28 effective mitigation is, and can only be, based on specific units;  
29 and that the effectiveness of mitigation depends heavily on the  
30 nature of the purchasing companies.... It is not possible to make a  
31 meaningful assessment of the effectiveness of a proposed  
32 divestiture in remedying structural market problems resulting from  
33 the proposed merger in the absence of the actual identification of

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<sup>84</sup> October 14, 2005, PJM Market Monitoring Unit “*Exelon/PSEG Merger Analysis Part Two*,” at page 3.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., at page 4.

1                   specific units. A supplemental analysis must be performed once a  
2                   definitive declaration of divested assets has been developed.<sup>86</sup>

3     **Q.     Have the Petitioners acknowledged that the location of a generating plant**  
4           **and its fuel type may be properly viewed as important factors in assessing the**  
5           **plant’s potential contribution to the mitigation of their market power?**

6     A.     Yes. The Petitioners acknowledged this in their response to Data Request  
7           NJEUC/RESA-PSEG-52.

8     **Q.     Has the FERC accepted the Petitioners’ proposed mitigation plan even**  
9           **though it does not identify the specific units to be divested or the buyers of**  
10          **the divested capacity?**

11    A.     Yes. The FERC notes that specific units to be divested have not been identified  
12          but states that it will be able to address this issue in the subsequent compliance  
13          filing.<sup>87</sup>

14    **Q.     Is this consistent with the FERC’s own merger guidelines?**

15    A.     No. In its Order approving the proposed merger, the FERC essentially  
16          acknowledges that its own merger guidelines require the specific units to be  
17          divested.<sup>88</sup> However, the FERC believed that through a subsequent compliance  
18          filing it could ensure that the appropriate units are being divested.

19    **Q.     Would the buyer of the nuclear capacity that is being “virtually divested”**  
20          **have any control over plant operations?**

21    A.     No. In fact, the Petitioners do not propose to sell the energy from any specific  
22          nuclear asset(s) through the proposed auction of rolling three-year firm contracts  
23          or one of the alternative products available under the long-term contract option.  
24          Instead, the capacity will be available at an aggregate of the Petitioners’ PJM East

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid., at page 20.

<sup>87</sup> *FERC Order Authorizing Merger*, Paragraphs 141 and 142 at pages 48 and 49.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., at Paragraph 141, on pages 48-49.

1 nuclear generation buses. Only in the second alternative product available under  
2 the long-term contract option does it appear that the Petitioners would be  
3 guaranteeing delivery of firm energy based on the performance of a designated  
4 PJM East nuclear facility.<sup>89</sup>

5 Consequently, in none of the virtual divestiture alternatives, that is, virtual  
6 divestiture through the auction of rolling three-year firm contracts or through  
7 long-term energy sales contracts or swaps, would operational control over any of  
8 EEG's nuclear units be transferred to any buyer. Instead, in all instances, EEG  
9 would retain all operational control over the scheduling of the output of the  
10 nuclear units and the scheduling of plant outages. EEG would retain control and  
11 decision-making authority over all aspects of plant operations, such as decisions  
12 to require a plant to run or shut-down, to declare an unscheduled outage, or to  
13 establish output levels when operating.

14 The buyer of the firm energy that the Petitioners propose to sell as part of their  
15 virtual divestiture would not have any control over the operations of EEG's  
16 nuclear units.

17 **Q. Have the Petitioners acknowledged that the virtual divestiture of the nuclear**  
18 **units would not transfer operational control of the plant?**

19 A. Yes. The Petitioners have agreed that the virtually divested capacity would not  
20 carry with it the right to:

- 21 a. determine when the generating plant is operated;
- 22 b. set the price at which the plant is bid into PJM;
- 23 c. determine when, and for how long, the plant will shut down for  
24 maintenance;
- 25 d. determine whether, and to what extent, capital improvements are to be  
26 made to the plant;

---

<sup>89</sup> Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame, at page 18, lines 2-7.

1 e. decide whether and when to retire the unit.<sup>90</sup>

2 **Q. Has the FERC approved the virtual divestiture plan proposed by the**  
3 **Petitioners?**

4 A. Yes. the FERC found that the virtual divestiture would effectively transfer control  
5 of the output of the nuclear capacity from the merged firm to the purchasers.<sup>91</sup>  
6 The FERC further found that the merged firm could not withhold the energy from  
7 the market and that the buyer of the energy would determine where and to whom  
8 the energy is ultimately sold.<sup>92</sup>

9 **Q. Is this consistent with FERC precedent?**

10 A. No. It is a well established FERC precedent that the capacity associated with firm  
11 energy sales must be attributed to the party that has the authority to decide when  
12 generating resources are available for operation<sup>93</sup> and that an applicant may only  
13 add or subtract long-term firm purchases or sales, respectively, that assign  
14 operational control of such capacity to the buyer:

15 In short, if an Applicant has control over certain capacity such that  
16 the Petitioner can affect the ability of that capacity to reach the  
17 relevant market, then that capacity should be attributed to the  
18 Petitioner when performing the screens.<sup>94</sup>

19 **Q. Is there any actual experience with the concept of virtual divestiture of a**  
20 **power plant?**

21 A. No. The concept of virtual divestiture is novel and untested.

---

<sup>90</sup> Response to Data Request NJEUC/RESA-PSEG-63.

<sup>91</sup> *FERC Order Authorizing Merger*, Paragraph 134, at page 46.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>93</sup> FERC Revised Filing Requirements, Section 33.3(c)(4)(i)(A).

<sup>94</sup> 110 FERC 61,097, at page 29.

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1 **Q. Have you examined what Mr. Frame’s HHI pre-merger to post-mitigation**  
 2 **changes would be if the virtually divested capacity was considered to be**  
 3 **within the operational control of EEG?**

4 A. Yes. We have examined the pre-merger to post-mitigation HHI changes in Mr.  
 5 Frame’s Mitigation Scenario 1 if only the actual divestment was considered. The  
 6 results are presented in Table 7 below. As this Table shows, the PJM East market  
 7 would be substantially more concentrated if the virtually divested nuclear capacity  
 8 were not allocated to other participants.

9 **Table 7: Pre-Merger to Post-Mitigation HHI Changes, Frame Mitigation**  
 10 **Scenario 1, with and without nuclear virtual divestments**

	Summer				Winter			Shoulder		
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	1	2	3
HHI Change: Post-Mitigation Scenario 1										
With nuclear virtual divestment	-23	-1	1	-78	-33	40	-28	2	-33	-12
Without nuclear virtual divestment	332	394	547	910	344	757	822	387	562	784
Difference	355	395	546	989	377	717	850	385	595	796

11  
 12 **Q. Is the Petitioners’ proposed virtual divestiture plan symmetric in terms of**  
 13 **increasing and decreasing the amounts of capacity that would be divested as**  
 14 **circumstances change?**

15 A. No. The Petitioners have proposed that the amount of capacity that would be  
 16 virtually divested would decrease in response to (i) the sale of a nuclear  
 17 generating unit to a non-affiliated entity; (ii) the retirement or permanent derating  
 18 of a nuclear generating unit; and (iii) the construction of facilities that provide  
 19 additional transfer capacity into PJM East, excluding any increase in transfer  
 20 capability that might result from the construction included in the PJM Regional  
 21 Transmission Expansion Plan that is effective June 2005.<sup>95</sup> However, the amount  
 22 of nuclear capacity to be virtually divested would not be increased even if the  
 23 Petitioners acquired or built more capacity or increased the capacity of an existing  
 24 generating facility.

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1 **Q. Is there any provision of the Petitioners proposed mitigation plan that would**  
2 **prevent EEG from purchasing or building new capacity in PJM East or**  
3 **Northern New Jersey?**

4 A. No.

5 **Q. Will the Petitioners agree to a moratorium on generating facility**  
6 **development as a condition precedent to the approval of the proposed**  
7 **merger?**

8 A. No.<sup>96</sup>

9 **Q. Have you seen any evidence that the Petitioners are planning to increase the**  
10 **capacity of any of their nuclear units in PJM East?**

11 A. Yes. PSEG already has announced that it will seek approval from the Nuclear  
12 Regulatory Commission to increase the power level of the Hope Creek nuclear  
13 plant by approximately 15 percent beginning in 2006.<sup>97</sup> At the same time, [  
14

15 REDACTED

16 ]

17 **Q. How much nuclear capacity would the Petitioners retain under their**  
18 **proposed virtual divestiture plan?**

19 A. If the merger is approved and closed, the combined company will own and have  
20 operational control over more than 6,200 MW of baseload nuclear capacity in  
21 PJM East.

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<sup>95</sup> Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame, at page 19, lines 5-11.

<sup>96</sup> Response to Data Request NJLEUC/RESA-PSEG-41.

<sup>97</sup> "Hope Creek Tells NRC of plans to apply this spring for 15% uprate," *Nucleonics Week*, March 21, 2005, at page 11.

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**Table 8: EEG Nuclear Capacity in PJM East**

Nuclear Unit	Summer Capacity (MW) <sup>98</sup>
Oyster Creek	619
Limerick	2,268
Salem	2,300
Hope Creek	1,049

2

3 EEG also will own and have operational control over another 3,010 MW of  
4 baseload nuclear capacity at the Peach Bottom and Three Mile Island nuclear  
5 units located next to PJM East, and 10,439 MW of baseload nuclear capacity in  
6 the remainder of PJM Expanded.<sup>99</sup> These figures do not include the power  
7 uprates at Hope Creek and [REDACTED] that we mentioned previously.

8

**Q. If the virtual divestiture of nuclear capacity through periodic auctions were  
9 approved, would EEG nevertheless continue to have a significant incentive to  
10 exercise market power?**

11

A. Yes. EEG would continue to own and benefit from the energy generated at more  
12 than 3,800 MW of nuclear capacity in PJM East, another 2,800 MW of nuclear  
13 capacity located just west of the Eastern Interface, as well as substantial baseload  
14 fossil capacity. Therefore, even if it divested the energy output from 2,600 MW of  
15 nuclear capacity, EEG would still profit greatly from the higher prices in the PJM  
16 energy markets that would result from the exercise of market power.

17

18

19

20

21

22

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<sup>98</sup> Source data from the Direct Testimony of Rodney Frame, Exhibits RF-3 and RF-4.  
<sup>99</sup> Exhibit RF-4.

1 they are buying from EEG, the higher the prices those potential bidders would be  
2 willing to pay to EEG in the virtual auction.

3 **Q. Is it the Petitioners' position that the BPU would have an oversight role or**  
4 **authority concerning the nuclear auctions conducted as part of the virtual**  
5 **divestiture?**

6 A. No. The Petitioners have said that the BPU would have no active role with respect  
7 to the auctions.<sup>100</sup>

## 8 **IX. SYNAPSE HHI ANALYSES**

9 **Q. Does Mr. Frame examine a wide range of scenarios concerning the possible**  
10 **buyers of the capacity that would be actually or virtually divested by EEG?**

11 A. No. There are a large number of permutations of the parties that might be buyers  
12 of the capacity that would be divested by EEG and the amounts of capacity each  
13 such potential buyer might purchase. However, Mr. Frame examined only one  
14 base case divestiture mitigation scenario in his Direct Testimony. He also  
15 examined another three alternative mitigation scenarios in his Supplemental  
16 Testimony:

17 Mitigation Scenario 1 – The virtual divestiture of nuclear capacity is to two  
18 parties that do not currently own any generating capacity in PJM and the  
19 fossil divestiture is split among Edison Mission Energy (50 percent),  
20 Mirant (25 percent) and Constellation (25 percent).

21 Mitigation Scenario 2 – The virtual divestiture of nuclear capacity is made on a  
22 pro-rata basis to the winning suppliers in the recent New Jersey BGS  
23 auctions, but excluding PSEG from that allocation, and the fossil  
24 divestiture was made equally to FirstEnergy, PHI, PPL and Reliant.

25 Mitigation Scenario 3 – The virtual divestiture of nuclear capacity is made on the  
26 same basis as under Alternative 2 and all of the fossil divestiture is made  
27 to a single party that does not now own any generation capacity in PJM.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Response to NJLEUC/RESA-PSEG-88.

1 The base case divestiture scenario in Mr. Frame’s Direct Testimony reflected the  
2 specific restrictions and limitations on potential purchasers that the Petitioners  
3 originally proposed. These restrictions and limitations were eliminated by the  
4 Petitioners and, consequently, they were not reflected in the three alternative  
5 Mitigation Scenarios examined by Mr. Frame in his Supplemental Testimony.

6 Consequently, in each of the Mitigation Scenarios he examines, Mr. Frame  
7 assumes that the virtually divested nuclear capacity is purchased either by buyers  
8 that do not currently own any generating capacity in PJM or by a large number of  
9 parties that currently do own capacity in PJM. He also assumes that the fossil  
10 capacity being divested is being purchased either by a single party that does not  
11 now own capacity in PJM or by three or more existing PJM participants. Given  
12 these assumptions, it is not surprising that his analyses show that post-mitigation  
13 HHIs are not much different from pre-merger concentration levels.

14 **Q. Has Mr. Frame modeled the full range of possible buyers of the capacity that**  
15 **EEG would have to divest and the amounts of capacity that each buyer might**  
16 **purchase?**

17 A. No. Mr. Frame only examines a very limited range of mitigation scenarios. In  
18 order to test the impact of the proposed merger in a wider range of possible  
19 mitigation scenarios, we have modeled the HHI changes in the PJM East energy  
20 market in the following three realistic scenarios:

21 Mitigation Scenario 4 -- all of the divested capacity is purchased by PPL.

22 Mitigation Scenario 5 -- the divested nuclear capacity is purchased equally by  
23 PPL and PEPCO and the divested fossil capacity is purchased by PPL.

24 Mitigation Scenario 6 – the virtually divested nuclear capacity is purchased by  
25 PPL and the divested fossil capacity is purchased by PEPCO and Reliant.

26 PPL, PEPCO and Reliant are the next largest owners of capacity in PJM East,  
27 after PSEG and Exelon.

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<sup>101</sup> Supplemental Testimony of Rodney Frame, at page 8.

**Biewald-Fagan-Schlissel Direct Testimony**

**BPU Docket No. EM05020106**

**OAL Docket No. PUC-1874-05**

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1 **Q. Please summarize the Mitigation Scenarios that you have analyzed and what**  
2 **input and mitigation assumptions were used in each of these cases.**

3 A. As noted above, we have evaluated six Mitigation Scenarios. As shown in Table 9  
4 below, three of the Mitigation Scenarios (Nos. 1-3) were developed by Mr.  
5 Frame. The other three Mitigation Scenarios were developed by Synapse.

6 **Table 9: Mitigation Scenarios evaluated by Synapse**

	Mitigation Scenario 1	Mitigation Scenario 2	Mitigation Scenario 3	Mitigation Scenario 4	Mitigation Scenario 5	Mitigation Scenario 6
Who developed this mitigation case?	Mr. Frame	Mr. Frame	Mr. Frame	Synapse	Synapse	Synapse
Parties who purchase the nuclear virtual divestiture (2600 MW)	Two new entrants	Pro-rata to BGS auction winners (excluding PSE&G)	Pro-rata to BGS auction winners (excluding PSE&G)	PPL	PPL (50%) and PEPCO (50%)	PPL
Parties who purchase the actual fossil divestiture (4000 MW)	EME (50%), Mirant (25%) and Constellation (25%)	FE (25%), PHI (25%), PPL (25%), and Reliant (25%)	One new entrant	PPL	PPL	PEPCO (50%) and Reliant (50%)

7

8 **Q. What input assumptions did you use to evaluate these Mitigation Scenarios?**

9 A. We have used two sets of input assumptions to evaluate these Mitigation  
10 Scenarios: Set one included all of the input assumptions used by Mr. Frame in the  
11 HHI analyses that he has discussed in his Direct and Supplemental Testimony in  
12 this proceeding. Set two included most of Mr. Frame's input assumptions but with  
13 the nuclear and transmission assumptions corrected as we have discussed earlier  
14 in this testimony.

1 This means that we have examined a total of twelve cases, involving six  
2 Mitigation Scenarios under each of the two sets of input assumptions.

3 **Q. Please summarize the corrections that you have made to Mr. Frame's input**  
4 **assumptions.**

5 A. As we have explained in Sections V.B.1, V.B.4 and V.B.5 above, we have  
6 corrected Mr. Frame's input assumptions to reflect (1) the proposed [ ] MW  
7 power uprate at Hope Creek in 2006, (2) Petitioners' claimed improvements in  
8 operating performance at both Salem and Hope Creek, (3) the use of the recent  
9 performance of Exelon's nuclear units, and (4) the use of an economic allocation  
10 of the transmission import capability across the PJM East interface.

11 **Q. Does this mean that you are satisfied that the remainder of Mr. Frame's**  
12 **input assumptions are reasonable and produce realistic results?**

13 A. Not at all. As we have discussed in Section V of this testimony, we believe that,  
14 overall, Mr. Frame's assumptions and modeling methodology bias his analyses  
15 and cause him to understate the potential impact of the proposed merger on the  
16 levels of concentration in the PJM energy market. However, it was not possible  
17 for us to modify Mr. Frame's assumptions to make them more realistic and still be  
18 able to use his database to run revised HHI analyses. For this reason, we have  
19 accepted most of Mr. Frame's input assumptions with confidence that their use  
20 causes us to understate the post-divestiture levels of concentration in the PJM East  
21 energy market and the ability of EEG to exercise market power.

22 **Q. Have you rerun Mr. Frame's HHI model using all of his input assumptions?**

23 A. Yes. As shown on Exhibit BFS-6, when we reran Mr. Frame's model, we  
24 obtained the same results as Mr. Frame has presented in his Exhibit RF-9  
25 (Revised).

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1 **Q. What are the results of rerunning Mr. Frame’s Mitigation Scenarios 1**  
2 **through 3 to reflect your corrected nuclear and transmission import**  
3 **assumptions?**

4 A. These results are presented in Table 10 below and in Exhibit BFS-6.

5 **Table 10: Pre-Merger to Post-Mitigation HHI Changes in Mr. Frame’s**  
6 **Mitigation Scenarios 1-3, with Frame and Synapse Input**  
7 **Assumptions**

	Summer				Winter			Shoulder		
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	1	2	3
HHI Change: Mitigation Scenario 1										
Frame input assumptions	-23	-1	1	-78	-33	40	-28	2	-33	-12
Synapse input assumptions	75	106	151	139	63	246	209	75	75	137
HHI Change: Mitigation Scenario 2										
Frame input assumptions	60	63	36	-88	34	68	-21	58	4	-4
Synapse input assumptions	167	179	198	160	138	287	240	141	126	160
HHI Change: Mitigation Scenario 3										
Frame input assumptions	5	13	5	-110	-18	39	-44	11	-33	-26
Synapse input assumptions	110	128	166	139	86	262	218	92	86	138

8  
9 As a result of making just our four corrections to Mr. Frame’s input assumptions,  
10 the merger would fail the FERC Appendix A Screening Analysis due to HHI  
11 changes greater than 100 in six of the ten hours studied in Mitigation Scenario 1;  
12 in all ten of the hours studied in Mr. Frame’s Mitigation Scenario 2; and in seven  
13 of the ten hours studied in Mr. Frame’s Mitigation Scenario 3. Indeed, in some of  
14 the hours studied in these Scenarios, the pre-merger to post-mitigation HHI  
15 changes would be significantly higher than 100.

16 **Q. What are the results of your modeling of your three additional Mitigation**  
17 **Scenarios (Nos. 4-6) using all of Mr. Frame’s modeling assumptions?**

18 A. As shown in Table 11 below, in Mitigation Scenarios 4, 5 and 6, the HHI changes  
19 from pre-merger to post-mitigation are significantly above 100 in all ten hours  
20 examined using Mr. Frame’s input assumptions.<sup>102</sup> Consequently, even if we use  
21 all of Mr. Frame’s input assumptions, the proposed merger fails the Appendix A

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1 Screening Analysis in all ten hours studied if it is assumed the divested capacity is  
 2 purchased by parties which are already substantial participants in PJM, as is  
 3 modeled in Mitigation Scenarios 4, 5 and 6.

4 **Table 11: Pre-Merger to Post-Mitigation HHI Changes in Synapse**  
 5 **Mitigation Scenarios 4, 5 and 6, with Frame and Synapse Input**  
 6 **Assumptions**

	Summer				Winter			Shoulder		
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	1	2	3
HHI Change: Mitigation Scenario 4										
Frame input assumptions	339	367	323	348	362	340	358	351	294	359
Synapse input assumptions	506	544	557	683	523	621	692	540	577	686
HHI Change: Mitigation Scenario 5										
Frame input assumptions	274	289	222	130	274	255	188	270	204	194
Synapse input assumptions	422	441	420	416	410	502	479	414	413	440
HHI Change: Mitigation Scenario 6										
Frame input assumptions	200	224	207	192	205	273	235	221	185	242
Synapse input assumptions	318	363	412	541	329	554	579	363	412	571

7  
 8 **Q. Finally, what are the results of your modeling of your three additional**  
 9 **Mitigation Scenarios (Nos. 4-6) when you use your corrected nuclear and**  
 10 **transmission input assumptions?**

11 A. As shown in Table 11 above, the use of our four corrections to Mr. Frame’s inputs  
 12 assumptions for future nuclear unit performance and the allocation of the limited  
 13 transmission capability across the PJM East interface results in the proposed  
 14 merger failing the FERC Appendix A Screening Analysis by very substantial  
 15 margins in all of the hours examined.

---

<sup>102</sup> These results are presented in greater detail in Exhibit BFS-6.

1 **Q. Are there any restrictions on the potential buyers of either the fossil capacity**  
2 **being actually divested or the nuclear capacity being virtually divested that**  
3 **would prevent the third, fourth and fifth largest existing participants in PJM**  
4 **from buying all the divested capacity as you have assumed in Mitigation**  
5 **Scenarios 4, 5 and 6?**

6 A. No.

7 **X. THE BGS AUCTION**

8 **Q. Have the Petitioners presented any analysis of the ability of EEG to exercise**  
9 **market power in the BGS auctions?**

10 A. No. The Petitioners have not presented any analysis beyond several pages of  
11 narrative discussion in the Additional Testimony of Mr. Frame.<sup>103</sup>

12 **Q. Have the Petitioners conducted a market power study of the BGS auctions?**

13 A. No.<sup>104</sup>

14 **Q. Should the BPU be concerned about the potential for EEG to exercise market**  
15 **power in the BGS auctions?**

16 A. Yes. PSEG has supplied substantial amounts of power through the BGS auctions,  
17 both as a successful bidder and as a supplier to other successful bidders. For  
18 example, see the Direct Testimony of Petitioner witness Mr. Frank Cassidy in JP-  
19 9, at pages 18 through 26.

20 **Q. Has Exelon supplied a significant amount of BGS power?**

21 A. No.

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<sup>103</sup> See the Additional Direct Testimony of Mr. Frame in JP-6 Additional.

<sup>104</sup> Response to NJLEUC/RESA-PSEG-125.

1 **Q. Is there any reason to expect that this might change in the near future?**

2 A. Yes. Exelon has been committed to using its nuclear capacity in Illinois to  
3 serving loads in its Chicago service area. This commitment will no longer exist  
4 after the end of 2006. At that time, Exelon will be free to bid some or all of its  
5 10,000 MW+ of nuclear capacity into the BGS auctions.

6 **Q. Wouldn't BGS customers be expected to benefit from the availability of this**  
7 **additional low-cost nuclear energy?**

8 A. Yes, unless EEG is able to exercise market power to boost BGS prices due to the  
9 availability of this additional nuclear energy, its dominance in the PJM East  
10 market, and/or its position as a supplier of natural gas to competitor power plants.

11 **Q. What action would the BPU need to take to provide an adequate check that**  
12 **no BGS bidder has exercised market power?**

13 A. In order to permit a meaningful investigation of whether any post-merger  
14 bidder(s) will exercise market power in the annual BGS auctions, the BPU needs  
15 to conduct more detailed oversight of the BGS auction process.

16 **XI THE ABILITY OF EEG TO EXERCISE MARKET**  
17 **POWER THROUGH STRATEGIC BIDDING**

18 **Q. Please explain why it is important for the BPU to be concerned that EEG, the**  
19 **new company created by the proposed merger, would be able to exercise**  
20 **market power even if the merger satisfied the FERC merger guidelines.**

21 A. At the same time that the merger would result in a huge new company, the  
22 merger-related savings claimed by Petitioners are extremely minor. For example,  
23 in the testimony of Petitioner witness William D. Arndt, the Petitioners have  
24 noted that the electric merger-related savings in New Jersey would average only  
25 \$12 million per year during the first four years after the merger is completed, the

1 period emphasized by the Petitioners in their merger studies.<sup>105</sup> These claimed  
2 savings could easily be lost if EEG were able to raise market prices only slightly  
3 through the exercise of the market power that comes from its dominant size.

4 Given the size of the proposed merged company, the potential impact of the  
5 merged company and energy and capacity market prices in PJM East and the  
6 extremely minor merger-related savings claimed by the Petitioners, it is critical  
7 for the BPU to look beyond the results of Mr. Frame’s idealized HHI analyses. In  
8 particular, the BPU must examine whether or not it will be profitable for the  
9 merged company to exercise market power through strategic bidding or by  
10 physically withholding capacity from the market. This is crucial because the  
11 merger will create a situation in PJM East with a single dominant firm, even if the  
12 Petitioners actually carry out the revised mitigation that they propose. In this  
13 situation, it is important to determine whether EEG, which will be the dominant  
14 firm and “market leader” in PJM East, will be able to profitably exercise market  
15 power through strategic bidding because merely looking at the usual market  
16 concentration indices for the total market (the “HHI”) does not address this  
17 adequately.

18 **Q. Have the Petitioners presented a strategic bidding analysis in this**  
19 **proceeding?**

20 A. No. Neither the Petitioners nor Mr. Frame have performed any strategic bidding  
21 analyses.

22 **Q. Have you prepared an analysis to evaluate whether EEG would be able to**  
23 **benefit from strategic bidding?**

24 A. Yes. We used the ELMO model to evaluate whether EEG would be able to  
25 exercise market power by strategic bidding.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Exhibit JP-5, at page 54.

1 ELMO is a screening model developed by Synapse to evaluate the market power  
2 potential in the electricity energy market. The model is based on the supply curve  
3 concept and the potential revenue gain that participants could earn by bidding  
4 resources above their costs. The basic mechanism is that the owners of units on  
5 or below the margin can increase the market price by bidding up or withholding  
6 capacity. Then all the resources that still remain in the market receive a higher  
7 price. For any given participant one can think of low-cost baseload resources as  
8 the motive and intermediate cost marginal resources as the means to exercise  
9 market power in this way. Any company that has both may be able to  
10 independently increase their net revenues – although all generators benefit when  
11 any one boosts the market price.

12 ELMO is not a detailed market simulation, so its results are indicative but not  
13 definitive. Some of the characteristics of ELMO are:

- 14 ▪ A single resource curve representing complete units.
- 15 ▪ Outages represented by derated capacity rather than probabilistically.
- 16 ▪ A single market with no internal transmission constraints.
- 17 ▪ No operational limits related to unit commitment or ramping.
- 18 ▪ No operational restrictions related to grid stability requirements.
- 19 ▪ No fixed contracts or obligations.
- 20 ▪ Independent pricing behavior, i.e., no implicit or explicit collusion.

21 Thus, in a number of ways ELMO does not represent all the complications and  
22 restrictions of the actual market that both provide and limit opportunities for the  
23 exercise of market power.

24 **Q. What analyses did you do with ELMO?**

25 A. In performing this market power evaluation, we have examined the same six  
26 Mitigation Scenarios that we examined in our HHI analyses discussed in Section

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<sup>106</sup> See Exhibit BFS-8.

1 IX of this testimony. As with the HHI analyses, we examined each Mitigation  
2 Scenario using two sets of input assumptions. Our first set of analyses used all of  
3 Mr. Frame’s input assumptions. Our second set of analyses used most of Mr.  
4 Frame’s input assumptions except that we made corrections to reflect improved  
5 nuclear power plant performance capacity and economic allocation of the  
6 transmission into PJM East.

7 In both sets of analyses we used the resources as identified by Mr. Frame in his  
8 various pre and post merger cases and look at the market power potential. For the  
9 basic resource curve we used Mr. Frame’s “Summer1” period data which gave the  
10 most total resources.

11 **Q. What were the results of your analyses?**

12 A. The results of our strategic bidding analyses are presented in Exhibit BFS-9.  
13 These analyses with the Synapse ELMO model revealed substantial market power  
14 potential in the existing PJM East energy market in which PSEG has a resource  
15 share of roughly 25 percent. However, the potential for the exercise of market  
16 power increases as a result of the merger even after mitigation. This increase in  
17 the potential for the exercise is represented by percentage increases in market  
18 clearing prices in the pre-merger and post-mitigation situations. For example, a  
19 15.8 percent result in a post-mitigation situation represents a greater potential for  
20 the exercise of market power than does a 13.5 percent result in the corresponding  
21 pre-merger situation.

22 All of the scenarios that we examined showed increases in the average energy  
23 market clearing price as a result of the exercise of market power. In the first set  
24 of analyses, which used all of Mr. Frame’s input assumptions, our projections of  
25 pre-merger to post-mitigation increases range from two tenths of one percent  
26 increase (for Mr. Frame’s Mitigation Scenarios 1 and 3) to slightly more than one

1 percent increase (for Synapse Mitigation Scenarios 4,5 and 6).<sup>107</sup> The net revenue  
2 changes (difference between market price and production costs) for the  
3 participants range from 12 percent to 16 percent depending on the Mitigation  
4 Scenario.

5 The results of our second set of analyses, which used corrected nuclear  
6 performance and transmission import assumptions, also showed potential  
7 increases in the potential for the exercise of market power from the pre-merger to  
8 the post-mitigation scenarios. For example, Synapse Mitigation Scenarios 4 and 5  
9 showed potential market power revenue impacts 2.3 percent greater than the pre-  
10 merger situation. The market power revenue impact under Synapse Mitigation  
11 Scenario 6 was 1.3 percent.<sup>108</sup>

12 **Q. What is your overall conclusion from the ELMO modeling?**

13 A. Our ELMO modeling shows that there already is a significant potential for market  
14 power in PJM East because of PSEG's substantial market share. However, the  
15 proposed merger can be expected to make the situation worse, even with the  
16 Petitioners' proposed levels of virtual and actual divestiture. The amount by  
17 which the proposed merger will increase the ability of EEG to exercise market  
18 power will depend on the identities of the parties that actually purchase this  
19 divested capacity.

20 **Q. Have you seen any other studies that have concluded that market**  
21 **concentration is associated with higher prices in electricity markets?**

22 A. Yes. In addition to theoretical models, the economics literature contains a wealth  
23 of empirical analyses dealing with market concentration and market power in  
24 electricity markets, both before and after the energy crisis in California. In its

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<sup>107</sup> Confidential Exhibit BFS-9, Table 5, at page 4.

<sup>108</sup> Confidential Exhibit BFS-9, Table 6, at page 5.

1 report on market power in restructured electricity markets, the U.S. Department of  
2 Energy finds that:

3 There is strong evidence that market power has been exercised in the  
4 electricity context. In both the United Kingdom (U.K.) and California,  
5 where data from competitive electricity generation markets are now  
6 available, researchers have found that wholesale power prices have been  
7 as much as 75 percent above competitive levels at times. Other studies  
8 examining electricity markets in Australia, New Jersey, and Colorado  
9 identify potential market power issues in those areas as well.<sup>109</sup>  
10

11 Just to name a few other studies, Bushnell (2003) argues that “more advanced  
12 methods, such as models of oligopoly competition, can potentially provide a  
13 much better understanding of the competitive outlook for a market” than the tests  
14 historically used by regulators as screens for the potential abuse of market power  
15 by suppliers. Under an alternative plan for the divestiture of California’s thermal  
16 generation units, Bushnell finds that “a more substantial, but still plausible,  
17 reduction in supplier concentration would have saved consumers nearly \$2 billion  
18 during the summer of 2000.”<sup>110</sup>

19 Likewise, Borenstein et al. (1999) examine the degree of competition in the  
20 California wholesale electricity market during June-November 1998 by  
21 comparing the market prices with estimates of the prices that would have resulted  
22 if all firms were price takers (i.e., if no firm had market power). They find  
23 significant departures from competitive pricing, raising the cost of power  
24 purchases by about 22 percent above the competitive level. Borenstein et al. find

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<sup>109</sup> U.S. Department of Energy Office of Economic, Electricity and Natural Gas Analysis, Office of Policy. “Horizontal Market Power in Restructured Electricity Markets.” March 2000. Washington, D.C. DOE/PO-0060.

<sup>110</sup> Bushnell, Jim. 2003. “Looking for Trouble: Competition Policy in the U.S. Electricity Industry” *Center For the Study of Energy Markets (CSEM) Working Paper Series*. Paper CSEMWP-109. <http://repositories.cdlib.org/uce/i/csem/CSEMWP-109>

1 that these departures are most pronounced during the highest demand periods but  
2 that the observed prices cannot be attributed to competitive peak-load pricing.<sup>111</sup>

3 **Q. Have economists studied the effect of concentration on market price in other**  
4 **industries?**

5 A. Yes. We will discuss several examples. Lopez et al. (2002) seek to separate  
6 oligopoly-power and cost-efficiency effects of changes in industrial concentration  
7 and assesses their impact on output prices in 32 food-processing industries. Their  
8 empirical results indicate that although concentration induces cost efficiency in  
9 one-third of the industries, oligopoly-power effects either dominate cost  
10 efficiency or reinforce inefficiency, resulting in higher output prices in most  
11 industries.<sup>112</sup>

12 Gasoline markets have been the focus of several studies of market concentration  
13 and price effects. GAO finds that increases in HHI as a result of mergers in the  
14 1990s were associated with an increase in the price of gasoline averaging about 1  
15 cent to 2 cents per gallon.<sup>113</sup>

16 The banking industry has also been scrutinized for price effects associated with  
17 market concentration. Supporting earlier studies,<sup>114</sup> Rhoades (1992) found that

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<sup>111</sup> Borenstein, Severin, James Bushnell, and Frank Wolak. "Diagnosing Market Power in California's Deregulated Wholesale Electricity Market." 2000. Working Paper No. PWP-064. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Energy Institute.

<sup>112</sup> Lopez, Rigoberto A., Azzeddine M. Azzam, and Carmen Liron-Espana. Mar 2002. "Market Power and/or Efficiency: A Structural Approach." *Review of Industrial Organization*. Vol. 20, No. 2. pp 115-126.

<sup>113</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office. 2004. "Effects of Mergers and Market Concentration in the U.S. Petroleum Industry." GAO-04-96.

<sup>114</sup> Berger, Alan N. and Timothy H. Hannan, 1989. "Deposit Interest Rates and Local Market Concentration." In *Concentration and Price*. The MIT Press: Cambridge MA. ed. Leonard W. Weiss.

1 mortgage interest rates tended to be higher in cities where concentration was  
2 relatively high, based on data on loan rates from 20 cities in 1987 and 1988.<sup>115</sup>

3 In an extensive review of existing empirical studies, Leonard Weiss found that  
4 higher levels of concentration do indeed tend to correlate with higher prices  
5 throughout most of the markets considered.<sup>116</sup> Weiss's summary of 121 data sets  
6 of concentration and price covering a wide range of industries (including airlines,  
7 supermarkets, cement, and many others) shows a convincing majority of studies  
8 in which concentration appears to result in higher market price:

9	Significant positive effects	76
10	Non-significant positive effects	30
11	Non-significant negative effects	11
12	Significant negative effects	<u>4</u>
13	TOTAL	121

14 In the table above, a “significant positive effect” refers to a statistically significant  
15 result in which higher concentration correlates with higher prices. For roughly  
16 two-thirds of data sets, a 10 percentage point rise in the combined market share  
17 of the three largest firms was associated with an increase in price of more than 1  
18 percent.<sup>117</sup> Another 20 percent are correlated with a price increase of zero to 1  
19 percent.<sup>118</sup>

20 **Q. Are studies of other industries relevant to electricity markets?**

21 A. Electricity differs from other commodities in significant ways. Competition from  
22 substitute products can mitigate the effects of concentrated markets for other  
23 commodities (i.e., if the price of one product increases, consumers may be willing

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<sup>115</sup> Rhoades, Stephen A. 1992. “Evidence on the Size of Banking Markets from Mortgage Loan Rates in Twenty Cities.” *Federal Reserve Bulletin* 78 pp. 117-118.

<sup>116</sup> *Concentration and Price*, Weiss, editor, the MIT Press, 1989.

<sup>117</sup> *Competition and Price*, Weiss, Editor, MIT Press, 1989, at page 19.

<sup>118</sup> We group these datasets by the lower value when a range of associated price increases is presented.

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1 to purchase another). Electricity does not have obvious or readily available  
2 substitutes for many purposes. Moreover, demand for electricity does not easily  
3 respond to changes in price. Where other sources of energy can be substituted for  
4 electricity (e.g., furnaces burning natural gas or oil are an alternative to electric  
5 heat), shifting to other commodities is quite limited.

6 Generally, other commodities face competition from other countries or regions.  
7 To some extent, the effects of concentration in electricity markets can be  
8 moderated by importing power, but these imports are limited by the transmission  
9 system.

10 In general, these differences will intensify the effects of market concentration on  
11 price in electricity markets relative to many other industries.

## 12 **XII. THE IMPACT OF MARKET POWER ON NEW** 13 **JERSEY ELECTRIC PRICES**

14 **Q. Have you quantified what the exercise of market power identified in these**  
15 **analyses could cost New Jersey electricity ratepayers?**

16 A. Yes. Based upon the information discussed above, we conclude that the  
17 wholesale market price increases of more than 1 percent resulting from the merger  
18 are possible. For New Jersey, where annual electricity sales are about 80  
19 thousand GWh per year and wholesales prices for 2006 are anticipated to be in the  
20 neighborhood of \$80/MWh (load weighted price for PJM East based upon current  
21 forward market prices for PJM West, scaled up based upon the past actual ratio of  
22 PJM West to PJM East prices), the total wholesale cost is about \$6.4 billion per  
23 year. A one percent increase in the wholesale market price would amount to \$64  
24 million per year. Over ten years, not accounting for market changes, escalation,  
25 or discounting, the total impact on NJ customers would amount to \$640 million.  
26 This calculation is shown in Exhibit BFS-10. There are credible scenarios in  
27 which the impact would be significantly greater.

1 **Q. What increase in wholesale market prices would wipe out the merger related**  
2 **savings claimed by the Petitioners for New Jersey ratepayers?**

3 A. The \$12 million average annual electric merger-related savings claimed for the  
4 years 2006-2009 by the Petitioners for New Jersey ratepayers would be wiped out  
5 by just a 0.20 percent increase in wholesale prices from the exercise of market  
6 power.

### 7 **XIII.THE IMPLICATIONS OF GAS MARKET POWER**

8 **Q. Have you evaluated whether the merged company could exercise market**  
9 **power in gas markets?**

10 A. No. Ratepayer Advocate witness Mr. Richard Lelash has examined that issue.

11 **Q. Have seen any evidence that suggests that the merged company’s ability to**  
12 **exercise market power in gas markets also would enable it to earn additional**  
13 **revenues in electric energy markets?**

14 A. Yes. The following evidence suggests that the new company created by the  
15 merger could earn additional revenues in electric markets and disadvantage  
16 electric competitors through the exercise of market power in gas markets.

17 For example, an August 2005 Presentation to investors by the President of  
18 Exelon’s Power Team noted that in Exelon’s market in the East (PJM) “natural  
19 gas prices drive power prices and that “power prices are tracking closely to  
20 increasing fuel costs.”<sup>119</sup> Because the merged company will have such substantial  
21 amounts of nuclear capacity, it will be able to profit from higher power prices due  
22 to increasing natural gas prices. Natural gas tends to set the marginal cost of  
23 power. Nuclear power generation cost will be substantially less.

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<sup>119</sup> Exhibit BFS-7, at page 8 of 14.

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4 **Q. Have you seen any evidence that the merged company would be able to**  
5 **disadvantage electric competitors through the exercise of market power in**  
6 **gas markets?**

7 A. Yes. PSEG has indicated that during 2004 it delivered natural gas to power  
8 eleven merchant plants.<sup>121</sup>

9 **XIV. THE BPU CANNOT RELY ON PJM TO**  
10 **EFFECTIVELY MITIGATE THE EXERCISE OF**  
11 **MARKET POWER BY EEG**

12 **Q. Can the BPU rely on PJM to effectively mitigate the exercise of market**  
13 **power by EEG?**

14 A. No. Primarily, PJM is limited to offer-capping suppliers at 110 percent of  
15 marginal costs, even if such an offer cap results in a greater return to the supplier  
16 than would be expected in a fully competitive market. The ten percent adder is  
17 somewhat arbitrary and it has not been definitively shown that a lower level  
18 would not result in outcomes more closely approximate fully competitive  
19 markets.

20 Moreover, energy offers are not capped at 110 percent of marginal cost if the only  
21 binding constraint is the PJM East interface itself.

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<sup>120</sup> Confidential Response to RAR-MKT-87 (CONF).

<sup>121</sup> Response to RAR-MKT-11.

1 **Q. What is the impact of the limited market power mitigation tools available to**  
2 **the PJM?**

3 A. The result is a reduced ability to ensure that market price outcomes are  
4 competitive and that participants are not exercising market power through  
5 strategic bidding or the withholding of otherwise available capacity.

6 **Q. Given the current tools available to PJM, could the BPU rely on PJM to**  
7 **effectively monitor and mitigate the exercise of market power by EEG if the**  
8 **merger were approved and closed?**

9 A. No.

## 10 **XV. NUCLEAR-RELATED EARNINGS**

11 **Q. Have the Petitioners provided any estimate of their projected nuclear-related**  
12 **earnings/savings from the proposed merger?**

13 A. Yes. The Petitioners have estimated that the merger would result in approximately  
14 \$170 million of additional pre-tax earnings each year. Approximately \$70 million  
15 of these additional earnings would be from nuclear production improvements.  
16 Approximately \$100 million would be savings from nuclear cost reductions.<sup>122</sup>

17 **Q. What are the nuclear production improvements that the Petitioners expect to**  
18 **achieve from the proposed merger?**

19 A. The testimony filed at the FERC by Christopher Crane, the President and Chief  
20 Nuclear Officer of Exelon Nuclear, emphasizes the significantly improved  
21 performance that the Petitioners expect at the Salem and Hope Creek nuclear

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<sup>122</sup> *Financial Overview*, presentation by John F. Young, Exelon Vice President, Finance and Markets, at the Exelon Investor Conference, held in New York City on August 5, 2005, at the 10<sup>th</sup> unnumbered page. Exhibit BFS-11, at page 13 of 15.

1 plants as a result of the proposed merger.<sup>123</sup> For example, Mr. Crane notes the  
2 following in his testimony:

3 I see no reason why, over time following the merger, Salem and  
4 Hope Creek cannot be improved to the same level of performance  
5 of the plants in the Exelon Fleet. What that means, among other  
6 things, is that there is no reason why these plants cannot  
7 consistently produce more electricity than they do today. As I have  
8 testified, capacity factors at Salem and Hope Creek in 2004 were  
9 74.9% (Salem 1), 89.8% (Salem 2), and 65.6% (Hope Creek), as  
10 compared to Exelon's Fleet 2004 average capacity factor of 93.5%.  
11 If we bring each of the three PSEG reactors up to the Exelon Fleet  
12 average in terms of capacity factor, then in effect, we will be able  
13 to produce approximately 4.8 million MWh of additional  
14 electricity annually from these plants.<sup>124</sup>

15 **Q. Would the approximately \$170 million in additional annual nuclear-related**  
16 **pre-tax earnings that the Petitioners expect from the merger be on the**  
17 **regulated or the unregulated side of their business?**

18 A. These additional nuclear-related pre-tax earnings would be on the unregulated  
19 side of the merged company.

20 **Q. Is it reasonable to expect that the additional nuclear-related pre-tax earnings**  
21 **resulting from the merger could exceed even the \$170 million per year**  
22 **estimated by the Petitioners?**

23 A. Yes. Given the significant increases in natural gas futures and forward electricity  
24 prices for the years 2006 and 2007, it is reasonable to expect that, for near term  
25 years, at least, the additional annual pre-tax earnings from nuclear production  
26 improvements at Salem and Hope Creek could exceed the approximate \$70  
27 million annual figure that the Petitioners currently project by \$30 million in 2006  
28 and \$20 million in 2007.

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<sup>123</sup> Prepared Direct Testimony of Christopher M. Crane in FERC Docket No. EC05-43-000, at page 2.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., at page 20.

1 **Q. Is it also reasonable to expect that EEG also will earn other profits from the**  
2 **sale of its nuclear capacity and energy?**

3 A. Yes. EEG will be able to earn significant profits from the sale of its nuclear  
4 capacity and energy in a number of different auctions and markets. For example,  
5 EEG will be able to sell capacity in the proposed PJM RPM markets. It also will  
6 be able to bid in the New Jersey BGS auction. In addition, if the merger is  
7 approved as proposed, there will be periodic auctions of the energy from the  
8 virtually divested nuclear plants. Finally, EEG will be able to participate in the  
9 spot PJM energy markets.

10 **Q. Will any of these profits be on the regulated side of EEG?**

11 A. No. All of the profits from these capacity and energy sales will be on the  
12 unregulated side of EEG.

13 **Q. Does this complete your testimony?**

14 A. Yes.

15

16