
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Annual Review of Base Rates for Fuel
Costs for South Carolina Electric & Gas
Company }
} Docket No. 2018-2-E
}
}

**Corrected Direct Testimony of
Devi Glick**

**On Behalf of
South Carolina Coastal Conservation League and Southern Alliance for
Clean Energy**

**On the Topics of
Avoided Cost Calculations and the Costs and Benefits of Solar Net
Energy Metering**

April 12, 2018

Table of Contents

1.	INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS.....	1
2.	SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	3
3.	AVOIDED GENERATOR CAPACITY COST METHODOLOGY.....	5
4.	WINTER RESERVE MARGIN	8
5.	SCE&G'S AVOIDED COST CALCULATIONS	12
	Avoided Energy	12
	Avoided Generation Capacity Calculations.....	14
6.	NET ENERGY METERING METHODOLOGY—2018 APPLICATION.....	21
	Avoided Transmission and Distribution Capacity Value	22
	Avoided Line Losses.....	26
	Avoided Environmental Costs	31

CORRECTED VERSION

1 **1. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS**

2 **Q. Please state your name and business address for the record.**

3 A. My name is Devi Glick. I work at Synapse Energy Economics, Inc., located at
4 485 Massachusetts Avenue in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

5 **Q. Please describe Synapse Energy Economics.**

6 A. Synapse Energy Economics is a research and consulting firm specializing in
7 electricity and natural gas industry regulation, planning, and analysis. Our work
8 covers a range of issues, including integrated resource planning; economic and
9 technical assessments of energy resources; electricity market modeling and
10 assessment; energy efficiency policies and programs; renewable resource
11 technologies and policies; and climate change strategies. Synapse works for a
12 wide range of clients, including attorneys general, offices of consumer advocates,
13 public utility commissions, environmental advocates, the U.S. Environmental
14 Protection Agency, the U.S. Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of
15 Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the National Association of
16 Regulatory Utility Commissioners. Synapse has over 20 professional staff with
17 extensive experience in the electricity industry.

18 **Q. Please summarize your professional and educational experience.**

19 A. I have a master's degree in public policy and a master's degree in environmental
20 science from the University of Michigan; a bachelor's degree in environmental
21 studies from Middlebury College; and more than five years of professional
22 experience as a consultant, researcher, and analyst.

23 At Synapse and previously at Rocky Mountain Institute, I have focused on a wide
24 range of energy and electricity issues, including: utility resource planning,
25 distributed energy resource valuation, energy efficiency program impact analysis,
26 and rate design effectiveness. For this work, I develop in-house models and
27 perform analysis using industry-standard models.

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1 On topics related to the costs and benefits of distributed generation, I have co-
2 authored two studies reviewing valuation methodologies for solar PV. These
3 studies have been highly cited in public utility proceedings for their
4 recommendations around distributed energy resource pricing and rate design.
5 Most recently, I evaluated various rate design options for distributed energy
6 resources within the state of Hawaii.

7 My CV is attached as Exhibit DG-1.

8 **Q. On whose behalf are you testifying in this proceeding?**

9 A. I am testifying on behalf of the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League
10 (CCL) and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy (SACE).

11 **Q. Have you testified previously before the South Carolina Public Service
12 Commission (“the Commission”)?**

13 A. No.

14 **Q. What is the purpose of your direct testimony in this proceeding?**

15 A. The primary purpose of my testimony is both to provide input recommendations
16 for improving on South Carolina Electric & Gas Company’s (“SCE&G” or “the
17 Company”) avoided cost calculations offered to qualifying facilities (“QFs”) under the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”) and to
18 provide input on the 2018 application of the Net Energy Metering (“NEM”) Methodology for valuing the costs and benefits of Distributed Energy Resources
19 (“DERs”). Additionally, my testimony addresses SCE&G’s proposed PR-1 and
20 PR-2 tariffs.
21
22

23 **Q. How is the remainder of your testimony organized?**

24 A. My testimony is organized as follows:

- 25 1. Introduction and Qualifications
26 2. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations
27 3. Avoided Generation Capacity Cost Methodology

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- 1 4. Winter Reserve Margin Calculations
- 2 5. SCE&G's Avoided Cost Calculations
- 3 6. Net Energy Metering Methodology - 2018 Application

4 **Q. Are you sponsoring any exhibits?**

5 A. Yes. I am sponsoring the following exhibits:

- 6 • DG-1 (Resume of Devi Glick), and
- 7 • DG-2 (Avoided Cost of Transmission and Distribution Detail).

8

9 **2. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

10 **Q. Please summarize your primary conclusions.**

11 A. This is the third proceeding of its kind, post-Act 236, and the first avoided cost
12 rate filed in the wake of the cancelation of V.C. Summer nuclear units 2 and 3.
13 SCE&G now proposes substantial changes to the avoided cost methodology
14 approved by the PSC in prior dockets. The result is that solar QFs are denied the
15 ability to defer the addition of any new capacity that the company proposes
16 building, potentially charging ratepayers for expensive new generation plants that
17 could have been avoided.

18 As discussed and supported in greater detail below, my primary conclusions are
19 summarized as follows:

- 20 1. SCE&G failed to abide by this Commission's approved methodology for
21 calculating the avoided generation capacity cost for solar QFs. This resulted in
22 the elimination of an avoided capacity payment.
- 23 2. SCE&G relied on a very high winter reserve margin of 21 percent to develop
24 a capacity expansion plan where solar QFs avoid minimal costs. This resulted
25 in artificially low avoided cost payment rates in tariffs PR-1 and PR-2.
- 26 3. SCE&G made several methodological and technical errors in calculating
27 avoided costs for qualifying facilities under PURPA, particularly with regards

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1 to avoided generation capacity costs. These errors appear to be at odds with
2 PURPA and result in artificially low avoided cost payment rates in tariffs PR-
3 1 and PR-2.

4 4. These errors carry over to the NEM Methodology and application, resulting in
5 erroneous NEM component valuations. The Company also failed to recognize
6 and value avoided costs associated with additional NEM Methodology
7 components that are appropriate for consideration in this annual update. As an
8 example, avoided transmission and distribution costs are capable of being
9 reasonably quantified at this time and therefore should be included.

10 **Q. Please summarize your primary recommendations.**

11 A. I also recommend that the Commission require the Company to correct its
12 methodological and technical errors associated with its QF avoided cost
13 determination (including recalculating the avoided generation capacity cost using
14 the prior approved methodology), so that QFs are compensated appropriately as
15 required under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 and subsequent
16 requirements. The Company should file revised PR-1 and PR-2 tariffs correcting
17 the errors prior to Commission approval of the new tariffs.

18 I recommend that the Commission require the Company to complete a reserve
19 margin study prior to the publication of the 2019 IRP. In the interim, the
20 Company should recalculate the avoided cost of solar QFs based on a resource
21 plan completed with last year's 14 percent reserve margin.

22 Similarly, I recommend that the Commission require the Company to apply those
23 corrections to the DER avoided cost determinations so that DER resources
24 considered within the NEM framework are valued correctly. The Company
25 should revise the NEM tariff with the corrected NEM valuation.

26 I recommend that the Commission require the Company to calculate its avoided
27 transmission and distribution costs within the NEM methodology framework and
28 update its avoided line loss values. The Company should calculate and add these

CORRECTED VERSION

1 values to its NEM valuation. The Company should file a revised NEM tariff with
2 the updated NEM valuation prior to Commission approval of the new tariff.

3 Finally, the Company should evaluate and include avoided environmental costs in
4 future NEM valuation updates.

5

6 3. AVOIDED GENERATON CAPACITY COST METHODOLOGY

7 **Q. What is the avoided generation capacity value methodology approved in**
8 **Docket 2017-2-E?**

9 A. The methodology approved in Docket 2017-2-E has three steps.

10 Step 1: Calculate the avoided capacity value over a 15-year planning horizon
11 using a difference in revenue requirement methodology. Witness Lynch
12 explained this step in his direct testimony to Docket 2017-2-E:

13 Using a difference in revenue requirements methodology approved by the
14 Commission in Order No. 2016-297, SCE&G calculates the difference in
15 revenue requirements between the base case and the change case. Using
16 the resource plan in its latest IRP or an updated resource plan if
17 appropriate, SCE&G calculates the incremental capital investment related
18 revenue required to support the existing resource plan and develops a
19 change resource plan based on the assumption of a 100 MW capacity
20 purchase at zero cost over the 15-year IRP planning horizon. The change
21 in revenue requirement over the 15-year period between the two resource
22 plans is associated with the 100 MW purchase and is stated as an average
23 cost per kilowatt (“kW”) year.¹

24 SCE&G’s avoided capacity cost in Docket 2017-2-E was \$6.35 per kW-year.²

¹ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2017-2-E, page 8.

² Ibid, page 9.

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1 Step 2: “Identif[y] the set of critical peak hours where energy would have a
2 capacity value on the system and spread the avoided capacity cost across those
3 hours.”³ Witness Lynch outlined this process in Docket 2016-2-E:

4 SCE&G determined the critical peak hours by analyzing the hours when
5 its load fell within 95% of seasonal peak in the last 15 years (page 17,
6 lines 9-10).

7 There are 380 critical peak hours within 95% of the summer peaks and 88
8 critical peak hours within 95% of the winter peaks. The winter hours are
9 approximately 20% of the total. Accordingly, SCE&G assigns 80% of the
10 annual avoided capacity cost...to the summer and 20% to the winter based
11 on the number of hours occurring in each critical peak season (page 18,
12 lines 2-7).

13 Table 1 outlines the seasonal capacity costs as calculated by SCE&G in Docket
14 2017-2-E.⁴ The summer component was \$5.08 per kW-year and the winter
15 component was \$1.27 per kW year. The summer capacity payment was
16 \$0.01965/kWh based on 264 critical peak hours in the summer season and the
17 winter capacity payment was \$0.00675/kWh based on 192 critical peak hours in
18 the winter season.⁵

19 **Table 1: Seasonal capacity values for Docket 2017-2-E**

	Summer Component	Winter Component
\$/kW-yr	\$5.08	\$1.27
Critical Peak Hours	264	192
\$/kWh	\$0.01965	\$0.00675

³ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2016-2-E, page 16.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

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1 Step 3: Calculate a single avoided cost value based on the production of a typical
2 solar PV system. Witness Lynch explains this step in Docket 2017-2-E.

3 An additional adjustment is made to the avoided energy and avoided
4 capacity costs to calculate a single value for these components. This
5 adjustment includes a projection of the amount of kWh energy that will be
6 produced in each time period specified in the rate.⁶

7 In Docket 2017-2-E, SCE&G's utilized analysis for a typical PV system that
8 generated electricity in 1,911 hours, and contributed critical capacity during 165
9 summer hours and 7 winter hours. SCE&G then applied these PV system results
10 to the seasonal capacity costs to produce a final 15 year levelized avoided
11 capacity cost of \$0.00172/kWh.⁷

12 **Q. Did SCE&G use the methodology approved in Docket 2017-2-E to calculate**
13 **the avoided generation capacity value this year?**

14 A. No, SCE&G did not.

15 **Q. Please describe the methodology SCE&G used to calculate the avoided**
16 **generation capacity cost for Docket 2018-2-E.**

17 A. SCE&G's proposed new methodology asserted that a resource must provide
18 capacity in the winter and summer in order to provide any capacity value. As
19 solar PV doesn't typically generate during winter peaking hours, SCE&G has
20 assigned it no annual capacity. Witness Lynch outlines this in his direct
21 testimony:

22 Since SCE&G's Reserve Margin Study shows that SCE&G needs as much
23 capacity in the winter as it does in the summer, a resource has to provide
24 capacity in the winter as well as the summer in order to avoid the need for
25 capacity and thereby have capacity value. Because solar does not provide
26 capacity during the winter period, the Company is unable to avoid any of

⁶ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2017-2-E, page 15, line 10 – page 16, line 2.

⁷ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2017-2-E, page 16.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 its projected future capacity needs and, therefore the avoided capacity cost
2 of solar for these winter months is zero.⁸

3 **Q. Is this a different methodology or just a difference in calculations?**

4 A. If SCE&G was simply updating its calculations, the Company would have
5 calculated a new capacity value, identified the critical peak system hours, and
6 then determined a final value based on the quantity of electricity generated by the
7 QF during those critical peak hours. It doesn't appear that SCE&G has performed
8 any of these steps.

9 **Q. Does SCE&G provide any explanation for using a new methodology?**

10 A. No, SCE&G does not provide any explanation.

11 **Q. What are your recommendations regarding SCE&G's methodology for**
12 **calculating avoided generation capacity cost?**

13 A. The Commission should require that SCE&G recalculate the avoided generation
14 capacity cost of distributed energy resources using the three-step methodology
15 approved in Docket 2017-2-E. In doing these calculations, the Commission
16 should require that SCE&G incorporate the recommendations outlined below in
17 Section 5: SCE&G's Avoided Cost Calculations, and 1) include an opportunity
18 cost in its revenue requirement calculations; 2) include a performance adjustment
19 factor of 1.20.

20

21 **4. WINTER RESERVE MARGIN**

22 **Q. What is a winter reserve margin?**

23 A. According to the National Energy Regulatory Commission, "reserve margin is the
24 difference between available capacity and peak demand, normalized by peak

⁸ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2018-2-E, page 15, line 9 – page 16, line 2.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 demand shown as a percentage to maintain reliable operation while meeting
2 unforeseen increases in demand (e.g. extreme weather) and unexpected outages of
3 existing capacity.”⁹ A winter reserve margin tells the utility how much capacity it
4 is required to have above its projected peak winter hour based on a 50/50
5 forecast.¹⁰

6 **Q. What has SCE&G’s winter reserve margin been historically?**

7 A. SCE&G has historically used a 14 percent winter reserve margin.¹¹

8 **Q. What winter reserve margin did SCE&G use in this docket?**

9 A. SCE&G has increased its winter reserve margin to 21 percent,^{12,13} a 50 percent
10 increase over the winter reserve margin used last year.

11 **Q. What winter reserve margin do other peer utilities use?**

12 A. The Company’s proposed winter reserve margin is substantially higher than peers
13 Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Progress, Southern Company, and Santee Cooper,
14 each of which use a winter reserve margin between 12 and 17 percent.^{14,15,16,17,18}

⁹ North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

<https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ri/Pages/PlanningReserveMargin.aspx>

¹⁰ With a 50/50 forecast of peak load, there is a 50 percent probability that the observed peak load will exceed the forecasted peak load (and a 50 percent probability that it will be lower).

¹¹ South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. Integrated Resource Plan, South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2017-2-E, page 33.

¹² Direct Testimony of Joseph Lynch, Docket 2018-2-E, page 6.

¹³ South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. Integrated Resource Plan, South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2018-2-E, page 37.

¹⁴ Southern Company. An Economic Study of System Planning Reserve Margin for the Southern Company System. January 2016.

¹⁵ Duke Energy Progress South Carolina, 2017 IRP Annual Report. Integrated Resource Plan November 1, 2017.

¹⁶ Duke Energy Progress, North Carolina, 2017 IRP Update Report, Integrated Resource Plan, September 1, 2017.

¹⁷ Duke Energy Carolinas South Carolina, 2017 IRP Annual Report Integrated Resource Plan September 1, 2017.

¹⁸ Santee Cooper Integrated Resource Plan, November 2016, page 15.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 **Q. What are the impacts of this increase in the winter reserve margin?**

2 A. Recognizing that a robust reserve margin is necessary to protect system reliability,
3 this dramatic increase in SCE&G’s winter reserve margin has a profound impact
4 on system costs for ratepayers by requiring substantially more winter capacity
5 than last year’s plan. Due to this change, SCE&G adds significant new
6 generation resources to its IRP at a cost of several hundred million dollars.¹⁹ The
7 change also shifts the Company’s peak requirements from primarily summer to
8 winter. This shift masks the capacity value for solar QFs.

9 **Q. How did SCE&G develop its reserve margin methodology?**

10 A. SCE&G witness Dr. Joseph Lynch used a 14 page study that relied solely on the
11 relationship between load and weather to calculate the winter reserve margin. It is
12 surprising that Dr. Lynch would rely on such limited analysis to propose
13 increasing rate-payers costs by hundreds of millions of dollars. SCE&G states in
14 a discovery response that “use of statistical regression to correlate loads and
15 weather is a standard industry methodology.”²⁰

16 SCE&G provided no research to support the development or use of this
17 methodology.²¹ Regional peer utilities such as Duke and Southern Company use
18 a different, more comprehensive methodology that balances physical reliability
19 and customer costs. The Company did assert that it is familiar with the methods
20 used by neighboring peer utilities.²²

¹⁹ For example, a 540 MW CC at \$1000/kW costs \$540 million.

²⁰ South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Coastal Conservation League and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy’s First Data Request, Docket No. 2018-2-E. Response #25.

²¹ Ibid.

²² South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, South Carolina Coastal Conservation League and Southern Alliance for Clean Energy’s First Data Request, Docket No. 2018-2-E. Response #26.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 **Q. Please describe the methodologies used by regional peer utilities to calculate**
2 **their reserve margins, and how these methodologies differ from the one used**
3 **by SCE&G.**

4 A. Southern Company, Duke Energy Carolinas, and Duke Energy Progress utilize
5 reserve margins that were calculated with extensive analysis focused on balancing
6 the physical needs of the system and the economic cost imposed on customers.

7 • Southern Company (Georgia Power, Alabama Power, Gulf Power, Mississippi
8 Power) utilized a system dispatch model named Strategic Energy and Risk
9 Valuation Model (SERVM) to evaluate production costs relative to customer
10 costs of outages. It published a 62-page study detailing what it deems to be an
11 economically optimum 17 percent reserve margin.²³

12 • Duke Energy Progress and Duke Energy Carolinas retained Astrape
13 Consulting to conduct a resource adequacy study in both 2012 and 2016.
14 Their 17 percent winter reserve margins also utilize a methodology that makes
15 efforts to balance reliability and cost minimization.^{24,25,26}

16 **Q. What are your recommendations regarding SCE&G's winter reserve**
17 **margin?**

18 A. I have two recommendations:

19 1. The Commission should require that SCE&G hire an independent firm to
20 conduct an analysis to determine an appropriate reserve margin for both winter
21 and summer. This study should utilize a methodology that balances physical
22 reliability with minimizing economic costs to the customers.

23 2. For purposes of this docket I recommend the Commission require SCE&G to
24 use its historic 14 percent winter reserve margin. SCE&G has not fully justified
25 the considerable increase in its planning reserve margin.

²³ Southern Company. An Economic Study of System Planning Reserve Margin for the Southern Company System. January 2016.

²⁴ Duke Energy Progress South Carolina, 2017 IRP

²⁵ Duke Energy Process, North Carolina, 2017 IRP

²⁶ Duke Energy Carolinas South Carolina, 2017 IRP

1

2 **5. SCE&G’S AVOIDED COST CALCULATIONS**

3 **Q. You conclude that SCE&G has made errors in its Avoided Cost Calculations.**
4 **Please explain.**

5 A. SCE&G’s relies on an extremely high winter reserve margin of 21 percent in
6 designing its capacity expansion plan. This inappropriately reduces the proposed
7 avoided energy payments. SCE&G also utilizes a planning process that does not
8 allow QFs to provide generation or capacity value to the system when it faces
9 capacity shortfalls.

10 In calculating avoided capacity payments, SCE&G uses an unapproved avoided
11 cost methodology that eliminates the avoided capacity payments to solar QFs.
12 The Company made several other errors regarding the omission of an opportunity
13 cost of QFs and a performance adjustment factor for solar QFs. These are all
14 described in greater detail below.

15 *Avoided Energy*

16 **Q. What are your recommendations regarding the Company’s avoided energy**
17 **calculations?**

18 A. The Company relies on an extremely high 21 percent winter reserve margin
19 requirement from its 2018 IRP.²⁷ This winter reserve margin forces SCE&G to
20 include a new 540 MW CC in its resource plan for 2023 to comply with its
21 artificially high winter reserve margin. The result is a higher cost for ratepayers
22 and a lower avoided cost for QFs than they would be paid under an optimally
23 planned system with a more reasonable reserve margin.

²⁷ South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. Integrated Resource Plan, South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2018-9-E, page 37.

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1 **Q. How does SCE&G’s treatment of generation shortfalls in its planning**
2 **process affect the Company’s avoided energy cost calculations?**

3 A. The Company’s resource planning process strongly impacts the avoided cost
4 calculations. However, the IRP that the Company relies on for its resource plan is
5 not typically approved by the Commission, nor revised in response to Intervenor’s
6 testimony. The most recent IRP was filed in February and has not yet received
7 Intervenor input or any indication of Commission review. Because the Company
8 included the construction of a 540 MW NGCC in 2023 in its most recent IRP, that
9 proposed resource is incorporated into the avoided cost calculations. To date, the
10 Company has not been required to test a range of scenarios or model the cost of a
11 resource plan with DERs allowed to compete with or displace the CC or other
12 higher cost resources.

13 This has allowed the company to plan away any generation shortfalls that could
14 be more cost-effectively met with PV or other lower cost resources without
15 explanation. The result is SCE&G builds a higher cost system that does not best
16 serve the needs of the community, and DERs are awarded a lower marginal value
17 then they would have with a more efficiently planned system.

18 **Q. How does the Company’s peak demand forecast affect its avoided energy**
19 **costs?**

20 A. SCE&G’s near term energy forecasts have a significant impact on avoided energy
21 and capacity costs by driving the need for generation capacity in its resource
22 plans. This generation reduces the value that DERs can provide to the system.
23 SCE&G’s year-on-year increase in the near term forecasted peak load reflects a
24 dramatic increase in demand, as compared to prior years’ forecasts. I am
25 concerned that this near-term jump is driving long-term planning decisions at a
26 significant cost to ratepayers without justification.

27 **Q. What is your recommendation regarding SCE&G’s avoided energy cost**
28 **calculations?**

29 A. The Commission should require that SCE&G complete a proper reserve margin
30 study, to be finished in time for the 2019 IRP. The Commission should also

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1 require that SCE&G complete a new capacity expansion plan using last year's
2 reserve margin of 14 percent. SCE&G should then be required to re-calculate its
3 avoided energy cost based on this new capacity expansion plan. If SCE&G aligns
4 its winter reserve margin with that of its peers, that 540 MW CC currently
5 planned for 2023 will not be needed for many years, if at all. That delay
6 represents significantly lower costs for ratepayers. This will also lead to a more
7 accurate avoided cost rate for QFs.

8

9 *Avoided Generation Capacity Calculations*

10 **Q. Turning to avoided generation capacity costs, what is your assessment of**
11 **SCE&G's avoided generation capacity costs calculations?**

12 A. Based on the direct testimony of SCE&G Witness Lynch and the SCE&G 2018
13 IRP,²⁸ the Company appears to have made several errors, including:

- 14 1. Using an unapproved (and undefined) methodology;
- 15 2. Failing to include opportunity cost in its revenue requirement calculations;
- 16 and
- 17 3. Failing to include a performance adjustment factor.

18 **Q. Please describe the Company's errors in calculating the cost of avoided**
19 **generation capacity.**

20 A. As described in detail in section 3 of this testimony, SCE&G does not utilize the
21 methodology approved in Docket 2017-2-E to calculate the avoided cost of
22 generation capacity. SCE&G instead asserts that resources only have capacity
23 value if they are available in both the summer and winter.²⁹ Furthermore,
24 "because solar does not provide capacity during the winter period, the Company
25 is unable to avoid any of its projected future capacity needs and, therefore, the

²⁸ South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. Integrated Resource Plan, South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2018-9-E.

²⁹ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2018-2-E, pages 15.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 avoided capacity cost of solar for these winter months is zero.”³⁰ The Company
2 cites its Solar Capacity Benefits Study³¹ to support this value.³² However the
3 study does not provide an explanation as to how exactly SCE&G calculated the
4 value of zero or what methodology was used.

5 **Q. What is the final value that SCE&G uses for avoided generation capacity?**

6 A. Zero.

7 **Q. If SCE&G had applied the methodology approved in Docket 2017-2-E to this**
8 **year’s updated resource plan, what value would SCE&G have gotten for**
9 **avoided generation capacity?**

10 A. SCE&G did not follow the methodology approved in Docket 2017-2-E, therefore
11 there were no documents provided in discovery that would allow one to replicate
12 the calculations that the Company did last year using an updated resource plan to
13 come up with an exact value.

14 If SCE&G used the approved methodology to evaluate an updated resource plan
15 (with a 14 percent reserve margin), one would expect the avoided generation cost
16 to be significantly higher. There are two reasons for this: first, the 540 MW CC
17 currently planned for 2023 to meet SCE&G’s winter reserve margin would not be
18 needed. Additionally, the system would shift back to summer peaking. Future
19 capacity expansion plans would be driven by summer peaking load, which is
20 significantly more likely to line up with solar generation. With the summer
21 reserve margin set to a minimum of 14 percent, the observed winter reserve
22 margin never drops below 17 percent.³³

³⁰ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2018-2-E, pages 15-16.

³¹ Direct Testimony of Joseph M Lynch, Docket No.2018-2-E. Exhibit No JML-4. On Calculating the Capacity Benefits of Solar QFs.

³² Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2018-2-E, page 14.

³³ Discovery Response 1: Confidential Attachment to Response 1, EPLAN 17_Summer-Winter_CC2023_(112017)

CORRECTED VERSION

1 **Q. Please explain the relevance of opportunity costs in SCE&G's revenue**
2 **requirements calculation.**

3 A. An opportunity cost is the loss of potential gain from other alternatives when one
4 alternative is chosen. As discussed earlier, in years when SCE&G lacks adequate
5 generation capacity to meet its reserve margin, QFs allow the Company to avoid
6 procuring generation capacity. In years when SCE&G has excess capacity, on the
7 other hand, SCE&G is expected to offer its excess capacity into the market, to
8 generate additional revenue from otherwise unused or underutilized assets. The
9 opportunity cost associated with excess generation capacity is the potential
10 additional revenue not realized.

11 SCE&G is expected to utilize its assets to provide safe, reliable power at just and
12 reasonable rates. Doing so requires making best use of its resources on behalf of
13 its ratepayers, including engaging in off-system sales of energy and capacity
14 whenever prudent. The generation capacity provided by generators under contract
15 is included when SCE&G considers its generation capacity position relative to the
16 reserve margin. However, SCE&G does not appear to include this additional
17 revenue when calculating the difference of revenue requirements between the
18 base case and the with-QF case. The simplest way to correct this error is to
19 include a market capacity value for all years wherein QF capacity would provide
20 SCE&G with more generation capacity than its reserve margin requires.

21 **Q. Absent a wholesale generation capacity market, how can SCE&G determine**
22 **the value of selling contracts for generation capacity?**

23 A. I believe that SCE&G is already making these estimations. For instance, SCE&G
24 includes five separate years of firm capacity purchases in its 2018 IRP.³⁴
25 SCE&G's inclusion of firm annual capacity purchases in its IRP is a clear
26 indication that SCE&G already has an ability to predict the regional market price
27 for generation capacity. Not only is SCE&G able to forecast the value of selling
28 surplus capacity contracts, it already has market prices for years 2017–2019

³⁴ South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. Integrated Resource Plan, South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2018-2-E, page 37.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 because it has been participating in the regional generation capacity marketplace
2 as a purchaser for those delivery years. Table 2 details the annual generation
3 capacity avoided cost (\$/kW-yr) proposed by SCE&G last year, the annual
4 generation capacity price SCE&G considered appropriate for its own capacity
5 purchases last year, and the PJM combustion turbine cost of new entry for
6 2018/2019. The PJM value is included because it represents the total net revenue
7 requirements a utility must recover, based on a bottom-up estimate of technology
8 costs.

9 **Table 2**

SCE&G Avoided Cost 2017³⁵	SCE&G Purchase 2016³⁶	SCE&G Purchase 2017³⁷	SCE&G Purchase 2018³⁸	SCE&G Purchase 2019³⁹	PJM CT CONE 2018/19⁴⁰
\$6.35	\$61.10	\$68.62	\$70.92	\$72.38	\$102.32

10

11 Table 2, above, is very similar to the table provided by my colleague Dr. Thomas
12 Vitolo in his direct testimony in the 2017 SCE&G fuel cost proceeding, 2017-2-E,
13 and is still relevant. It shows that SCE&G’s proposed generation capacity
14 payments to QFs are well below the actual generation capacity revenue the QFs’
15 inclusion could bring to the Company.

³⁵ Direct testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2017-2-E, page 11, line 5.

³⁶ Data response SACE#2c.xlsx, Capacity Values tab, Cell D4.

³⁷ Ibid. Cell E4.

³⁸ Ibid. Cell F4.

³⁹ Ibid. Cell G4.

⁴⁰ PJM. 2017. “2020/2021 RPM Base Residual Auction Planning Period Parameters.” Table 3, 2019/2020 BRA Net CONE ICAP Terms, RTO. Converted from \$/MW-Year to \$/kW-yr.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 **Q. What generation capacity value should SCE&G use?**

2 A. SCE&G participates in a regional generation capacity bilateral marketplace rather
3 than a wholesale capacity marketplace provided by an RTO such as PJM. Thus,
4 values reflecting SCE&G’s recent experience in the local generation capacity
5 bilateral marketplace are instructive. SCE&G procured a bilateral contract for
6 generation capacity for four consecutive years, with an annual increase exceeding
7 the rate of inflation. Absent additional data specific to SCE&G’s generation
8 capacity market, I recommend that SCE&G use its capacity purchase price for the
9 years 2017, 2018, and 2019. For the year 2020 and beyond, I recommend
10 applying a forecasted inflation rate to the 2019 generation capacity value. When
11 preparing the 2019 IRP and calculating the avoided cost for next year’s docket,
12 SCE&G should gather generation capacity marketplace data to make a 15-year
13 forecast of the value of generation capacity within the region.

14 **Q. Please describe the Company’s error in failing to include a performance**
15 **adjustment factor.**

16 A. In the methodology approved in Docket 2017-2-E, the Company seeks to pay a
17 QF for providing capacity based not on its nameplate rating or expected
18 performance, but rather as a performance payment. In Docket 2017-2-E SCE&G’s
19 divides avoided capacity costs (\$6.35 per kW-year) “by the number of critical
20 peak hours in each period...based on 264 critical peak hours in the summer
21 season and...192 critical peak hours in the winter season.”⁴¹ SCE&G’s approach
22 is to subdivide the hours of the year into summer peak, winter peak, and off-peak
23 and then pay for QF generation capacity on a per kWh basis rather than a per kW-
24 yr basis, depending on the period in which the generation occurs. This approach
25 has merit, because it both simplifies the tariff structure and provides a stronger
26 incentive for the QF to produce power during peak hours when generation
27 capacity is the most valuable.

⁴¹ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2017-2-E, page 9, lines 3 and 17-20.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 However, this approach must be adjusted if it is to treat QF avoided generation
2 capacity fairly when compared to the Company's own generation capacity. If an
3 SCE&G generator were unavailable for 5 percent of the critical peak hours in a
4 season, the Company would not argue that the generator was no longer fully used
5 and useful as a generation capacity contributor and therefore ineligible for full
6 cost recovery. The same would be true if the same generator was unavailable for
7 10 or 20 percent of the hours in a given year. We expect that utility-owned
8 generators will have forced and planned outages and therefore do not require 100
9 percent availability during critical peak hours as a condition of cost recovery. To
10 ensure that qualifying facilities are not subject to undue discrimination, this
11 principle must also be applied to the QF capacity payments.

12 The appropriate way to provide QFs avoided generation capacity compensation
13 based on performance while also treating QFs and utility generators indifferently
14 is the use of a performance adjustment factor (PAF). The PAF is the reciprocal of
15 the availability a generator must obtain to be eligible for full avoided generation
16 capacity cost payments. The PAF value, a number greater than one, is then
17 multiplied by the \$/kW-yr avoided generation capacity value when calculating the
18 avoided generation capacity rates. If the QF's performance mirrors the expected
19 availability exactly, it will be paid the exact avoided generation capacity value. If
20 it performs better or worse, the payment is commensurately higher or lower.

21 **Q. Do other utilities use the PAF to adjust performance-based avoided**
22 **generation capacity payments?**

23 A. Yes. For example, Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy Progress use a PAF
24 in both North and South Carolina.^{42,43} In addition, Georgia Power uses an
25 approach very similar to the PAF whereby a QF may provide less than 100

⁴² North Carolina Utilities Commission Docket No. E-100 Sub 140.

⁴³ South Carolina Public Service Commission Docket No. 1995-1192-E.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 percent performance during key availability hours and still receive full capacity
2 payments.^{44,45}

3 **Q. What PAF value should SCE&G use?**

4 A. A PAF of 1.20 corresponds to an availability factor of 83.3 percent. I would
5 expect that a utility-owned generator with an availability factor of 83.3 percent
6 would be considered used and useful from a generation capacity perspective. A
7 QF with the same performance should be equally compensated for its generation
8 capacity contributions, suggesting that a PAF of 1.20 is appropriate. To the extent
9 that the South Carolina Public Utility Commission would consider a utility-owned
10 generator with availability factor less than 83.3 percent useful, it should consider
11 a PAF even higher than 1.20.

12 **Q. Please summarize your recommendations for calculating the value of avoided**
13 **generation capacity for qualifying facilities.**

14 A. I recommend that the Commission require SCE&G to use the methodology
15 approved in Docket 2017-2-E to calculate avoided generation capacity with the
16 following modifications:

- 17 1. Revise the Company's resource plan based on a 14 percent winter reserve
18 margin.
- 19 2. Include the additional revenue the Company would collect by selling marginal
20 surplus generation capacity contracts made possible by the new QFs in the
21 DRR calculation. Based on known market transactions in the SCE&G
22 territory, the Company should use a capacity value of \$68.62 per kW-yr in
23 2017, \$70.92 per kW-yr in 2018, \$72.38 per kW-yr in 2019, and the 2019
24 value adjusted for inflation for the year 2020 and beyond.

⁴⁴ Georgia Power. 2015. "Georgia Power Company's Qualifying Facilities (QF) Fundamentals." Page 9. Available at http://www.psc.state.ga.us/electric/GPC_%20QF_Fundamentals_Guide-PPT.pdf.

⁴⁵ Georgia Power. 2007. "Georgia Power's Small Power Producers Fundamentals." Page 17. Available at http://www.psc.state.ga.us/electric/GP_SMALL_POWER_PROD_PPT_1.ppt.

CORRECTED VERSION

- 1 3. Revise the generation capacity payment split between summer and winter to
- 2 95 percent summer and 5 percent winter.
- 3 4. Include a performance adjustment factor of 1.20.

4

5 **6. NET ENERGY METERING METHODOLOGY—2018 APPLICATION**

6 **Q. Did the Company correctly calculate the total value of NEM DERs?**

7 A. I believe that the Total Value of NEM Distributed Energy Resources table, as
8 shown in Table 6 of Witness Lynch’s testimony, is both incorrect and incomplete.
9 As just discussed in Section 5, the Company incorrectly calculated avoided
10 energy and avoided generation capacity values. These same errors extend to the
11 DER calculations as well. The Company’s errors with respect to avoided
12 generation capacity in particular appear to be at odds with a plain reading of the
13 Value of Solar methodology agreed to by parties in the settlement in Docket No.
14 2014-246-E (defining “avoided capacity” as the increase or reduction in fixed
15 costs to the utility “of building and maintaining new conventional generation
16 resources associated with the adoption of NEM”). Now that the Company gives
17 zero capacity value for net metered DERs, these resources have no ability to avoid
18 new capacity.

19 The Company should also include an avoided transmission and distribution
20 capacity value and update its line loss calculations. Finally, SCE&G should
21 evaluate and include a value for avoided environmental costs.

22 These modifications to the NEM value are significant because ratepayers
23 compensate SCE&G for the difference between retail rate and the determined
24 total value of NEM distributed energy resources. If the Commission approves an
25 artificially low avoided cost payment, ratepayers are being overcharged.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 **Q. How should SCE&G remedy the incorrectly calculated values presented in**
2 **the NEM table submitted by Witness Lynch?**

3 A. The Company should correct its methodologies and calculations for avoided
4 energy in Row 1, avoided generation capacity in Row 2, avoided T&D capacity in
5 Row 4, and avoided line losses in Row 12.⁴⁶ For avoided energy and capacity
6 values, the corrections noted in Section 5 of my testimony should be incorporated.
7 I make further recommendations below for including an avoided transmission and
8 distribution value and for updating line losses. SCE&G should also evaluate and
9 include in future updates an avoided environmental cost value in row 10.

10 *Avoided Transmission and Distribution Capacity Value*

11 **Q. Please explain the avoided transmission and distribution capacity**
12 **component.**

13 A. This component of the NEM Methodology refers to a DER's contribution to
14 deferring or avoiding the addition of transmission and/or distribution capacity
15 resources needed to serve load. The value of avoided transmission and
16 distribution (T&D) capacity should include an estimate of the costs of regional
17 and local transmission projects that may be avoided or deferred because of
18 distributed generation. Notably, avoided T&D capacity is relevant not only for the
19 NEM Methodology application, but also reflects a value added by small QF
20 resources and therefore should be reflected in SCE&G's PR-1 tariff.

21 **Q. Do you agree with SCE&G's findings that DER resources never avoid any**
22 **transmission or distribution capacity costs?**

23 A. No. SCE&G Company Witness Lynch claims that "customer-scale NEM
24 resources are distributed across SCE&G's transmission system and have too small
25 of an impact on any transmission circuit to result in avoided transmission
26 capacity."⁴⁷ On the distribution system, SCE&G suggests that because it must

⁴⁶ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2018-2-E, Table 6.

⁴⁷ Ibid. at page 28, line 15.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 “plan for when the DER is not supplying power,”⁴⁸ the Company must plan as if
2 the resource simply doesn’t exist.

3 I do not agree. These positions entirely overlook the ways that DERs, in the
4 aggregate and on average over time, reduce the need for T&D capacity
5 investments. If the DERs alleviates some of the strain on the system during
6 transmission or distribution system peaks, then those resources do, in fact, reduce
7 pressure on that system and therefore help to defer or avoid future upgrades to
8 that system.

9 **Q. Do other energy resources, such as energy efficiency, receive credit for**
10 **deferring or avoiding T&D resources?**

11 A. Yes. Energy efficiency resources are regularly credited with avoiding or deferring
12 T&D investments.⁴⁹ See the table in DCG-2 (Avoided Cost of Transmission and
13 Distribution Detail) for the results of ACEEE’s survey of avoided costs of T&D
14 for use in energy efficiency program screening. Although there is variation from
15 utility to utility, most of the avoided T&D values are between \$25 and \$75 per
16 kW-year.

17 **Q. How are these values calculated for energy efficiency?**

18 A. Methods for quantifying the value of avoided or deferred T&D investments from
19 implementing energy efficiency vary in complexity, cost, and accuracy. In its
20 October 2014 report, the Mendota Group described a range of such methods.
21 More involved methods, such as the system planning approach and rate case
22 marginal cost data with allocators, may provide somewhat more accuracy but at a
23 significantly higher cost than simpler methods. Less resource-intensive methods
24 for quantifying the value of avoided or deferred T&D include: the current values
25 method, which defines the average cost to serve load as each system’s net cost
26 divided by its peak capability; the simple method, which analyzes the cost and

⁴⁸ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2018-2-E, page 29, line 3.

⁴⁹ Baatz, Brendon. 2015. “Everyone Benefits: Practices and Recommendations for Utility System Benefits of Energy Efficiency.” American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE).

CORRECTED VERSION

1 capacity of a representative sample of recent T&D upgrade projects; and the
2 historical/forecast method, which considers whether historical and forecast T&D
3 investments are related to load growth, and weights these investments.⁵⁰

4 **Q. Are the T&D avoidance impacts of EE on the system different from DER**
5 **impacts?**

6 A. No, they are generally the same: if and when EE, DER and distribution-level QFs
7 reduce load during times when the system is constrained, they avoid or defer
8 T&D investments.

9 **Q. Do other jurisdictions credit distributed energy resources with avoiding**
10 **T&D investment?**

11 A. Yes. Austin, Texas, found a value of 1.0 cents per kWh for avoided transmission
12 capacity cost.⁵¹ In Maine, the PUC adopted a value of 1.6 cents per kWh for
13 avoided transmission capacity.⁵² Avoided distribution capacity was not included
14 in the Maine study because peak loads in the state have been and are forecasted to
15 be generally flat, and thus capacity-related distribution investments were not
16 anticipated. In contrast, SCE&G's 2017 IRP projects peak load to grow
17 significantly over the period of analysis, suggesting that the benefit of avoiding
18 distribution capacity investment in SCE&G's territory is likely to be substantial.⁵³
19 In 2014, the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission approved the structure and
20 methodology for a value of solar (VOS) tariff that utilities can adopt in lieu of net
21 metering. The VOS tariff framework calls for value components to be broken out,
22 including avoided transmission capacity and avoided distribution capacity. In its
23 Briefing Papers, Minnesota Public Utilities Commission staff found an avoided

⁵⁰ The Mendota Group. 2014. "Benchmarking Transmission and Distribution Costs Avoided by Energy Efficiency Investments for Public Service Company of Colorado." Colorado Public Utility Commission proceeding 14A-1057EG, Hearing Exhibit 1, Attachment SMW-2.

⁵¹ Chakka, Babu 2014. "Austin Energy Value of Solar Methodology."

⁵² Maine Public Utilities Commission. 2015. Maine Distributed Solar Valuation Study.

⁵³ South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. Integrated Resource Plan, South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2017-9-E, page 2.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 transmission capacity value of 1.51 cents per kWh and an avoided distribution
2 capacity value of 0.9 cents per kWh for Xcel Energy.⁵⁴

3 **Q. How should SCE&G calculate the value of avoided T&D capacity for DERs?**

4 A. Each method has pros and cons. If SCE&G does not wish to expend the resources
5 to engage in a modeling exercise to calculate avoided T&D benefits, the
6 Company could employ a simpler method, such as the historical/forecast analysis
7 approach. By considering many years, both historical and forecast, this method
8 does not disproportionately weigh infrequent, large investments. Although it does
9 not incorporate time and spatial variation, this method is easily applied using
10 publicly available data and is appropriate given SCE&G's forecasted load growth
11 over the IRP period.

12 In the absence of more granular data on monthly system peaks, the benefits of
13 DERs in terms of avoided T&D capacity can be approximated using the
14 production profile that SCE&G uses for these resources for capacity planning
15 purposes. The 2017 IRP indicates that the amount of firm solar capacity expected
16 to be available on the system peak hour is 50 percent; other analysis pegs the
17 capacity contribution at 66 percent.^{55,56} If SCE&G expects that the bulk of the
18 newly arriving DER capacity is likely to be solar PV capacity, and assuming that
19 SCE&G's avoided T&D investment is likely to fall in the range of the avoided
20 T&D values found for energy efficiency programs, then SCE&G's QF and DER
21 benefits could be anywhere from \$0 to \$100/kW-year. Considering that most of
22 the avoided T&D values used for energy efficiency programs fell in a narrower
23 range, an avoided T&D value could be between \$12.50 and \$37.50/kW-year if
24 using the SCE&G IRP value.

⁵⁴ Minnesota Public Utilities Commission Staff. 2014. CSG Rate Briefing Papers, Docket No. E002/M-13-867.

⁵⁵ South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. Integrated Resource Plan, South Carolina Public Service Commission, Docket No. 2017-9-E, page 37.

⁵⁶ John D. Wilson, "Analysis for Solar Capacity Equivalent Values for the South Carolina Electric and Gas System." Table 4, PSC Docket No. 2017-2-E (Exhibit TJV-2).

CORRECTED VERSION

1 Whatever method the Company chooses, it is important to fairly and transparently
2 assess and attribute avoided T&D benefits to these resources. While small QFs
3 also avoid transmission and distribution capacity, the Company and Commission
4 should be careful with the measurement standard used: whereas an avoided
5 transmission and distribution capacity calculation applicable to tariff PR-1 must
6 meet a “known and measurable” standard, calculations for the NEM table may
7 meet a less stringent “quantifiable” standard.

8 *Avoided Line Losses*

9 **Q. What are line losses?**

10 A. Because the wires that deliver electricity have losses, some of the power placed
11 on the transmission system is lost, never arriving to load. This means that for
12 every kWh of electricity that the utility sells it must generate one kWh plus the
13 amount lost in transit. Electricity generated on site from solar PV does not have to
14 travel through the electricity system, therefore the utility does not have to produce
15 this additional electricity lost in transit. Loss values can range from SCE&G
16 reported value of 0.246 cents/kWh over the IRP planning horizon up to more than
17 2.5 cents/kWh,⁵⁷ depending on the system.

18 **Q. Do you find SCE&G’s description of avoided line losses associated with**
19 **DERs adequate?**

20 A. No, I do not. Witness Lynch explained the Company’s approach in detail in the
21 2016 proceeding, requiring four full pages to detail the line loss methodology.⁵⁸
22 His 2018 testimony contains just nine lines.⁵⁹ Because nothing in his 2018
23 testimony suggests a methodological change from 2016, I presume the Company
24 has not changed its methodology for line loss calculation in the past year. While
25 SCE&G correctly defined marginal distribution losses as twice average losses, the

⁵⁷ Hansen, L., Lacy, V., Glick, D., A Review of Solar PV Benefit and Cost Studies, Second Edition. Rocky Mountain Institute. September 2013.

⁵⁸ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2016-2-E, pages 29–32.

⁵⁹ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2016-2-E, page 31, line 5 through 13.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 Company appears to have made two important errors in calculating line losses.
2 The Company used annual average system losses as the basis for calculating
3 marginal losses rather than losses associated with the temporal solar profile, and
4 the Company failed to allocate transmission losses as marginal (e.g. twice average
5 loss). These two errors both result in SCE&G failing to credit DERs with the full
6 value of their line loss avoidance.

7 **Q. What are annual average system losses?**

8 A. The annual average system loss is the total MWh of energy lost over the course of
9 the year divided by total MWh of energy placed on the system by the generators.
10 This average does not represent the system loss for a specific hour or system load,
11 but rather the average over 8,760 hours of high load and low load, daytime and
12 nighttime.

13 **Q. Why shouldn't annual average system loss be used to calculate the avoided
14 line losses due to solar PV?**

15 A. Real power losses increase with increased current flow.⁶⁰ This means that the line
16 loss avoidance benefits of a DER are higher during times of high system load than
17 times of low system load. For example, because daytime load is generally higher
18 than nighttime load, solar DERs likely avoid more line losses per kWh of
19 generation than a resource that operates on a full 24-hour basis. Similarly, annual
20 load tends to peak on hot, sunny days—the very hours when solar is producing at
21 highest efficiency.

22 **Q. How should SCE&G calculate system losses?**

23 A. SCE&G should consider the temporal and seasonal nature of solar PV output
24 when determining the line losses that solar DERs avoid. Ideally, SCE&G would
25 calculate the system loss for each hour of the year, and then determine how many

⁶⁰ PJM, “Marginal Losses Implementation Training,” 2007. Page 6. Available at:
[http://www.pjm.com/~media/training/new-initiatives/ip-ml/marginal-losses-implementation-
training.ashx](http://www.pjm.com/~media/training/new-initiatives/ip-ml/marginal-losses-implementation-training.ashx).

CORRECTED VERSION

1 MWh were saved each hour due to line loss avoidance induced by solar DERs. To
2 the extent that this approach is overly burdensome, the Company could calculate
3 the average system loss at 100 MW increments, ranging from peak load all the
4 way down to the lowest load of the year. By assigning each hour’s demand to a
5 load bin representing a 100 MW range, the Company could determine the line
6 loss avoidance benefits for various levels of load. The use of average annual
7 losses ignores that solar is most productive during periods of higher load and
8 doesn’t produce any electricity at all during periods of the lowest load. This likely
9 undercounts the annual system line loss avoidance due to solar DERs.

10 **Q. Please explain SCE&G’s use of marginal line losses.**

11 A. Witness Lynch explains marginal line losses as follows:

12 Marginal losses represent line losses associated with the last few
13 increments or decrements in the system load. As the system load
14 increases on power lines, the losses associated with each increment
15 in load tend to increase and, after a certain point, will increase at
16 an increasing rate. In general, the losses associated with the last
17 MW served will be greater than those associated with the MW just
18 before it. Therefore, marginal losses tend to be greater than
19 average losses and, since NEM DER reduces system loads on the
20 margin, their avoided line losses should be based on marginal
21 losses.⁶¹

22 On the distribution system, SCE&G models marginal losses as “approximately
23 twice average losses.”⁶² However, SCE&G models “marginal losses equal to
24 average losses on the transmission and sub-transmission system.”⁶³

⁶¹ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2016-2-E, page 30, line 6.

⁶² Ibid. page 31, line 15.

⁶³ Ibid. page 30, line 15.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 **Q. How do you recommend SCE&G's determine marginal line losses?**

2 A. SCE&G is correct to double average losses in deriving marginal losses, as it does
3 now in calculating marginal distribution system losses. But it doubles the wrong
4 average. SCE&G is doubling an average of losses over every hour of the year.
5 Solar does not produce electricity over every hour of the year. Solar will not avoid
6 losses, for instance, at midnight, so it is incorrect, as SCE&G does, to include
7 midnight in the average. To be accurate, SCE&G should calculate the average
8 system losses during the hours when solar generates. Then it should double that
9 PV-generation weighted average losses to accurately calculate the marginal losses
10 for solar.

11 When calculating transmission losses, SCE&G currently uses the average line
12 loss for all hours of the day, and doesn't double that average to derive marginal
13 losses. Instead, it should use an annual system loss average weighted to the PV
14 generation profile, and it should double that average transmission loss to arrive at
15 the marginal transmission losses avoided by solar PV. Review of the literature^{64,65}
16 indicates that "for transmission losses, the marginal losses are always twice the
17 average losses."⁶⁶ While it is true that "the amount of losses on the
18 transmission/sub-transmission system do not necessarily decrease with load"⁶⁷ in
19 a given hour, the system's behavior over the course of a year will behave
20 consistently with Joule's first law, resulting in marginal losses double the average
21 losses.

⁶⁴ Eldridge, B. et al. 2017. "Marginal Loss Calculations for the DCOPF." FERC Technical Report on Loss Estimation. Page 3. Available at: <https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2017/marginallosscalculations.pdf>.

⁶⁵ Ivanov, C. 2012. "Marginal Line Losses," for Cooperative Research Network, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. Page 19. Available at https://www.michigan.gov/documents/energy/MECA_Response_to_EE_Q15_final_419596_7.pdf.

⁶⁶ Liu, L. and A. Zobian. 2002. "The Importance of Marginal Loss Pricing in an RTO Environment." The Electricity Journal 15(8):40-45. Page 2. Available at: http://www.ces-us.com/download/Reports_and_Publications/Losses%20paper%20-QFsweb.pdf.

⁶⁷ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2016-2-E, page 31, line 8.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 **Q. Do avoided marginal T&D line losses also have capacity implications?**

2 A. Yes, this is the case for NEM DER resources and QFs eligible for tariff PR-1
3 interconnected to the distribution system. Injecting power directly into the
4 distribution system avoids the need for additional power to overcome losses in the
5 T&D system. Therefore, the avoided energy and avoided generation capacity
6 should be grossed up by the avoided losses on the transmission and the
7 distribution system for these generation resources.

8 Notably, a larger QF connected to the primary or secondary distribution system
9 only avoids transmission and sub-transmission losses, in addition to the additional
10 generation and transmission capacity necessary to overcome the line losses
11 associated with that avoided loss. A DER or QF connected to the primary or
12 secondary distribution system avoids energy losses commensurate with the
13 cumulative T&D marginal loss factor, and the additional generation and
14 transmission capacity necessary to overcome the line losses.

15 **Q. Which projects should these loss factors apply to?**

16 A. Any small generation resource connected at the distribution level should be
17 reimbursed for both transmission-level and distribution-level savings. This
18 includes both NEM DERs and QFs eligible for tariff PR-1. Larger resources
19 connected to the distribution system avoided transmission and sub-transmission
20 losses but may not avoid distribution system losses, and therefore should only be
21 reimbursed for transmission-level savings. This applies to QFs eligible for PR-2
22 that are interconnected at the distribution level.

23 **Q. Should there be an adjustment due to SCE&G's reserve margin?**

24 A. Yes. SCE&G asserts it must ensure a reserve margin of 21 percent, representing
25 additional generation capacity beyond the Company's expected annual peak load,
26 in order to ensure reliable supply. DER resources have capacity value, and that
27 capacity value also translates into a reduced reserve margin requirement. The
28 avoided T&D line losses of 8 to 9 percent are quite reliable, and this portion of

CORRECTED VERSION

1 avoided generation capacity should be counted towards reducing the level of peak
2 load for which SCE&G should plan.

3 **Q. Please summarize your recommendations for calculating the value of avoided**
4 **line losses for DERs.**

5 A. I have four recommendations.

- 6 1. SCE&G should not use straight average annual line losses, but instead use
7 average annual T&D losses weighed to a PV profile to account for solar PV
8 output’s correlation with higher load, and therefore higher losses.
- 9 2. SCE&G should recognize that marginal transmission line losses, like marginal
10 distribution line losses, are double the average line loss.
- 11 3. SCE&G should gross up avoided generation and transmission capacity
12 calculations assigned to distribution-level DERs and QFs to reflect the
13 avoided generation and transmission capacity otherwise needed to overcome
14 line losses.
- 15 4. SCE&G should recognize that, in addition to the avoided generation and
16 transmission capacity associated with overcoming line losses, the associated
17 21 percent reserve margin assigned to the generation capacity is also avoided.
18 As such, that too should be reflected in avoided generation capacity
19 calculations assigned to distribution-level DER and QF resources.

20 ***Avoided Environmental Costs***

21 **Q. How should SCE&G proceed with regards to the avoided environmental**
22 **costs not covered by avoided criteria pollutants and avoided CO₂ costs?**

23 A. SCE&G states that “at present, there are no environmental costs that are not
24 already included in the other specific components of the methodology.”⁶⁸. I
25 disagree with that conclusion. To the extent that distributed energy generators
26 help to alleviate costs associated with environmental compliance at SCE&G’s

⁶⁸ Direct Testimony of Joseph M. Lynch, Docket No. 2017-2-E, page 31, line 1.

CORRECTED VERSION

1 other facilities, those savings should be reflected in the NEM calculation. One
2 example is coal combustion residuals (CCR).

3 On December 19, 2014, EPA issued a final rule regulating CCR under Subtitle D
4 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The rule applies to new and
5 existing landfills and ash ponds. It establishes minimum siting and construction
6 standards for new CCR facilities, requires existing ash ponds at operating coal
7 plants to either install liners and ground water monitoring or permanently retire,
8 and sets standards for long-term stability and closure care.⁶⁹ NEM resources will
9 result in the reduced dispatch of SCE&G's coal units. The reduction implies less
10 CCR generation, and therefore a potential delay in the need to construct new ash
11 ponds or other CCR facilities. The reduction also suggests less CCR waste
12 generated over the lifetime of the plant, and therefore a reduction in eventual CCR
13 site cleanup costs. These avoided environmental costs are financial, quantifiable,
14 and a direct result of DER generation. As such, savings such as these should be
15 included in Witness Lynch's Table 9, Row 10.

16 **Q. Please summarize your recommendations regarding net energy metering**
17 **methodology—2018 application.**

18 A. The Company should correct the errors associated with calculating avoided
19 energy costs, avoided generation capacity costs, avoided T&D capacity costs, and
20 avoided line losses associated with NEM resources. Additionally, SCE&G should
21 both acknowledge that there are positive benefits associated with avoided
22 environmental cost categories and resolve to provide appropriate values in next
23 year's application.

24 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

25 A. Yes.

⁶⁹ 80 Fed. Reg. 21302 (April 17, 2015)



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Senior Associate

- Led technical analysis, modeling, training and capacity building work for utilities and governments in Sub-Saharan Africa around integrated resource planning for the central electricity grid energy and identified over a billion dollars in savings based on improved resource-planning processes.
- Represented RMI as a content expert and presented materials on electricity pricing and rate design at conferences and events.
- Led a project to research and evaluate utility resource planning and spending processes, focusing specifically on integrated resource planning, to highlight systematic overspending on conventional resources and underinvestment and underutilization of distributed energy resources as a least-cost alternative.

Associate

- Led modeling analysis in collaboration with NextGen Climate America which identified a CO₂ loophole in the Clean Power Plan of 250 million tons, or 41 percent of EPA projected abatement, and was submitted as an official federal comment, and led to a modification to address the loophole in the final rule.
- Led financial and economic modeling in collaboration with a major U.S. utility to quantify the impact that solar PV would have on their sales, and helped them identify alternative business models that would allow them to recapture a significant portion of this at-risk value.
- Supported the planning, content development, facilitation, and execution of numerous events and workshops with participants from across the electricity sector for RMI's Electricity Innovation Lab (eLab) initiative.
- Co-authored two studies reviewing valuation methodologies for solar PV and laying out new principles and recommendations around pricing and rate design for a distributed energy future in the United States. These studies have been highly cited by the industry and submitted as evidence in numerous Public Utility Commission rate cases.

The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI. *Graduate Student Instructor*, September 2011 – July 2012

Prepared lesson plans, taught classes, graded papers and other coursework, met regularly with students.

The Virginia Sea Grant at the Virginia Institute of Marine Science, Gloucester Point, VA. *Policy Intern*, Summer 2011

Managed a communication network analysis study of coastal resource management stakeholders on the Eastern Shore of the Delmarva Peninsula.

The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NAFTA), Montreal, QC. *Short Term Educational Program/Intern*, Summer 2010

Researched energy and climate issues relevant to the NAFTA parties to assist the executive director in conducting a GAP analysis of emission monitoring, reporting, and verification systems in North America.

Congressman Tom Allen, Portland, ME. *Technology Systems and Outreach Coordinator*, August 2007 – December 2008

Directed Congressman Allen's technology operation, responded to constituent requests, and represented the Congressman at events throughout southern Maine.

EDUCATION

The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI

Master of Public Policy, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, 2012

Master of Science, School of Natural Resources and the Environment, 2012

Masters Project: *Climate Change Adaptation Planning in U.S. Cities*

Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT

Bachelor of Arts, 2007

Environmental Studies, Policy Focus; Minor in Spanish

Thesis: *Environmental Security in a Changing National Security Environment: Reconciling Divergent Policy Interests, Cold War to Present*

PUBLICATIONS

Lashof, D. A., D. Weiskopf, D. Glick. 2014. *Potential Emission Leakage Under the Clean Power Plan and a Proposed Solution: A Comment to the US EPA*. NextGen Climate America.

Smith, O., M. Lehrman, D. Glick. 2014. *Rate Design for the Distribution Edge*. Rocky Mountain Institute.

Hansen, L., V. Lacy, D. Glick. 2013. *A Review of Solar PV Benefit & Cost Studies*. Rocky Mountain Institute.

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF SOUTH CAROLINA: Docket No. 2017-2-E

Direct Testimony of Devi Glick: Exhibit DCG-2

Avoided Cost of Transmission and Distribution Detail (nominal \$)

Utility or jurisdiction	Source	Avoided T&D (\$/kW-year)
Idaho Power	Idaho Power 2013	\$0.00
Arizona Public Service	Mendota 2014	\$0.00
Wisconsin	Cadmus 2013	\$0.00
Indiana Michigan Power	I&M 2013	\$0.00
State of Texas	Texas 2015	\$0.00
Consumers Energy	Mendota 2014	\$0.00
Vectren	Vectren 2014	\$12.14
Nevada Power	NVE 2012	\$12.23
Public Service Oklahoma	PSO 2014	\$19.17
Ameren Missouri	Ameren 2014	\$27.68
Xcel Energy Colorado	Xcel CO 2013	\$28.40
Southwest Public Service	SPS 2013	\$28.87
Potomac Edison	Exeter 2014	\$30.69
Connecticut Light and Power	AESC 2013	\$32.24
Baltimore Gas and Electric	Exeter 2014	\$33.15
PGE Oregon	Mendota 2014	\$33.20
National Grid Rhode Island	AESC 2013	\$41.24
ComEd Illinois	Mendota 2014	\$42.00
Consolidated Edison Non Network	Mendota 2014	\$42.63
United Illuminating	AESC 2013	\$47.82
MidAmerican South Dakota	Mendota 2014	\$48.16
MidAmerican	Mendota 2014	\$51.86
Northern Indiana Public Service	NIPSCO 2014	\$52.25
PacifiCorp Oregon	Mendota 2014	\$52.64
PacifiCorp Utah	Mendota 2014	\$52.64
PacifiCorp Washington	Mendota 2014	\$52.64
Xcel Energy Minnesota	Xcel MN 2012	\$53.17
Southern California Edison	Mendota 2014	\$53.49
Delmarva Power and Light	Exeter 2014	\$55.43
Northwest Utilities	Mendota 2014	\$65.59
Public Service New Hampshire	AESC 2013	\$70.05
San Diego Gas and Electric	Mendota 2014	\$73.32
Pacific Gas and Electric	Mendota 2014	\$75.57
PEPCO	Exeter 2014	\$79.12
Southern Maryland Electric Coop	Exeter 2014	\$79.12
NSTAR	AESC 2013	\$89.79
WMECO	AESC 2013	\$98.35
Tucson Electric Power	Mendota 2014	\$100.00
Unitil New Hampshire	AESC 2013	\$102.29
Interstate Power and Light	Mendota 2014	\$107.00
Consolidated Edison Network	Mendota 2014	\$120.52
Vermont	AESC 2013	\$158.15
Unitil Massachusetts	AESC 2013	\$173.79
National Grid Massachusetts	AESC 2013	\$200.01

Source: Baatz, Brendon. *Everyone Benefits: Practices and Recommendations for Utility System Benefits of Energy Efficiency*. ACEEE: June 2015.