May 31, 2023



VIA E-MAIL

The Honorable Eranda Vero The Honorable Arlene Ashton Office of Administrative Law Judge Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission 801 Market Street, Suite 4063 Philadelphia, PA 19107

Re: Pa. PUC v. Philadelphia Gas Works, Docket No. R-2023-3037933

Dear Judge Vero and Judge Ashton:

Please find enclosed POWER Interfaith Statement No. 3, the Direct Testimony of Ben Havumaki. The parties have been served per the attached Certificate of Service. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you.

Sincerely,

<u>/s/ Devin McDougall</u> PA Attorney ID No. 329855 Senior Attorney Earthjustice 1617 John F. Kennedy Blvd., Suite 2020 Philadelphia, PA 19103 <u>dmcdougall@earthjustice.org</u> (917) 628-7411

cc: PA PUC Secretary's Bureau (Cover Letter and Certificate of Service only) Parties of Record

BEFORE THE PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION

Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, et al.

Docket No. R-2023-3037933

v.

Philadelphia Gas Works

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF BEN HAVUMAKI

ON BEHALF OF

POWER INTERFAITH

May 31, 2023

POWER Interfaith Statement No. 3

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EXHIBIT LIST

Exh. BH-1, Ben Havumaki Curriculum Vitae.

Exh. BH-2, PGW Interrogatory Responses.

Exh. BH-3, Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order No. 87884.

Exh. BH-4, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2018-3006818 (Oct. 3, 2019).

Exh. BH-5, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2020-3017206 (Nov. 19, 2020).

Exh. BH-6, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2020-3018835 (Feb. 18, 2021).

Exh. BH-7, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Recommended Decision, PA PUC Docket No. R-2021-3030218 (July 28, 2022).

Exh. BH-8, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2021-3030218 (Sept. 15, 2022).

Exh. BH-9, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Recommended Decision, PA PUC Docket No. R-2022-3031113 (Oct. 11, 2022).

Exh, BH-10, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2022-3031113 (Oct. 27, 2022).

Exh. BH-11, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Recommended Decision, PA PUC Docket No. R-2020-3018835 (Dec. 4, 2020).

Exh. BH-12, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2021-3023618, (Oct. 28, 2021).

* Exhibits are available for download <u>here</u>.

1 <u>I. Witness Identification and Qualifications</u>

2	Q.	Please state your name, business name and address, and role in this proceeding.
3	А.	My name is Ben Havumaki. I work for Synapse Energy Economics, Inc. ("Synapse"),
4		with a business address at 485 Massachusetts Avenue in Cambridge, MA. I appear here in
5		my capacity as an expert witness on behalf of POWER Interfaith.
6	Q.	Please summarize your experience and expertise in the utility industry.
7	A.	I have approximately five years of experience working in regulated utility proceedings as
8		an analyst and expert witness. At Synapse, I focus on a range of related regulatory topics,
9		including ratemaking and rate design, performance-based regulation, and grid
10		modernization. I have sponsored testimony before the Minnesota Public Utilities
11		Commission, the Public Utilities Commission of New Hampshire, the Georgia Public
12		Service Commission, the Illinois Commerce Commission, the West Virginia Public
13		Service Commission, the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, and the New
14		Brunswick Energy and Utilities Board. A copy of my curriculum vitae is attached. ¹
15	Q.	Have you ever testified before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission or other
16		regulatory agencies in Pennsylvania?
17	А.	No.
18		
19	<u>II. P</u>	Purpose of Testimony
20	Q.	What is the purpose of your testimony?

- A. The purpose of my testimony is to respond to Philadelphia Gas Work's ("PGW")
- 22 proposal to increase its residential customer charge. After considering PGW's arguments,

¹ Exh. BH-1, Ben Havumaki Curriculum Vitae.


1		I show that the large increase to the customer charge that has been proposed is not just		
2		and reasonable, because it is neither required nor consistent with past practices and		
3	regulatory precedents in Pennsylvania. I further demonstrate that the proposed increase, if			
4	permitted, would violate the principle of gradualism, unduly burden low-income			
5	customers, and blunt incentives for energy efficiency and conservation that help to reduce			
6		overall gas system costs.		
7				
8	<u>III. (</u>	Summary of PGW's Rate Design Proposal		
9	Q.	Please describe PGW's proposed change to its residential customer charge.		
10	A.	PGW proposes to increase the residential customer charge by over thirty percent, from		
11		\$14.90 per month to $$19.50$ per month. ²		
12	Q.	Why is PGW proposing to increase its residential customer charge?		
13	А.	PGW states that its proposed increase would help to better align rates with costs,		
14		resulting in a residential customer charge that would recover a greater share of total		
15		residential class fixed customer costs and improve revenue stability. ³ PGW asserts that its		
16		current rate design that recovers the majority of fixed costs through variable delivery is		
17		"inefficient and distorts the price signals to customers." ⁴ By implication, PGW suggests		
18		that its proposed fixed charge increase would improve efficiency and send what PGW		
19		views as the correct or proper price signals to customers.		
20	Q.	Why does PGW conclude that raising the residential fixed charge would better align		
21		rates and costs?		
22	A.	This conclusion is based upon the results of PGW's Class Cost of Service Study		

² PGW Statement No. 1, Direct Test. of Denise Adamucci, at 13:5–6 (Feb. 27, 2023).
³ PGW Statement No. 6, Direct Test. of Florian Teme, at 8:5–9:4 (Feb. 27, 2023).
⁴ PGW Statement No. 6, Direct Test. of Florian Teme, at 9:1 (Feb. 27, 2023).

("CCOSS").⁵ 1

2	Q.	Is the proposed increase to the residential customer charge reasonable?
3	А.	No, for multiple reasons:
4		1. The proposed fixed charge increase is inconsistent with past regulatory practices in
5		Pennsylvania and would violate the principle of gradualism.
6		2. PGW has not justified the need to increase the residential customer charge for
7		economic efficiency.
8		3. Increasing the residential customer charge would harm low-income customers.
9		4. Increasing the residential customer charge would blunt incentives for energy
10		efficiency.
11		
12	<u>IV.</u>]	The Proposed Increase to the Residential Customer Charge is Inconsistent
13	<u>with</u>	Past Pennsylvania Practices and Would Violate the Principle of
14	<u>Gra</u>	<u>dualism</u>
15	Q.	How do PGW's current and proposed residential customer charges compare to
16		those of peer utilities?
17	А.	PGW's current residential customer charge of \$14.90 is in line with those of peer utilities,
18		at the median of the customer charges provided for comparison by PGW witness Ms.
19		Adamucci. ⁶ If PGW's proposed increase to its customer charge were granted, this would
20		make PGW's residential customer charge notably higher than those of peer utilities (see
21		Figure 1).

 ⁵ PGW Statement No. 6, Direct Test. of Florian Teme, at 6:16–20. (Feb. 27, 2023).
 ⁶ PGW Statement No. 1, Direct Test. of Denise Adamucci, at 14, Table: Residential Customer Charge Comparison (Feb. 27, 2023).



⁷ Exh. BH-4, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2018-3006818, at 4 (Oct. 3, 2019). ⁸ Exh. BH-4, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2018-3006818, at 25 (Oct. 3,

^{2019).}

⁹ Exh. BH-5, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2020-3017206, at 4 (Nov. 19, 2020).

1		increase from \$16.75 to \$23.00; ¹⁰ no actual increase. ¹¹			
2		• Utilities Gas, Inc. ("UGI") (R-2021-3030218): requested increase from \$14.60 to			
3		\$19.95; actual increase to \$15.00. ^{12,13}			
4		• PECO (R-2022-3031113): requested increase from \$13.63 to \$18.50; ¹⁴ actual			
5		increase to \$14.25. ^{15,16}			
6		In each of these past cases, the utility requested a considerable increase in the			
7		customer charge, and the ultimate result was a far more modest increase (or, in the			
8		Columbia case, no increase at all). Whereas granting the proposed customer charges			
9		could have resulted in rate shock for residential customers in these cases, the actual			
10		outcomes of these cases reflect the principle of gradualism. Similarly, PGW's current			
11		proposed increase in its residential customer charge is unduly large, and in the interest of			
12		maintaining gradualism, it should not be granted.			
13	Q.	Please explain how PGW's proposed increase to the customer charge would violate			
14		the principle of gradualism.			
15	A.	Gradualism requires that sudden, adverse changes to customer rates should be			
16		minimized. ¹⁷ PGW proposes to increase the fixed customer charge for residential			
17		customers by over thirty percent. PGW's requested increase is more than double the			

¹⁶ Exh, BH-10, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2022-3031113, at 1-2 (Oct. 27, 2022).

¹⁰ Exh. BH-6, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2020-3018835, at 3 (Feb. 18, 2021).

¹¹ Exh. BH-6, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2020-3018835, at 264–265 (Feb. 18, 2021).

¹² Exh. BH-7, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Recommended Decision, PA PUC Docket No. R-2021-3030218, at 33, 44 (July 28, 2022).

¹³ Exh. BH-8, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2021-3030218, at 1–2 (Sept. 15, 2022).

¹⁴ Exh. BH-9, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Recommended Decision, PA PUC Docket No. R-2022-3031113, at 26 (Oct. 11, 2022).

 ¹¹, 2022).
 ¹⁵ Exh. BH-9, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Recommended Decision, PA PUC Docket No. R-2022-3031113, at 2 (Oct. 11, 2022).

¹⁷ The foundational treatise of rate design principles, including the gradualism principle ("rate stability") is: Bonbright, James. *Principles of Public Utility Rates*. New York, NY. Columbia University Press, 1961.

2

increase that resulted from its 2017 rate case and nearly four times the increase from the 2020 rate case.

3 Has the Commission recently made any statements about gradualism? 0. 4 Yes. In Columbia's 2020 rate case, the Commission adopted the Administrative Law A. 5 Judge's ("ALJ") recommendation to fully deny Columbia's request to increase its 6 residential customer charge from \$16.75 per month to \$23.00 per month, endorsing the 7 ALJ's finding "that the proposed increase to the residential customer charge violates the principle of gradualism."^{18,19} In the 2021 UGI rate case, the Commission adopted the 8 9 ALJ's recommendation to increase the customer charge by substantially less than the 10 amount proposed by the utility, citing "reducing rate shock to customers" as part of its justification.²⁰ 11 12 What conclusion do you draw from these past case examples? Q. I conclude that PGW's proposed increase to the residential customer charge is 13 A. 14 inconsistent with recent precedent in Pennsylvania and would violate the principle of 15 gradualism. In short, I conclude that the proposed rate increase is too large. 16 **V. PGW Has Not Justified the Need to Increase the Residential Customer** 17 18 **Charge for Economic Efficiency**

19 A. PGW's Assessment of Economic Efficiency is Flawed

20 Q. What is the connection between PGW's CCOSS analysis and its rate design

¹⁸ Exh. BH-11, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Recommended Decision, PA PUC Docket No. R-2020-3018835, at 399–400 (Dec. 4, 2020).

¹⁹ Exh. BH-6, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2020-3018835, at 264–265 (Feb. 18, 2021).

²⁰ Exh. BH-12, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2021-3023618, at 30 (Oct. 28, 2021).

proposal?

A. PGW suggests that increasing the customer charge would improve overall efficiency by
better aligning rates with costs, as dictated by its CCOSS.²¹ In PGW's view, efficiency
could be improved by increasing the fixed residential customer charge, thereby reducing
the gap between PGW's residential customer charge and the theoretical customer charge
indicated by PGW's CCOSS.

7 Q. What o

What does PGW mean when it refers to "efficiency?"

A. PGW is referring to *economic* efficiency, which is a theoretical condition of resource
allocation that maximizes collective wellbeing. Economic efficiency is abstract and
unmeasurable. In the gas utility context, economic efficiency means that customers are
consuming the optimal amount of gas, and achieving efficiency could even mean *increasing* overall gas consumption—unlike energy efficiency, which targets reductions
in consumption.

Q. What are the technical limitations of PGW's CCOSS for assessing economic efficiency?

16 A. PGW's CCOSS is based upon embedded costs.²² While PGW's methodology for

17 classifying certain costs as customer-related appears to be reasonable, making

18 conclusions about *efficient* rate design based solely on this study is not reasonable,

because the study is based upon historical (embedded) costs and is therefore not

20 forward-looking.

- 21 Q. Why must efficient pricing be assessed on a forward-looking basis?
- 22 A. Economic theory holds that efficiency is maximized when prices are set to reflect

²¹ PGW Statement No. 6, Direct Test. of Florian Teme, at 6:16–20, 8:5–9:4 (Feb. 27, 2023).

²² Exh. BH-2, PGW Interrogatory Responses, Response to POWER-01-53.

1		marginal costs. ²³ In the context of PGW's customer charge, marginal cost-based pricing
2		would reflect the incremental cost of connecting an additional residential customer to the
3		utility distribution system. ²⁴
4	Q.	What is the implication of PGW's reliance on an embedded study for the aim of
5		setting efficient rates?
6	А.	The implication is that PGW's CCOSS does not provide a definitive answer about
7		making rates efficient. To determine the theoretically efficient rate design, including the
8		economically efficient level for the residential customer charge, PGW would need to
9		consider marginal cost data.
10		
11	R T	he Commission Should Consider Multiple Goals of Rate Design, Not Just
	D , 1	ne Commission Should Consider Multiple Goals of Nate Design, not oust
12		nomic Efficiency
12	Eco	nomic Efficiency
12 13	Eco Q.	nomic Efficiency Is improving economic efficiency a worthy goal?
12 13 14	Eco Q.	nomic Efficiency Is improving economic efficiency a worthy goal? Yes. However, like other aspects of rate design, increasing efficiency is not the only
12 13 14 15	Ecor Q. A.	 nomic Efficiency Is improving economic efficiency a worthy goal? Yes. However, like other aspects of rate design, increasing efficiency is not the only consideration when assessing rate design options.
12 13 14 15 16	Econ Q. A. Q.	 nomic Efficiency Is improving economic efficiency a worthy goal? Yes. However, like other aspects of rate design, increasing efficiency is not the only consideration when assessing rate design options. Why do you say that economic efficiency is not the lone aim of rate design?
12 13 14 15 16 17	Econ Q. A. Q.	 nomic Efficiency Is improving economic efficiency a worthy goal? Yes. However, like other aspects of rate design, increasing efficiency is not the only consideration when assessing rate design options. Why do you say that economic efficiency is not the lone aim of rate design? Efficiency is one worthy goal in rate design, but increasing efficiency is not a
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	Econ Q. A. Q.	 nomic Efficiency Is improving economic efficiency a worthy goal? Yes. However, like other aspects of rate design, increasing efficiency is not the only consideration when assessing rate design options. Why do you say that economic efficiency is not the lone aim of rate design? Efficiency is one worthy goal in rate design, but increasing efficiency is not a straightforward objective and it may conflict with other goals—a point that PGW seems

²³ Lazar, Jim, et al., Regulatory Assistance Project, *Electric Cost Allocation for a New Era: A Manual*, at 79 (Jan. 2020), <u>https://perma.cc/S267-RUUE</u>.
²⁴ When rates based on marginal costs do not yield approved revenue requirements, they can be escalated to ensure

recovery of approved costs.

1		usage, customers, and promoting energy efficiency and conservation. ²⁵
2	Q.	Could PGW's focus on economic efficiency conflict with other rate design
3		objectives?
4	A.	Yes, it could. I've already discussed the conflict between PGW's proposal and adherence
5		to the principle of gradualism. I also believe that PGW's emphasis on increasing
6		economic efficiency may be in tension with the objectives of promoting reasonable
7		conservation and energy efficiency. Implicit in PGW's argument for increasing the
8		residential fixed charge in the name of economic efficiency is the view that higher gas
9		consumption could be a desirable outcome. I will address this issue in more detail in a
10		later section of my Testimony.
11	Q.	How has PGW arrived at its specific proposal to increase the residential customer
12		charge?
13	A.	It is not entirely clear, but it appears that the proposed increase is based on judgment and
14		not the outcome of any specific quantitative analysis. While PGW presents the results of
15		its CCOSS in testimony, it does not ultimately suggest that these results be enacted in
16		cost allocation or rate design. Instead, it has attempted to balance the cost-of-service
17		results with other considerations. ^{26,27}
18	Q.	Has PGW demonstrated a necessity to increase the residential customer charge?

¹⁹

A.

No. PGW has not shown that increasing the residential customer charge is necessary or

²⁵ The need to balance efficiency with other goals for rate design was noted by James Bonbright in his seminal rate design treatise, where he attributed the "complexity" of "rate-structure problems" partially to "the necessity, faced alike by public utility managements and by regulating agencies, of taking into account numerous conflicting standards of fairness and functional efficiency in the choice of a rate structure." Further elucidating the concept of balancing objectives with reference to the specific challenge of designing rates to be both cost-reflective and simple, Bonbright wrote that, "as with other clashes among various desiderata of rate-making policy, the wise choice must be that of wise compromise." See: Bonbright, James. *Principles of Public Utility Rates*. New York, NY. Columbia University Press, 1961, at 288–289.

²⁶ PGW Statement No. 6, Direct Test. of Florian Teme, at 6:16–25 (Feb. 27, 2023).

²⁷ Exh. BH-2, PGW Interrogatory Responses, Response to POWER-01-52.

even warranted. While PGW cites concerns about efficiency and revenue stability, it is
evident that the proposed increase is ultimately based upon PGW's judgment rather than
relevant, forward-looking analysis. In my view, for the reasons discussed above, the
balance of judgment should militate against increasing the residential charge. In the
remainder of my testimony, I will consider two additional factors that weigh against
increasing the residential customer charge: adverse impacts on low-income customers,
and diminished incentives to conserve energy.

8 Q. Should PGW increase its residential fixed charge to promote revenue stability?

9 A. No. I understand that PGW favors greater fixed charge recovery because this recovery is *fixed*. In other words, raising fixed charges would increase the share of revenues that is
assured to PGW. Yet PGW has not demonstrated that revenue sufficiency is a material
concern, and even if it had, concerns about revenue sufficiency are not a reason alone to
increase fixed charges.

14

15 VI. Increasing the Residential Customer Charge Would Harm Low-Income

16 **Customers**

17 Q. Please explain your concerns about impacts to low-income customers.

18 A. PGW's proposal to increase the residential fixed charge would also increase the fixed

19 proportion of customers' monthly bills (Table 1). For low-income customers, the increase

- 20 to the fixed portion of the bill may be particularly deleterious because it is unavoidable.
- 21 On the other hand, increases to variable rates can be mitigated by reducing gas

22 consumption.

10

1

3

Table 1. Impact of rate changes to fixed share of residential bills, by usage

Usage tier	Monthly use (Mcf)	Fixed share (current)	Fixed share (proposed)	Change in fixed shar
Low usage	30.5	24%	27%	3.8%
Typical usage	71	12%	14%	2.3%
High usage	229	4%	5%	0.9%

4	0.	Does PGW's Custome	r Responsibility Progr	am ("CRP") a	ddress these concerns?
T	\mathbf{v}		I INCOPULISIONICY I IUEI	and Chi ja	uuress enese concerns.

5 A. Not adequately. PGW incorrectly claims that CRP "render[s] the proposed changes moot"

6 for low-income customers, low users of energy, and customers on fixed incomes.²⁸

7 However, only a small proportion of eligible households are enrolled in CRP.

8 Q. Why do you conclude that CRP participation is low?

- 9 A. Based on the latest available data from December 2022, only forty-one percent of
- 10 confirmed low-income customers in PGW's service territory were enrolled in CRP.²⁹ In
- 11 addition, PGW's count of confirmed low-income customers is likely incomplete, meaning
- 12 that the percentage of enrolled versus eligible customers is probably even lower than
- 13 reported. PGW identifies "confirmed low income" customers as those who have
- 14 proactively sought assistance through CRP or Low Income Home Energy Assistance
- 15 Program ("LIHEAP") grants or who have contacted PGW to self-declare their
- 16 low-income status in the past two years.³⁰

17 Q. Are there other reasons to be concerned about impacts to low-income, low-use 18 customers?

19 A. Yes. In addition to the concerns already articulated about impacts to all low-income

²⁸ Exh. BH-2, PGW Interrogatory Responses, Response to POWER-01-62.

²⁹ Exh. BH-2, PGW Interrogatory Responses, Response to POWER-01-61.

³⁰ Exh. BH-2, PGW Interrogatory Responses, Response to CAUSE-01-3.

customers, the proposed fixed charge increase would disproportionately raise the bills of
 low-use customers—including low-income, low-use customers. Simply put, the lower a

- 3 customer's monthly gas consumption, the greater the percentage increase in their bill.
- 4 The relationship between consumption and bill impacts is shown below in Table 2.
- 5

Table 2. Impacts of rate changes on total bills for residential customers, by usage

Usage tier	Monthly use (Mcf)	Total bill (current)	Total bill (proposed) ³¹	Percentage change in bill
Low usage	30.5	\$63.00	\$71.12	12.9%
Typical usage	71	\$125.38	\$137.73	9.9%
High usage	229	\$368.75	\$397.59	7.8%

6

7	Q.	How would the two adverse effects of fixed charge increases impact low-income,
8		low-use customers?
9	А.	These two effects would interact unfavorably for low-income, low-use customers, as
10		these customers would experience disproportionate bill increases while simultaneously
11		suffering a decline in their ability to mitigate against the bill increases through
12		conservation.
13		
14	VII.	Increasing the Residential Customer Charge Would Reduce Incentives
15	<u>for (</u>	Conservation and Energy Efficiency
16	Q.	What is the connection between customer charges and incentives for conservation
17		and energy efficiency?
18	A.	Recovering revenues through increased customer charges rather than increased variable
19		rates will tend to reduce the incentive to conserve energy relative to alternative rate

³¹ These values were calculated using PGW's response to OCA-05-47, Attachment C and differ slightly from the values provided in PGW's response to POWER-01-58. Both responses are included in Exh. BH-2, PGW Interrogatory Responses.

23	Q.	Has the relationship between customer charges and conservation been addressed in
22		in the public interest and consistent with state policy and regulatory priorities.
21		variable rate regime is desirable, then it should provide evidence that such an approach is
20		charge will improve economic efficiency. If PGW believes that a higher fixed charge/low
19		public interest. Rather, PGW has only suggested that increasing the fixed residential
18	A.	No, and I do not believe that sending a price signal that deters energy efficiency is in the
17		instead of rewarding efficiency?
16		residential customers to receive price signals that incentivize consuming more gas
15	Q.	Has PGW introduced any evidence justifying that it is in the public interest for its
14		conservation and energy efficiency and encourages greater consumption of gas.
13		increases to fixed charges over increases to variable charges reduces incentives for
12		variable delivery charge for the residential class by only about eleven percent. ³² Favoring
11		increase its residential customer charge by about thirty-one percent and to increase its
10		rather than by increasing variable delivery charges. Specifically, PGW is proposing to
9		increase in residential class revenues through raising the residential customer charge
8	А.	Yes, I believe that it does. PGW proposes to recover a large share of its requested
7		efficiency?
6	Q.	Does PGW's proposal have adverse implications for conservation and energy
5		energy efficiency.
4		higher variable rate scheme, customers stand to benefit more from conservation and
3		lower share of their monthly bill is avoidable. Meanwhile, under a low fixed charge and
2		lower variable rates stand to derive less of an economic benefit from conservation since a
1		designs with lower fixed charges. That's because customers with higher fixed charges and

³² Exh. BH-2, PGW Interrogatory Responses, Response OCA-05-47, Attachment C.

any recent Pennsylvania proceedings?

2 A. Yes. In Columbia's 2020 rate case, the ALJ agreed with the Office of Consumer Advocate 3 ("OCA") that a lower fixed monthly charge would provide greater incentive to customers to conserve energy and reduce consumption.³³ The Commission in turn accepted the 4 5 ALJ's recommendations in that case.³⁴

6 **O**. Have other utility regulatory commissions recognized the detrimental impact of 7 higher fixed customer charges?

Yes, the negative effects of increasing customer charges are well-recognized in both gas 8 A. 9 and electric proceedings. One example comes from a 2016 rate case in Maryland. While 10 the Potomac Electric Power Company requested to increase its basic service charge for 11 residential customers from \$7.39 per month to \$12.00 per month, the Maryland Public 12 Service Commission approved a much smaller increase to only \$7.60 per month and 13 explained that the proposed change would result in customers having less control over their bills and would be antithetical to energy conservation efforts:³⁵ 14 15 In arriving at this increase, we place emphasis on Maryland's public 16 policy goals that intend to encourage energy conservation. 17 Maintaining relatively low customer charges provides customers 18 with greater control over their electric bills by increasing the value 19 of volumetric charges. No matter how diligently customers might

- 20 attempt to conserve energy or respond to AMI-enabled peak pricing incentives, they cannot reduce fixed customer charges.³⁶
- 21

³³ Exh. BH-11, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Recommended Decision, PA PUC Docket No. R-2020-3018835, at 401 (December 4, 2020).

³⁴ Exh. BH-6, Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, Opinion and Order, PA PUC Docket No. R-2020-3018835, at 264–265 (February 18, 2021).

³⁵ Exh. BH-3, Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order No. 87884, MD PSC Case No. 9418, at 110 (Nov. 15, 2016).

³⁶ Exh. BH-3, Maryland Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Order No. 87884, MD PSC Case No. 9418, at 110 (Nov. 15, 2016).

1 IX. Summary of Recommendations

2	Q.	Please summarize your findings.		
3	A.	I find that PGW has not justified the need to increase its residential customer charge.		
4		Specifically, I find that:		
5		• The proposed increase would violate gradualism and run counter to recent		
6		Pennsylvania regulatory precedent and rate design practices among peer utilities in		
7		the state.		
8		• PGW has not demonstrated that the residential customer charge needs to be increased		
9		to promote economic efficiency.		
10		• Increasing the residential customer charge would unduly harm low-income		
11		customers.		
12		• Increasing the residential customer charge would blunt incentives for conservation		
13		and energy efficiency.		
14	Q.	Please summarize your recommendations.		
15	А.	I recommend that the Commission deny PGW's requested increase in the residential		
16		customer charge and instead maintain the residential customer charge at its current level.		
17				
18	<u>X. C</u>	<u>onclusion</u>		
19	Q.	Does this conclude your testimony?		
20	A.	Yes.		

VERIFICATION

I hereby verify that the facts contained in the foregoing testimony are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge, that I am duly authorized to make this verification, and that I expect to be able to prove the same at any hearing held in this matter. I understand that the statements herein are made subject to penalties of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4904 (relating to unsworn falsification to authorities).

Dated: May 31, 2023

/s/ Ben Havumaki

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have this day served via email a true copy of this document upon the parties, in accordance with the requirements of 52 Pa. Code § 1.54 (relating to service by a party).

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