BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND

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IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY FOR AN INCREASE IN ITS RETAIL RATES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRIC ENERGY

Case No. 9655

Direct Testimony of

Melissa Whited

On Behalf of

The Maryland Office of People's Counsel

March 3, 2021

Case	e No.	. 9655
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Exhibit MW-1: Resume of Melissa Whited

1 I. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS

- 2 Q. Please state your name, title, and employer.
- 3 A. My name is Melissa Whited. I am a Principal Associate at Synapse Energy Economics

4 ("Synapse"), located at 485 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139.

5 Q. Please describe Synapse Energy Economics.

6 A. Synapse Energy Economics (Synapse) is a research and consulting firm specializing in 7 electricity and gas industry regulation, planning, and analysis. Our work covers a range of 8 issues, including economic and technical assessments of demand-side and supply-side 9 energy resources; energy efficiency policies and programs; integrated resource planning; 10 electricity market modeling and assessment; renewable resource technologies and 11 policies; and climate change strategies. Synapse works for a wide range of clients, 12 including attorneys general, offices of consumer advocates, public utility commissions, 13 environmental advocates, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of 14 Energy, U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the National 15 Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. Synapse has over 30 professional staff 16 with extensive experience in the electricity industry.

17 Q. Please summarize your professional and educational experience.

A. I have 12 years of experience in economic research and consulting. At Synapse, I have
 worked extensively on issues related to utility regulatory models, performance incentive
 mechanisms, and rate design. In 2015, I was the lead author of a report for the Western
 Interstate Energy Board titled "Utility Performance Incentive Mechanisms: A Handbook

1		for Regulators," and I have presented on performance incentive mechanisms to the
2		National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, National Governor's
3		Association Learning Lab on New Utility Business Models, Midwest Governors'
4		Association, and the Minnesota e21 Initiative working group.
5		I have sponsored testimony before the Newfoundland and Labrador Board of
6		Commissioners of Public Utilities, the Georgia Public Service Commission, the Rhode
7		Island Public Utilities Commission, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, the
8		Maine Public Utilities Commission, the California Public Utilities Commission, the
9		Hawaii Public Utilities Commission, the Public Service Commission of Utah, the Public
10		Utility Commission of Texas, the Virginia State Corporation Commission, and the
11		Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. I hold a Master of Arts in Agricultural and
12		Applied Economics and a Master of Science in Environment and Resources, both from
13		the University of Wisconsin-Madison. My resume is attached as Exhibit MW-1.
14	Q.	On whose behalf are you testifying in this case?
15	A.	I am testifying on behalf of the Office of People's Counsel (OPC).
16	Q.	What is the purpose of your testimony?
17	A.	The purpose of my testimony is to address the application of Potomac Electric Power
18		Company (Pepco or the Company) for a Multi-Year Plan (MYP) and Performance
19		Incentive Mechanisms (PIMs). I assess the incentives associated with the MYP and PIMs
20		and describe how Pepco's planning process and PIMs can be modified to deliver more
21		value and performance for customers.

1 2	Q	Have you testified previously before the Public Service Commission of Maryland or participated in any Commission-sponsored proceeding?
3	А	I have not testified before the Public Service Commission of Maryland (Commission),
4		but I was closely involved on behalf of OPC during both Phase I and Phase II of the
5		working group effort established by the Commission in Case No. 9618 regarding multi-
6		year rate plans and performance incentive mechanisms.
7	Q.	What materials did you rely on to develop your testimony?
7 8	Q. A.	What materials did you rely on to develop your testimony? The sources for my testimony and exhibits are public documents, responses to discovery
	-	

Was your testimony prepared by you or under your direction? 11 Q.

12 Yes. My testimony was prepared by me or under my direct supervision and control. A.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 II.

Please summarize your main conclusions. 14 Q.

15 A. My conclusions are as follows:

16	•	Pepco's proposed investment plan represents the continuation of a pattern that has
17		resulted in the Company having exceptionally high gross rate base on a per-customer
18		basis. The low risk of disallowance and rapid rate of cost recovery under the MYP
19		construct exacerbates the incentive that Pepco has to over-invest in its system. For
20		these reasons, additional measures are needed to promote cost-effective performance
21		and enhance customer value.

1		• Tracking metrics can serve as a valuable tool to increase transparency, determine
2		future performance standards, assess the need for and magnitude of future financial
3		rewards or penalties, and gather data to enable a benefit-cost analysis of any proposed
4		PIM. While I do not oppose the tracking of the data that Pepco has proposed, several
5		of the metrics are redundant, or would not provide useful information to inform future
6		PIMs.
7		• Pepco's proposed tracking metrics are largely inappropriate for full PIMs with
8		financial incentives. The metrics are in many cases redundant and would reward
9		Pepco for activities that it is already committed to undertaking or could easily
10		achieve. In particular, the reliability metrics should not be developed into PIMs, as
11		Pepco is already subject to reliability standards and has provided no information
12		regarding the costs and benefits to customers of incremental reliability improvements.
13		In sum, Pepco's proposed PIMs do little to align Pepco's incentives with the public
14		interest.
15	Q.	Please summarize your recommendations.
16	А.	I offer the following recommendations:
17		1. The Commission should require Maryland utilities to conduct integrated distribution
18		planning to enhance transparency and facilitate the determination of whether
19		investments included in MYPs are cost-effective relative to alternatives. To
20		accomplish this, I recommend that the Commission initiate a proceeding to develop

1		these requirements as soon as feasible. Approval of future MYPs should be
2		predicated on the filing and approval of integrated distribution plans.
3		2. The Commission should reject Pepco's proposed PIMs and instead consider metrics
4		and incentives to encourage Pepco to (a) explore cost-effective non-wires alternatives
5		(NWAs), and (b) empower customers to access and engage with their electricity
6		usage data. Specifically, in this proceeding, I recommend that the Commission
7		implement the following tracking metrics to inform the development of future PIMs:
8		i. Net Savings from NWAs
9		ii. NWA capacity installed (MW)
10		iii. NWA capacity (MW) by Distributed Energy Resource (DER) type
11		iv. NWA requests for proposals (RFPs) issued per year
12		v. NWA customer participation (percent of customers by rate class)
13		vi. Customers viewing Smart Energy Services content
14		vii. Customers with Access to Green Button Connect My Data
15		
16	III.	PEPCO'S MYP AND UTILITY INCENTIVES
17	Q.	What is your overall assessment of Pepco's proposed MYP?
18	A.	Pepco continues to invest heavily in traditional utility infrastructure at a rapid clip, with
19		little consideration regarding whether such investments are cost-effective. From 2021 to
20		2024, Pepco's distribution system investments are projected to increase at an annual

1		growth rate of more than 8 percent. ¹ Although Pepco proposes to mitigate the impact of
2		rate increases over the MYP, residential customers will still experience an increase in
3		their distribution bill of nearly 11 percent in Rate Year 3. ²
4		This rapid pace and magnitude of investment is even more alarming when one considers
5		that Pepco's gross distribution rate base per customer is already the highest out of 123
6		investor-owned utilities across the country. ³ Customers cannot be asked to sustain such
7		cost increases indefinitely, particularly when the benefits of these investments are
8		unclear, and lower-cost alternatives may be available.
9	Q.	What factors are driving these cost increases?
9 10	Q. A.	What factors are driving these cost increases? Fundamentally, I believe that capital bias plays a key role in driving Pepco's investments.
	•	
10	•	Fundamentally, I believe that capital bias plays a key role in driving Pepco's investments.
10 11	•	Fundamentally, I believe that capital bias plays a key role in driving Pepco's investments. It is widely recognized that utilities have a financial incentive to maximize their capital
10 11 12	•	Fundamentally, I believe that capital bias plays a key role in driving Pepco's investments. It is widely recognized that utilities have a financial incentive to maximize their capital expenditures in order to increase rate base and thereby increase profits, as long as the
10 11 12 13	•	Fundamentally, I believe that capital bias plays a key role in driving Pepco's investments. It is widely recognized that utilities have a financial incentive to maximize their capital expenditures in order to increase rate base and thereby increase profits, as long as the utility's rate of return is greater than the cost of borrowing. This is often referred to as the
10 11 12 13 14	•	Fundamentally, I believe that capital bias plays a key role in driving Pepco's investments. It is widely recognized that utilities have a financial incentive to maximize their capital expenditures in order to increase rate base and thereby increase profits, as long as the utility's rate of return is greater than the cost of borrowing. This is often referred to as the Averch-Johnson effect.

¹ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness Stewart, Case No. 9655, Schedule (RSS)-1, October 26, 2020, page 26.

 ² Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness Blazuna's Revised Schedule (PRB)-12, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020.
 ³ Panel Direct Testimony of Paul J. Alvarez and Dennis Stephens on behalf of OPC, Case No. 9655, March 3, 2021, pp. 9-10.

the risk of disallowance is small. Because of this, additional protections for customers are
 urgently needed.

Q. What evidence can you point to that Pepco has a bias towards utility-owned capital solutions?

- 5 A. Details regarding Pepco's failure to adequately consider lower-cost alternatives are
- 6 provided in the testimony of OPC Witnesses Alvarez and Stephens. For example, there
- 7 were instances in which less expensive solutions were dismissed without adequate
- 8 discussion of the benefits and drawbacks associated with the lower-cost alternatives.
- 9 Further, Messrs. Alvarez and Stephens note that NWAs were mentioned only once
- 10 among all projects' alternatives, and no evaluation of these alternatives' ability to address
- 11 the risk at hand was completed.⁴ The only specific inclusion of NWAs that I am aware of
- 12 are the battery storage investments that the Company was required to undertake under the
- 13 Energy Storage Pilot Project Act, which was codified in Maryland Code, Public Utilities
- 14 Section 7-216.

15 Q. What additional measures do you propose for increasing customer value?

16 A. There are several actions that regulators can take to provide greater value for customers.

17 In particular, regulators can:

⁴ Panel Direct Testimony of Paul J. Alvarez and Dennis Stephens on behalf of OPC, Case No. 9655, March 3, 2021, p. 20.

1		1.	Reduce the utility's return on equity to recognize the reduced risk that the utility faces
2			due to approval of forward-looking budgets and faster cost recovery; ⁵
3		2.	Require integrated distribution planning practices that enhance transparency and
4			facilitate the determination of whether investments are cost-effective relative to
5			alternatives;
6		3.	Implement metrics and PIMs that encourage the utility to deliver greater value to
7			customers.
8		Th	e remainder of my testimony is focused on the second and third points.
9	IV.	A	NEW PLANNING PARADIGM IS NEEDED.
10	Q.	Ple	ease elaborate on how integrated distribution planning can help ratepayers.
11	A.	As	summarized by ICF, an integrated distribution plan (IDP) "involves two general
12		eff	Forts: 1) multiple scenario-based studies of distribution grid impacts to identify 'grid
13		nee	eds,' and 2) a solutions assessment including potential operational changes to system
14		co	nfiguration, needed infrastructure replacement, upgrades and modernization
15		inv	vestments, and potential for non-wires alternatives." ⁶

⁵ This topic is addressed in more detail in OPC Witness Woolridge's Direct Testimony, Case No. 9655, March 3, 2021, pages 11-12, page 69, and page 71.

⁶ ICF International, *Integrated Distribution Planning*, Prepared for the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, August 2016, at vi. Available at <u>https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/09/f33/DOE%20MPUC%20Integrated%20Distribution%20Planning%208312016.pdf</u>

1	These studies are generally conducted annually with a 5- to 10- year planning horizon
2	and with considerable input from stakeholders regarding planning assumptions. IDPs also
3	tend to use forecasts with multiple load and DER scenarios to "to assess current system
4	capabilities, identify incremental infrastructure requirements and enable analysis of the
5	locational value of DERs." ⁷
6	Through the IDP process, the utility can solicit input regarding key assumptions (such as
7	DER forecasts); proposals for non-wires alternatives; and feedback regarding the costs
8	and benefits of incremental reliability investments. This type of input is critical for
9	ensuring that the utility is maximizing value to customers while providing grid
10	investments that are responsive to customers' evolving needs.
11	Further, the integrated component of IDP brings together the many different initiatives
12	and objectives that are often siloed in different regulatory proceedings. For example, an
13	IDP could:
14	• Articulate overall long-term goals and objectives that can guide utility actions
15	and investments;
16	• Coordinate energy efficiency efforts with grid needs, so that efficiency
17	programs can be better targeted to geographic areas where they can provide
18	the greatest benefit;

1		• Inform the development of reliability standards and investment plans with
2		consideration for both costs and benefits; and
3		• Comprehensively assess the potential for non-wires alternatives to reduce
4		system costs.
5		Currently these efforts are occurring in various separate initiatives, including the
6		EmPOWER Maryland docket (Case No. 9494), the electric reliability docket
7		(Case No. 9353), the grid transformation docket (PC44), Pepco's own system
8		capacity plan (based on a forward-looking 10-year peak load forecast), Pepco's
9		annual Long-Range Plan, and the MYP. Because of this fragmented approach,
10		there is little transparency or opportunity for effective input from stakeholders.
11 12	Q.	Does the MYP proceeding not provide adequate opportunity for stakeholder input and review of a utility's plans?
	Q. A.	
12		and review of a utility's plans?
12 13		and review of a utility's plans? No, for several reasons. First, rate case proceedings are contentious and not conducive to
12 13 14		and review of a utility's plans? No, for several reasons. First, rate case proceedings are contentious and not conducive to collaboration among the utility and stakeholders. Second, the 210 day rate case timeline
12 13 14 15		and review of a utility's plans? No, for several reasons. First, rate case proceedings are contentious and not conducive to collaboration among the utility and stakeholders. Second, the 210 day rate case timeline does not provide adequate time for an iterative planning process. By the time a utility has
12 13 14 15 16		and review of a utility's plans? No, for several reasons. First, rate case proceedings are contentious and not conducive to collaboration among the utility and stakeholders. Second, the 210 day rate case timeline does not provide adequate time for an iterative planning process. By the time a utility has filed its MYP, its planning assumptions and results are set, and not easily modified.
12 13 14 15 16 17		 and review of a utility's plans? No, for several reasons. First, rate case proceedings are contentious and not conducive to collaboration among the utility and stakeholders. Second, the 210 day rate case timeline does not provide adequate time for an iterative planning process. By the time a utility has filed its MYP, its planning assumptions and results are set, and not easily modified. Third, rate case filings contain a significant number of other issues that must be resolved,
12 13 14 15 16 17 18		and review of a utility's plans? No, for several reasons. First, rate case proceedings are contentious and not conducive to collaboration among the utility and stakeholders. Second, the 210 day rate case timeline does not provide adequate time for an iterative planning process. By the time a utility has filed its MYP, its planning assumptions and results are set, and not easily modified. Third, rate case filings contain a significant number of other issues that must be resolved, including assessment of the prudency of historical investments, the utility's return on

1 2	Q.	Have other commissions required utilities to undertake integrated distribution planning?
3	A.	Yes. I briefly highlight four examples below:
4		<u>Michigan</u>
5		The Michigan Public Service Commission directed the Michigan utilities to develop and
6		submit five-year plans that include benefit-cost analyses as well as analysis of
7		alternatives, including emerging technologies. The Michigan Public Service Commission
8		subsequently stated:
9		[T]here are significant benefits associated with a
10		comprehensive and forward-looking approach to
11		distribution planning that leverages greater Commission and
12		stakeholder input. A longer-term planning approach will
13		help the Commission and stakeholders better understand the
14		long-term goals and objectives underlying utility investment
15		plans and how the execution of these plans can meet these
16		goals and objectives in an affordable manner. ⁸
17		Minnesota
18		Minnesota has been a leader in integrated distribution planning and requires its utilities to
19		conduct comprehensive, coordinated, transparent, integrated distribution plans on an annual
20		basis. A critical component to this process is the consideration of non-wires alternatives. For

⁸ Michigan Public Service Commission, Case No. U-18-014, October 11, 2017, at 14-15.

1	any project with a total cost greater than \$2 million dollars is subject to an "analysis on how
2	non-wires alternatives compare in terms of viability, price, and long-term value."9
3	California
4	As part of its Distribution Resource Plan process, the California Public Utilities
5	Commission requires the utilities to file an annual Grid Needs Assessment and
6	Distribution Deferral Opportunity Report:
7	• The Grid Needs Assessment lists the grid needs and planned investments
8	that result from the utilities' annual planning process.
9	• The Distribution Deferral Opportunity Report provides a list of candidate
10	distribution deferral opportunities that result from an initial deferral
11	screening process.
12	The Commission stated that a primary purpose of this effort "is to provide transparency
13	into the assumptions and results of the distribution planning process that yield the
14	candidate deferral shortlist, proposed grid modernization investments, and proactive
15	hosting capacity upgrades proposed to accommodate forecast autonomous DER growth.
16	This will allow the Commission and stakeholders to ensure that the candidate deferral
17	shortlist meets the objective of maximizing ratepayer benefits of DERs." ¹⁰

⁹ Minnesota Integrated Distribution Planning Requirements for Xcel Energy, Docket E002/CI-18-251, August 30, 2018, page 7.

¹⁰ California Public Utilities Commission, Rulemaking 14-08-013, February 15, 2018, p. 33.

1 **New York** 2 In 2016, the New York Public Service Commission directed each utility to file utility 3 Distributed System Implementation Plans (DSIP) "addressing its own system and 4 identifying immediate changes that can be made to effectuate state energy goals and 5 objectives."¹¹ The DSIPs require that the utilities provide information and conduct 6 analysis in numerous areas, including: 7 a. Forecast of demand and energy growth (with 8760 data) 8 b. Capital investment plans 9 i. Identify impact DER may have on deferring or avoiding capital 10 investments. 11 ii. Historical and future capital budgets 12 iii. Identify beneficial locations for DER (e.g., where DER can provide the 13 most value) 14 iv. Describe the process used to identify NWAs and propose an improved 15 screening process 16 v. Explain how the utility proposes to maximize DER in such beneficial 17 locations 18 c. Specify near-term effects of DERs on system operations by DER type, and how it 19 can be managed to ensure reliability (through communications protocols, etc.)

¹¹ New York Public Service Commission, Case 14-M-0101, Order Adopting Distributed System Implementation Plan Guidance, April 20, 2016, p. 3.

1	Q.	Is Pepco's Long-Range Plan similar to an IDP?
2	А.	No. Pepco's Long-Range Plan differs from an IDP in numerous ways. For example, the
3		Long-Range Plan provides little information regarding the Company's long-term goals
4		guiding its investments; includes no underlying information regarding load forecasts or
5		DER forecasts; is not developed with stakeholder input; and does not discuss the viability
6		of alternative investments, such as DERs.
7	Q.	What do you recommend with respect to IDP in Maryland?
8	A.	I recommend that the Commission expeditiously initiate a proceeding to develop detailed
9		IDP requirements for Maryland utilities. In addition to drawing from the experiences of
10		jurisdictions highlighted in the above examples, I recommend that the Commission use
11		the NARUC-NASEO Task Force on Comprehensive Electricity Planning's recently
12		released Blueprint for State Action and Jade Cohort Roadmap as a resource. My
13		understanding is that the Commission will hold a virtual technical conference on March
14		25, 2021 to consider these reports as part of PC44. I fully support the Commission's
15		initiative, and I encourage the Commission to establish a schedule and process for the
16		development of detailed IDP recommendations by the conclusion of 2021.
17	V.	PEPCO'S PROPOSED TRACKING METRICS
18	Q.	Please provide an overview of the Company's PIMs proposal.
19	A.	The Company is proposing five "tracking only" PIMs:

Two reliability-related: Customer Average Interruption Duration Index
 (CAIDI) and Customers Experiencing Multiple Interruptions 4 (CEMI-4)

1	One customer service-related: First Call Resolution
2	• Two environment-related: Electric Vehicle charger installation and
3	Greenhouse Gas (GHG) reductions.
4	The PIMs will cover the calendar years 2021 through 2023. Pepco states that it will
5	provide a PIM performance report twice a year during the MYP term. ¹² A summary of
6	these tracking metrics, as included in Witness McGowan's Direct Testimony, is
7	presented in Table 1 below.

8 Table 1. Pepco Proposed Tracking Metrics

Category	Metric	Measurement	Goal	Upper/Lower Band	
Reliability	CAIDI	Actual CAIDI results	2021-2022 = 101.1 2023 = 102.2	+7.2-7.3 / -12.6 – 12.8	
Reliability	CEMI4	Percent of customers experiencing > 4 outages in the year	2.5%	+ .5% /4% points	
Customer Service	First Call Resolution	Percent of calls resolved on first call	2021-2022 = 75% 2023 = 80%	+/- 5% points	
Environment	GHG Emissions Reduction	Reduction of GHG emissions by Pepco	2021 = 21,390 $2022 = 20,962$ $2023 = 20,543$	+/- 10%	
Environment	EV Chargers Installation	Cumulative number of public chargers installed	Complete 6 months early 2021 = 102 2022 = 178 2023 = 250	Threshold: complete per EVCS plan; Stretch: complete 1 year early	
Source: Direct Testimony of Kevin M. McGowan, Table 2 at 31.					

¹² Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness McGowan, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, p. 32.

1	Q.	What is meant by "tracking only PIMs"?
2	A.	The Company explains that these PIMs are "tracking only" because they do not include
3		any financial impacts (i.e., rewards or penalties) for meeting or failing to meet the
4		targets. ¹³
5	Q.	What guidance has the Commission provided regarding PIMs?
	•	
6	A.	In Order No. 89638, the Commission stated that utilities may propose PIMs in any
7		newly-filed rate case, whether MRP or traditional. ¹⁴ The Commission indicated that it
8		expects any utility PIM proposal to be "tethered to a recognized State policy, accelerate
9		the policy goal beyond the current utility's capabilities, show measurable benefits to
10		ratepayers, and contain metrics which show baseline data over a specific timeframe." ¹⁵
11	Q.	Does Pepco's proposal meet the Commission's guidance for PIMs?
12	A.	No. The Company's proposal does not meet the definition of PIMs, as it does not contain
13		any financial incentives (penalties or rewards). As defined by the Public Conference 51
14		(PC51) Working Group, a PIM is "a ratemaking component/mechanism that adopts
15		specific metrics, targets, and financial incentives to effect desired utility performance
16		designed to support specified State policies [emphasis added]." ¹⁶ Further, Order No.
17		89638 states that the Commission will permit utilities to propose PIMs that show "the

¹³ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness McGowan, October 26, 2020, Case No. 9655, p. 28.

¹⁴ Maryland Public Service Commission, Order No. 89638 Approving Performance Incentive Mechanisms, Case No. 9618, p. 12.

¹⁵ Id. at 16.

¹⁶ Exploring the Use of Alternative Rate Plans or Methodologies to Establish New Base Rates for an Electric Company or Gas Company, PC51, and In the Matter of Alternative Rate Plans for Methodologies to Establish New Base Rates for an Electric Company or a Gas Company, Case No. 9618, Phase II Report on Performance Based Regulations, June 17, 2020, at iv.

1		policy goals and metrics to be achieved, proposed rewards and penalties, and an
2		expected timeline of performance[emphasis added]." ¹⁷
3	Q.	Is it appropriate to use the term "PIMs" to describe Pepco's proposal?
4	A.	No. Because Pepco's "PIMs" do not include a penalty or reward, the term PIM should
5		not be used to describe them. Instead, Pepco has submitted a proposal for "tracking
6		metrics" that may eventually become PIMs. Pepco indicates that it expects that the
7		tracking metrics proposed in this case to be developed over the MYP term and become
8		part of a PIM program, including incentives and penalties, in the next rate case. ¹⁸
9	Q.	Why has Pepco proposed tracking metrics instead of PIMs?
10	A.	Witness McGowan states that Pepco is proposing tracking metrics instead of PIMs to
11		allow the parties and the Commission to gain experience with metric development,
12		
		tracking, and reporting. Further, Pepco claims that its proposed tracking metrics "do not
13		tracking, and reporting. Further, Pepco claims that its proposed tracking metrics "do not have a robust history of data and trends as compared to the traditional operational
13 14		
		have a robust history of data and trends as compared to the traditional operational
14		have a robust history of data and trends as compared to the traditional operational metrics," and that tracking this data over the 2021-2023 MYP "will provide the parties

¹⁷ Maryland Public Service Commission, Order No. 89638 Approving Performance Incentive Mechanisms, Case No. 9618, p. 16.

¹⁸ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness McGowan, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, p. 29.

¹⁹ Ibid.

1 Q. What is your view on the usefulness of tracking metrics?

2 A. I am highly supportive of tracking metrics for increasing transparency regarding a 3 utility's performance across multiple dimensions. In fact, OPC recommended multiple 4 tracking metrics during the PC51 Phase II Working Group. Tracking metrics can provide 5 the Commission and stakeholders with relevant and timely information concerning the 6 achievement of both the utility's core responsibilities (such as reliability) and energy 7 policy goals. However, tracking metrics should not necessarily become PIMs. Instead, I 8 recommend that regulators take an incremental approach and only provide financial 9 incentives when necessary and beneficial to customers.

10 Q. Please describe the incremental approach that you recommend in greater detail.

- 11 A. I recommend that the Commission require tracking key performance metrics, but that
- 12 financial incentives only be provided to utilities when needed to offset a countervailing
- 13 incentive, or when otherwise necessary to focus utility management attention on a
- 14 specific performance area. As described in *Utility Performance Incentive Mechanisms: A*
- 15 Handbook for Regulators, full PIMs may not be necessary. Instead, the Commission need
- 16 only implement the steps that are required to achieve the desired performance level:²⁰
- 17 18
- First, dimensions of utility performance are identified that are of particular interest or concern.

²⁰ Whited, M., T. Woolf, and A. Napoleon, Utility Performance Incentive Mechanisms: A Handbook for Regulators. Prepared by Synapse Energy Economics. Denver: Western Interstate Energy Board. March 9, 2015. Available at <u>www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf</u>.

1		• Second, performance metrics and reporting are established to monitor utility
2		performance across key areas.
3		• Third, specific performance targets can be set if needed to provide a clear signal
4		regarding the level of performance that is expected of a utility.
5		• Finally, if necessary, financial rewards and penalties can be applied to increase
6		the utility's motivation to achieve the performance targets.
7		This incremental approach allows regulators and utilities to learn from each step before
8		designing and implementing the next step. It also enables regulators to review utility
9		performance without implementing financial rewards or penalties where such incentives
10		are not necessary, or where the risk associated with rewards or penalties is too high (e.g.,
11		when many factors outside of utility control may influence performance). In fact, many
12		jurisdictions elect to simply implement tracking metrics without any set plan to apply
13		financial incentives.
14	Q.	Do you support Pepco's proposal for tracking metrics?
15	А.	While I support the adoption of tracking metrics generally, I find that:
16		• Several of Pepco's proposed tracking metrics are redundant,
17		• The proposed tracking metrics are inappropriate for full PIMs (with financial
18		incentives), and

1		• The proposed tracking metrics do not address certain important energy policy
2		goals.
3		I therefore recommend that the Commission reject several of Pepco's proposed tracking
4		metrics, deny Pepco's proposal that its tracking metrics become full PIMs in the next rate
5		case, and require that Pepco implement alternative tracking metrics for non-wires
6		alternatives (NWAs) and customer empowerment. I describe these critiques and
7		recommendations in the following sections of my testimony.
8	VI.	PEPCO'S PROPOSED TRACKING METRICS SHOULD NOT BECOME PIMS
9		Reliability Tracking Metrics
10	Q.	Please summarize Pepco's proposed reliability metrics.
10 11	Q. A.	Please summarize Pepco's proposed reliability metrics. Pepco has proposed tracking metrics for CAIDI and CEMI-4. CAIDI measures the
	•	
11	•	Pepco has proposed tracking metrics for CAIDI and CEMI-4. CAIDI measures the
11 12	•	Pepco has proposed tracking metrics for CAIDI and CEMI-4. CAIDI measures the average duration of an outage and is defined as the System Average Interruption
11 12 13	•	Pepco has proposed tracking metrics for CAIDI and CEMI-4. CAIDI measures the average duration of an outage and is defined as the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) divided by the System Average Interruption Frequency Index
11 12 13 14	•	Pepco has proposed tracking metrics for CAIDI and CEMI-4. CAIDI measures the average duration of an outage and is defined as the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) divided by the System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI). Pepco created annual targets with upper and lower bands based on past
11 12 13 14 15	•	Pepco has proposed tracking metrics for CAIDI and CEMI-4. CAIDI measures the average duration of an outage and is defined as the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) divided by the System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI). Pepco created annual targets with upper and lower bands based on past performance and historical industry benchmarking results. ²¹
 11 12 13 14 15 16 	•	Pepco has proposed tracking metrics for CAIDI and CEMI-4. CAIDI measures the average duration of an outage and is defined as the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) divided by the System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI). Pepco created annual targets with upper and lower bands based on past performance and historical industry benchmarking results. ²¹ CEMI-4 is defined as the percent of customers experiencing four or more interruptions

²¹ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness Stewart, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, pp. 12-14.

1		results. Pepco states that its improvement in CEMI-4 has been less linear than its system-
2		wide SAIFI and SAIDI performance and developing a formal tracking metric would
3		better align Pepco's financial performance with its operational performance in
4		neighborhood reliability. ²²
5	Q.	Do you support the creation of new tracking metrics for CAIDI or CEMI-4?
6	A.	No. While I support reporting of both CAIDI and CEMI-4 statistics, Pepco already
7		reports these as part of its Service Quality and Reliability Annual Performance Report.
8		Thus, the creation of additional metrics in this proceeding is not necessary. Instead, I
9		recommend that Pepco augment its annual reliability report to include trends in both
10		CAIDI and CEMI-4 so that the Commission and stakeholders can more readily discern
11		whether performance is improving or deteriorating. In addition, I recommend that Pepco
12		make CEMI performance data by neighborhood available for download through a link on
13		its website so that stakeholders can understand where problem areas occur on Pepco's
14		system and the steps Pepco is taking to address these issues.
15 16	Q.	Should CAIDI or CEMI-4 be considered for future PIMs with the potential for financial rewards?
17		A. No, for multiple reasons. First, the Maryland Electricity Service Quality and
18		Reliability Act already requires each electric company to provide high levels of service
19		quality and reliability, ²³ and the Commission has established specific SAIFI and SAIDI
20		standards for each utility. Pursuant to PUA § 7-213(f)(2), the Commission may impose

²² Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness Stewart, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, pp. 14-15.
²³ Section 7-213(b) of the Public Utilities Article ("PUA") of the Maryland Code

1	penalties for failure to meet applicable service quality and reliability standards. Given
2	that specific standards already exist and there is potential for penalties under existing
3	regulations, it would be duplicative to create a new PIM for CAIDI that addresses
4	fundamentally the same area of performance. If the CEMI-4 tracking metric indicates
5	problems with specific aspects of reliability, I support the consideration of additional
6	reliability standards under the service quality and reliability standards defined in
7	COMAR 20.50.12, or through a penalty-only PIM. However, such standards should be
8	set so that they balance the benefits associated with improvements in reliability with the
9	incremental costs of reliability investments. It is important to recognize that there may be
10	diminishing returns to Pepco's reliability investments, and at some point the value of
11	improved reliability may exceed the incremental cost of providing it. Pepco has not
12	provided a benefit-cost analysis that would enable the Commission or stakeholders to set
13	CAIDI or CEMI-4 targets that balance the costs to customers with the incremental value
14	to customers.
15	Further, I would not support a PIM that provides Pepco with the opportunity to earn
16	additional profit for making reliability investments for two reasons:
17	1. Reliability is a core responsibility of the utilities, and the utilities should not be
18	provided with financial rewards for performing their key duties.
19	2. Pepco already earns a return on its capital investments and therefore already has a
20	financial incentive to invest in its system.

1		Indeed, Pepco's recent re	eliability en	hancements	and propos	sed reliabi	lity investr	nents
2		during the MYP demons	trate the inc	entive that	Pepco has t	o invest in	reliability	. For
3		example, Pepco states th	at it has dev	eloped tool	s to address	s CEMI in	cluding "a	daily
4		CEMI alerts flag when a	customer h	as a second	outage for	the year, a	CEMI da	shboard,
5		reporting and tracking of	f CEMI perf	formance by	y neighborh	ood, and t	he establis	hment of
6		a formal, budgeted CEM	I program."	24				
7		Moreover, Pepco's MYI	calls for st	eep increase	es in reliabi	lity spendi	ing. Pepco	's forecast
8		for reliability-related spe	ending throu	gh 2024 in	Table 2 bel	ow shows	that reliab	ility
9		spending is projected to	increase dra	matically o	ver the nex	t four year	s. ²⁵ Reliab	ility
10		spending is projected to	increase fro	m \$100 mil	lion in 202	0 to \$237 1	million in 2	2024.
11		Table 2. Forecast Capital a	nd Labor Exp	enditures Re	lated to Relia	ability		
			2020F	2021F	2022F	2023F	2024F	Total
		Total Reliability (\$000s)	\$100,281	\$137,819	\$176,669	\$217,231	\$237,235	\$869,236
		Year-on-Year Change	-	37.4%	28.2%	23.0%	9.2%	-
12		Source: Case No. 9353, Errata to	Potomac Electr	ric Power Comp	bany's Annual F	Performance F	Report coverin	g the period
13		of January 1, 2019 through Dece	mber 31, 2019,	filed July 1, 20	20.			
14 15	Q.	Are there any other rea proposed reliability tra	ť		support PI	Ms based	on Pepco'	S

- 16 A. Yes. I do not believe that CAIDI provides a good indication of reliability, and I am
- 17 concerned that Pepco's proposed reliability targets would not encourage the utility to
- 18 improve its performance beyond what it has already achieved.

²⁴ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness Stewart, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, p. 16.

²⁵ Pepco, Case No. 9353, Errata to Potomac Electric Power Company's Annual Performance Report covering the period of January 1, 2019 through December 31, 2019, filed July 1, 2020.


1	Q.	Please explain your concern regarding CAIDI.
2	A.	I am concerned that CAIDI does not provide a useful indication of reliability on Pepco's
3		system. As described above, CAIDI is simply SAIDI divided by SAIFI. Due to its
4		mathematical formulation, if the denominator (SAIFI) increases but the numerator
5		(SAIDI) remains constant, CAIDI will decline. Thus, an improvement in CAIDI could
6		actually signal an <i>increase</i> in the frequency of outages, rather than any improvement in
7		reliability. Conversely, if both SAIDI and SAIFI decline, but SAIDI declines
8		proportionately less than SAIFI, then CAIDI will increase. In this case, worsening CAIDI
9		would not necessarily imply a reliability problem, but rather that the frequency of outages
10		was declining faster than the duration of outages. For these reasons, CAIDI conveys less
11		useful information than SAIDI and SAIFI and should not lead to a financial reward or
12		penalty.
13 14	Q.	Please explain your concerns regarding the reliability targets that Pepco set for this MYP.
15	A.	I do not find Pepco's proposed CAIDI and CEMI-4 targets to be sufficient to drive
16		changes in performance. As shown in Table 3 and Figure 1 below, Pepco's historical
17		CAIDI performance has been improving over recent years. In three of the four most
18		recent years, CAIDI has actually been below Pepco's proposed lower band of its target
19		performance range.

	Year	CAIDI	Upper/Lower Band				
	2015	103	-				
	2016	100	-				
Historiaal	2017	83	-				
Historical	2018	76	-				
	2019	89	-				
	2020	82	-				
	2021	101.1	108.3 / 88.5				
Proposed Targets	2022	101.1	108.3 / 88.5				
	2023	102.2	109.5 / 89.4				

Table 3. Pepco CAIDI Historical Performance and Proposed Targets

Source: Historical CAIDI data for years 2015-2020 from Pepco Response to OPC DR 11-18(a).

Figure 1. Pepco CAIDI Historical Performance and Proposed Target Performance Range



Source: Historical CAIDI data for years 2015-2020 from Pepco Response to OPC DR 11-18(a).

The same is true for Pepco's CEMI-4 targets. Table 4 below shows Pepco's historic
CEMI-4 performance compared to its proposed targets for the MYP. Since 2016, Pepco
has performed better than its proposed CEMI-4 target. In fact, Pepco's performance was
superior to the lower band of its target performance range in years 2017 through 2020.

2

3


1

-			1 0			
	Year	CEMI-4	Upper/Lower Band			
	2015	2.58%	-			
	2016	2.28%	-			
Historical	2017	0.45%	-			
Historical	2018	1.63%	-			
	2019	0.75%	-			
	2020	0.64%	-			
	2021	2.50%	3.0% / 2.1%			
Proposed Target	2022	2.50%	3.0% / 2.1%			
	2023	2.50%	3.0% / 2.1%			

Table 4. Pepco CEMI-4 Historical Performance and Proposed Targets

Source: Historical CEMI-4 data for years 2015-2020 from Pepco Response to OPC DR 11-22(a).

Figure 2. Pepco Historical CEMI-4 Performance and Proposed Target Performance Range



4 5

1

2

3

Source: Historical CEMI-4 data for years 2015-2020 from Pepco Response to OPC DR 11-22(a).

Thus, Pepco is proposing no improvements to its recent performance; rather, Pepco has
set targets for itself that would allow its performance to significantly worsen while still
meeting its targets.

9 Q. What do you recommend regarding Pepco's proposed reliability tracking metrics?

10 Given that Pepco is already subject to penalties for failure to meet reliability standards,

11 the existing financial model already rewards Pepco for reliability investments, and Pepco

1		has failed to challenge itself to improve CAIDI and CEMI-4 performance during the
2		MYP, I recommend that the Commission dismiss Pepco's proposal that these reliability
3		tracking metrics become PIMs in the next rate case.
4		First Call Resolution Tracking Metric
5	Q.	Please describe First Call Resolution metric.
6	A.	Pepco describes First Call Resolution (FCR) as "a measurement of customers' perception
7		of their question being answered or their problem resolved in their first call for that
8		issue." ²⁶
9	Q.	Does Pepco currently track FCR?
10	А.	Yes. In accordance with Order No. 89629, the Company currently tracks FCR. ²⁷ To
11		comply with this Order, the Company tracks FCR using an automated analysis of the
12		phone calls received by the call center. This process tracks the number of times a phone
13		number calls the call center during a three-day span. If a number calls more than once
14		during the three-day span, it is assumed the call was not resolved the first time. If a
15		number doesn't appear more than once within three days, it is assumed that call was
16		resolved on the first call. The Company calculates its current FCR metric by dividing the
17		number of calls not appearing more than once by the total number of calls. The result of
18		this tracking metric in 2020 was approximately 80 percent. ²⁸

²⁶ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness Bell-Izzard, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, p. 20.
²⁷ Id. at 21.
²⁸ Id. at 22.

1 Q. What does Pepco propose for an FCR tracking metric?

2 A. Pepco is proposing a new way to measure FCR for its proposed MYP tracking metric. 3 Instead of using the automated analysis of phone calls received by the call center, Pepco 4 proposes to survey customers. Pepco will use its daily automated post-call survey to ask 5 customers whether their initial call center question was answered, or their problem was 6 resolved in their first call. The Company would then calculate the annual mean score for 7 those calls where the customer responded favorably that their issue was resolved on the 8 first call. Pepco proposes a performance target metric for the first two years of the MYP 9 at 75 percent and 80 percent for year 2023. These targets would exclude calls related to 10 outages, agency assistance numbers, non-CSR, internal company numbers, and internal 11 company numbers.²⁹

12 **O**. Has Pepco previously used a post-call survey to determine FCR?

13 A. Pepco reports that since 2018, it has used a post-call survey to determine customers'

14 perspective of FCR. However, due to a technical issue, Pepco is unable to retrieve results 15 prior to May 2020. Since May 2020, the survey has yielded results of between 83 percent and 88 percent.³⁰ 16

17 **Q**. Do you support Pepco's new tracking method for FCR?

A. 18 I find that Pepco's proposed customer survey would provide additional information to 19 help it better understand its call center performance. I support Pepco's proposal to track 20

this information as long as it does not replace the automatic analysis currently used by

²⁹ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness Bell-Izzard, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, pp. 21-22.

³⁰ Pepco Response to OPC DR 11-24 (b).

1	Pepco in response to Order No. 89629. I recommend that Pepco continue tracking FCR
2	using the automated methodology to help ensure there is not a worsening of performance
3	relative to historical levels.

4 Q. Should FCR be considered for a PIM in the next rate case?

5 A. No. I do not believe that this PIM is needed to encourage Pepco to undertake actions it 6 would not have already taken, nor is it clear that the benefits associated with improved 7 first call resolution would be worth the costs. As Pepco Witness Bell-Izzard indicates, in 8 the case of FCR, the Company already has an overall goal to deliver premier customer 9 service performance relative to its peers in the industry. Further, he states the Company 10 considers FCR as a best practice in its performance regarding improving overall customer satisfaction.³¹ Pepco indicates that it is already committed to improving FCR and overall 11 12 customer satisfaction.

- 13 In addition, Pepco's proposed targets for the MYP do not encourage the Company to
- 14 improve its performance. According to recent survey results, 83 to 88 percent of issues
- 15 are already resolved in the first call, indicating that Pepco's proposed target of 75 percent

16 for 2021 and 2022 is a low bar.

17

For these reasons, I recommend that FCR not be made a full PIM in the next rate case.

³¹ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness Bell-Izzard, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, pp. 20-21.

1 <u>Electric Vehicle Charging Station (EVCS) Installations</u>

2 Q. Please summarize Pepco's proposal for an EVCS Installation tracking metric.

- 3 A. Pepco's proposed EVCS metric would track the cumulative number of public electric
- 4 vehicle charging stations installed in each year of the MYP through its public charging
- 5 program as approved in Case No. 9478. The tracking metric contains cumulative
- 6 installation targets. Pepco indicates that the targets will allow the Company to measure
- 7 and monitor annual progress of the program and ensure resources are efficiently planned
- 8 and allocated.³² Pepco indicates the goal is to accelerate the deployment of all EVCS by
- 9 six-months (target goal) and 12-months (stretch goal).³³

10 **Q.** Please explain your concern with Pepco's proposed EV Charging Station metric.

- 11 A While I am not opposed to Pepco tracking its EVCS installation performance, I have
- 12 concerns regarding this metric for multiple reasons.
- 13 First, the metric appears to be redundant, as Pepco already reports on the status of its
- 14 public EVCS installations as part of its Semi-Annual Progress Report to the Commission.
- 15 Through this reporting framework it will be evident if Pepco is falling behind on the
- 16 deployment of its public charging network. While I support the continued tracking of
- 17 this progress through those reports, it is not necessary to establish a new tracking metric

18 in this proceeding.

³² Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness McGowan, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, p. 33.

³³ Pepco Response to OPC DR 11-4.

1		Lastly, the installation of these chargers will be mostly complete by the next rate case,
2		making the establishment of a PIM with financial incentives in the next rate case moot.
3		Specifically, Pepco's five-year EV Pilot commitment is for 250 public charging stations
4		to be installed by 2025. Unless Pepco is authorized to install additional charging stations
5		after 2025, there will be no need for continued tracking or a PIM within the next rate
6		case.
7 8	Q.	Please explain why the EVCS Installation tracking metric should not qualify for financial incentives in a future PIM.
9	A.	PIMs with financial incentives should only be applied where the utility has a disincentive
10		to align its performance with the public interest. Pepco already has a strong incentive to
11		install EVCS in a timely manner as it will earn a return on those assets. As directed by
12		the Commission in Order No. 88997 of Case No. 9478, the Company was authorized to
13		defer all incremental costs related to its EV pilot project into a regulatory asset and now
14		seeks approval of such costs, including a rate of return, in this MYP. ³⁴ Due to the fact the
15		Company will earn a return on its investment in EVCS, an additional performance
16		incentive would not be in the best interest of ratepayers.
17		Second, as currently defined, the metric provides no indication of the benefits to
18		customers associated with the target. Although Pepco indicates this metric will help in the
19		attainment of Maryland's zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) goals, ³⁵ Pepco does not provide
20		any indication as to how an advancement of its installation timeline by 6 months or 12

³⁴ Pepco Response to OPC DR 11-6(a).
³⁵ Pepco Response to OPC DR 11-4.

1	months will directly lead to incremental new purchases of ZEVs. That is, Pepco does not
2	explain how it would quantify and monetize the benefit to customers of installing EVCS
3	earlier than what is approved in its plan. If Pepco wants to propose an incentive
4	associated with earlier installation of EVCS in a future PIM, it should be required to
5	justify why ratepayers should pay for any reward associated with the attainment of its
6	target. Specifically, Pepco should demonstrate that the benefit of earlier installation
7	offsets the cost of both the more rapid installation timeline and the costs associated with a
8	financial reward. Because Pepco's proposed tracking metric does not provide any
9	information regarding how it will quantify the benefits to customers, there is no means of
10	ensuring that the benefits outweigh the costs, and thus it would not be appropriate to
11	provide Pepco with financial incentives associated with this metric.

Greenhouse Gas Performance Tracking Metric

13 Q. Please summarize Pepco's proposal for a GHG tracking metric.

14 Pepco proposes to track its progress towards an annual GHG target, reported as CO₂e in A. 15 tons/yr, for each year of the MYP. The GHG target is based on the estimated contribution 16 of the Company's Maryland operations to a calendar year 2020 GHG target for Maryland 17 and District of Columbia operations combined. To encourage improved performance over 18 time, Pepco proposes a 2 percent reduction in the GHG target in each year of the MYP. 19 Pepco further applies a 10 percent upper and lower band to these targets to account for 20 uncertainty in tracking Maryland emissions separately. Pepco proposes to meet this target 21 from reducing CO₂e from sources over which it has direct operational control. These

1		sources include emissions from building electricity usage, fleet vehicle fuel usage, and
2		sulfur hexafluoride (SF ₆) emissions from operational equipment. ³⁶
3	Q.	Please explain your concern with Pepco's proposed GHG tracking metric.
4	A.	While I appreciate the Company's proposal to track Maryland-specific emissions from its
5		operations, it is unclear what incremental benefit to customers this metric will provide, or
6		that the targets in any way "accelerate the policy goal beyond the current utility's
7		capabilities" as required by the Commission.
8		Pepco, as part of Exelon-wide efforts, has an existing goal of reducing GHG emissions
9		from internal operations across its footprint (emissions controllable by its employees and
10		processes). ³⁷ According to Pepco Witness McGowan, Pepco has already exceeded its
11		internal goal; as of 2019, Pepco had reduced emissions by approximately 42 percent from
12		2015 levels. ³⁸ While I commend Pepco for achieving a 42 percent emissions reduction
13		over four years, I do not believe that Pepco's proposed 2 percent annual emissions
14		reduction target represents a goal "beyond the current utility's capabilities."
15		This is further highlighted in Table 5 below, where I show Pepco's historical GHG
16		emission totals as provided in discovery. Since Pepco did not track GHG emissions
17		separately for Maryland prior to 2020, I apply the Company's estimate that Maryland

³⁶ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness McGowan, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, pp. 35-37.

³⁷ Exelon Corporation CDP Climate Change Questionnaire 2020 Wednesday, August 26, 2020. Available at: https://www.exeloncorp.com/sustainability/Documents/Exelon_Investor_CDP.pdf.

³⁸ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness McGowan, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, p. 37.

1	operations re	epresent 52	percent	of that	total.	This	table	indicates	that	emissions	were
1	operations re	epresent 52	percent	of that	total.	This	table	indicates	that	emissions	we

2 lower than the proposed 2021 target in 2017, 2019, and 2020.

3

Table 5. Historical GHG Emissions and Proposed Emissions Targets

Total Pepco Emissions Estimates by Source (MT CO2e)							
	Pepco (MD + DC)	Pepco MD	Pepco MD (52%)				
Historical							
2016	47,255	*	24,573				
2017	39,016	*	20,288				
2018	41,371	*	21,513				
2019	37,623	*	19,564				
2020	40,615	22,016	21,120				
Proposed Targets in MYP							
2021			21,390				
2022			20,962				
2023			20,543				

Source: Pepco Response to Staff DR 67-7.

Given the variability in emissions over time and Pepco's recent admirable performance in
 GHG emissions reduction, it is not clear how this tracking metric will incentivize Pepco

7 to take any actions beyond business as usual.

8 A Please explain why you do not support the proposed GHG tracking metric as a 9 future PIM.

10 A. Pepco has already made significant progress in achieving GHG emissions reductions

11 without an incentive. It is clear that Exelon and Pepco are already committed to reducing

- 12 emissions from internal operations in a manner that is aligned with Maryland's state
- 13 energy policy goals. It is not apparent that providing a financial incentive would provide
- 14 any incremental benefit to ratepayers; rather it would likely reward Pepco for achieving

15 results that it would have achieved anyway.

⁴

1		Finally, I have an additional concern that Pepco's proposal could allow the Company to
2		time certain investments, as to slow emissions reductions in the near-term but expedite
3		emissions reductions when a financial incentive is available. Specifically, Pepco could
4		slow emissions reductions during this MYP, thereby setting a low emissions reductions
5		baseline and target, which could be easily exceeded in future years once a financial
6		incentive is available.
7	VII.	ADDITIONAL METRICS SHOULD BE TRACKED
8 9	Q.	Are you proposing any tracking metrics for inclusion in Pepco's current MYP proposal?
10	A.	Yes. I find that Pepco's proposed tracking metrics are focused on its core utility
11		obligations and do not move beyond business-as-usual efforts. Therefore, I am proposing
12		five metrics related to the deployment of NWAs and two metrics related to customer
13		empowerment.
14		NWA Tracking Metrics
15	Q.	Please explain the importance of investment in NWA solutions.
16	A.	NWAs are investments or projects that can defer or avoid the need for equipment of
17		upgrades to the distribution system at a lower cost than the traditional solution. They can
18		include a variety of customer-controlled demand-side resources or grid-side investments
19		such as energy efficiency, demand response, solar PV, and storage. Incentivizing utilities
20		to invest in cost-effective NWAs instead of traditional wires-side investments can create
21		multiple benefits, including cost savings for customers, customer empowerment, and
22		emissions reductions.

1	Q.	What is your proposal for NWA tracking metrics?
2	A.	I propose the following five metrics to track Pepco's actions towards procuring NWA
3		solutions:
4		1. Net Savings from NWAs
5		2. NWA capacity installed (MW)
6		3. NWA capacity (MW) by DER type
7		4. NWA request for proposals (RFPs) issued per year
8		5. NWA customer participation (% of customers by rate class)
9	Q.	How will these metrics support Maryland's policy objectives?
10	A.	Increasing investment in cost-effective NWAs will help to promote the efficient and
11		innovative delivery of public utility services. Incentivizing Pepco to invest in cost-
12		effective NWAs instead of traditional wires-side investments can produce cost savings
13		for customers and encourage the adoption of distributed energy resources (DERs) like
14		storage.
15	Q.	Why are NWA tracking metrics needed?
16	A.	Although Pepco states that it has "recently begun the practice of looking at non-wires
17		alternatives to traditional infrastructure projects," ³⁹ there is little transparency regarding
18		what steps Pepco is actually taking to procure such alternatives. Reporting the five
19		tracking metrics above would provide insight into the effort that Pepco is making in this
20		regard.

³⁹ Direct testimony of Pepco Witness Stewart, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, p. 42.

1	Q.	Why is there a need to monitor the steps that Pepco is taking to explore NWAs?
2	A.	Like most utilities, Pepco has a disincentive to promote NWAs, since they reduce the
3		need for utility capital investments on which the Company earns a return. Further,
4		utilities often prefer to invest in traditional solutions compared to NWAs due their lack of
5		familiarity and experience with procuring, constructing, and operating the NWA solution.
6		To combat this disincentive, greater transparency is needed regarding the utility's pursuit
7		of non-traditional alternatives. The metrics that I proposed could also be used to
8		potentially design future PIMs regarding NWAs. For example, a future NWA PIM based
9		on the net-shared savings from the NWA solution compared to the traditional wires
10		solution could be implemented to allow the Company to benefit from the development of
11		cost-effective NWAs.
12		Customer Empowerment Tracking Metrics
13	Q.	Please describe your proposal for Customer Empowerment tracking metrics.
14	A.	I propose two tracking metrics to support customer empowerment and maximize the
15		benefits to customers of Pepco's investments. My proposed tracking metrics are shown in
16		Table 6 below. These metrics would track the number of customers accessing Pepco's
17		Smart Energy Services platform, and the number of customers with Green Button
18		Connect My Data (CMD) functionality enabled.
19		Table 6. Proposed Customer Empowerment Tracking Metrics

Metric	Measurement	Outcome
Customers viewing Smart Energy Services content	Percent of customers by rate class accessing Smart Energy Services content on Pepco's	Promotes enablement of customer access to more granular energy usage data that can help customers take control of energy usage

	website, measured by unique annual customer views	
Customers with Access to Green Button Connect My Data	Percent of customers with access to Green Button Connect My Data, by rate class	Incentivizes the utilization of Green Button Connect My Data functionality which will aid in customer energy management and facilitate customer- enabled data access by third-party vendors and DER developers

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3 The purpose of these metrics is to track the extent to which Pepco is actively empowering 4 and encouraging customers to access and use their energy data to better understand and 5 manage their electricity consumption, including through the use of third-party energy 6 service or distributed energy resource (DER) providers. Not only can this knowledge help 7 reduce customer bills, but Pepco states that customer use of the Smart Energy Services 8 platform "will drive sustained value by improving reliability, customer satisfaction, lowering customer bills and decreasing operational cost."⁴⁰ In addition, facilitating 9 10 customers' ability to share their usage data with energy service and DER providers can 11 help to promote energy efficiency and adoption of distributed solar, battery storage, or 12 other technologies that provide benefits to the grid. 13 Q. Please describe your first metric: "Smart Energy Services Views". 14 A. As described by Pepco, the Smart Energy Services platform is an analytic-based solution 15 that allows "customers to understand their energy consumption footprint and explore 16 options to reduce that consumption and their energy bills." For example, the Smart

17 Energy Services platform enables customers to view:

⁴⁰ Direct Testimony of Pepco Witness Barnett, Schedule (PSB)-1, Case No. 9655, October 26, 2020, p. 69.

1		• Bill projections, based on their current usage;
2		• Hourly energy usage;
3		• A breakdown of how their house uses energy; and
4		• Targeted energy tips based on their home. ⁴¹
5		This proposed metric would track unique customer visits to this page per year, thereby
6		encouraging Pepco to increase customer awareness and usage of this functionality, for
7		which customers are paying millions of dollars.
8 9	Q.	How much does Pepco expect to spend on the Smart Energy Services platform during the MYP?
10	А.	Pepco forecasts that it will spend \$8.5 million on enhancements to the Smart Energy
11		Services platform in 2022.
12 13	Q.	Does Pepco currently track how many customers access the Smart Energy Services platform?
14	А.	Yes. Pepco reports that in 2019, there were 190,225 unique customer views of Smart
15		Energy Services content on pepco.com. ⁴²

 ⁴¹ Response to OPC 4-12.
 ⁴² Response to OPC 4-12.

1 2	Q.	Please describe your metric "Customers with Access to Green Button Connect My Data."
3	A.	As described by the US Department of Energy, Green Button Connect My Data "allows
4		utility customers to automate the secure transfer of their own energy usage data to
5		authorized third parties, based on affirmative (opt-in) customer consent and control."43
6		This metric would track the percentage of customers, by rate class, with access to Green
7		Button Connect My Data functionality.
8	Q.	Do customers automatically have access to this functionality?
9	А.	No, this functionality is not automatically provided to customers. Pepco states that it sets
10		up accounts for any commercial customers who request it.44
11 12	Q.	Why do you believe that tracking the percentage of customers who have access to Green Button Connect My Data is needed?
13	А.	Pepco states that "[t]here have been no proactive customer marketing efforts to promote
14		the Connect My Data functionality." ⁴⁵ I am concerned that Pepco has no incentive to
15		make customers aware of this functionality, which will impede customers' usage of the
16		functionality and thus customers' ability to share their usage data with energy service and
17		DER providers.

 ⁴³ US Department of Energy, Energy.gov, Green Button. Available at <u>https://www.energy.gov/data/green-button</u>
 ⁴⁴ Response to OPC 4-12.

⁴⁵ Id.

1 VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- 2 Q. Please summarize your main conclusions.
- 3 A. My conclusions are as follows:

Pepco's proposed investment plan represents the continuation of a pattern that has
resulted in the Company having exceptionally high gross rate base on a per-customer
basis. The low risk of disallowance and rapid rate of cost recovery under the MYP
construct exacerbates the incentive that Pepco has to over-invest in its system. For
these reasons, additional measures are needed to enhance customer welfare.

Tracking metrics can serve as a valuable tool to increase transparency, determine
future performance standards, assess the need and magnitude of future financial
rewards or penalties, and gather data to enable a benefit-cost analysis of any proposed
PIM. While I do not oppose the tracking of the data that Pepco has proposed, several
of the metrics are redundant, or would not provide useful information to inform future
PIMs.

Pepco's proposed tracking metrics are largely inappropriate for full PIMs with
 financial incentives. The metrics are in many cases redundant and would reward
 Pepco for activities that it is already committed to undertaking or could easily
 achieve. In particular, the reliability metrics should not be developed into PIMs, as
 Pepco is already subject to reliability standards and has provided no information
 regarding the costs and benefits to customers of incremental reliability improvements.

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1		In sum, Pepco's proposed PIMs do little to better align Pepco's incentives with the
2		public interest.
3	Q.	Please summarize your recommendations.
4	A.	I offer the following recommendations:
5		1. The Commission should require Maryland utilities to conduct integrated distribution
6		planning to enhance transparency and facilitate the determination of whether
7		investments included in MYPs are cost-effective relative to alternatives. To
8		accomplish this, I recommend that the Commission initiate a proceeding to develop
9		these requirements as soon as feasible. Approval of future MYPs should be
10		predicated on the filing and approval of integrated distribution plans.
11		2. The Commission should reject Pepco's proposed PIMs and instead consider metrics
12		and incentives to encourage Pepco to (a) explore cost-effective NWAs, and (b)
13		empower customers to access and engage with their electricity usage data.
14	Q.	Does this conclude your testimony?
15	A.	Yes, it does.



Melissa Whited, Principal Associate

Synapse Energy Economics I 485 Massachusetts Avenue, Suite 3 I Cambridge, MA 02139 I 617-453-7024 mwhited@synapse-energy.com

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Synapse Energy Economics, Cambridge MA. *Principal Associate*, 2017 – present, *Senior Associate*, 2015 – 2017, *Associate*, 2012 – 2015

Consult and provide analysis of rate design proposals, alternative regulation, and other topics including distributed energy resources and electric vehicles. Develop expert witness testimony in public utility commission proceedings. Author reports on topics at the intersection of utility regulation, customer protection, and environmental impacts.

University of Wisconsin - Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Madison, WI. *Teaching Assistant – Environmental Economics*, 2011 – 2012

Developed teaching materials and led discussions on cost-benefit analysis, carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs, management of renewable and non-renewable resources, and other topics.

Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Water Division, Madison, WI. *Program and Policy Analyst - Intern*, Summer 2009

Researched water conservation programs nationwide to develop a proposal for Wisconsin's state conservation program. Developed spreadsheet model to calculate avoided costs of water conservation in terms of energy savings and avoided emissions.

Synapse Energy Economics, Cambridge, MA. Communications Manager, 2005 – 2008

Developed technical proposals for state and federal agencies, environmental and public interest groups, and businesses. Edited reports on energy efficiency, integrated resource planning, greenhouse gas regulations, renewable resources, and other topics.

EDUCATION

University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI Master of Arts in Agricultural and Applied Economics, 2012 Certificate in Energy Analysis and Policy National Science Foundation Fellow

University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI

Master of Science in Environment and Resources, 2010 Certificate in Humans and the Global Environment (CHANGE) Nelson Distinguished Fellowship

Southwestern University, Georgetown, TX

Bachelor of Arts in International Studies, Magna cum laude, 2003.

ADDITIONAL SKILLS

- Econometric Modeling Linear and nonlinear modeling including time-series, panel data, logit, probit, and discrete choice regression analysis
- Nonmarket Valuation Methods for Environmental Goods Hedonic valuation, travel cost method, and contingent valuation
- Cost-Benefit Analysis
- Input-Output Modeling for Regional Economic Analysis

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

- Winner, M. Jarvin Emerson Student Paper Competition, Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy, 2010
- Fellowship, National Science Foundation Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship (IGERT), University of Wisconsin Madison, 2009
- Nelson Distinguished Fellowship, University of Wisconsin Madison, 2008

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Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (Docket No. 4780): Direct testimony of Tim Woolf and Melissa Whited regarding National Grid's Power Sector Transformation proposals. On behalf of the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers. April 28, 2018.

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (Docket No. 4770): Direct testimony of Tim Woolf and Melissa Whited regarding National Grid's proposed performance incentive mechanisms, benefit-cost analyses, and request for recovery of costs for its Advanced Metering Functionality study and distributed energy resources enablement investments. On behalf of the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers. April 6, 2018.

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (Docket No. 4783): Direct testimony of Tim Woolf and Melissa Whited regarding National Grid's Advanced Metering Functionality Pilot. On behalf of the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers. February 22, 2018.

Virginia State Corporation Commission (Case No. PUR-2017-00044): Direct testimony of Melissa Whited regarding Rappahannock Electric Cooperative's proposed increases to fixed charges for residential customers and small business customers. On behalf of Sierra Club. September 19, 2017.

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Whited, M. 2016. "Energy Policy for the Future: Trends and Overview." Presentation to the National Conference of State Legislators' Capitol Forum, Washington, DC, December 8.

Whited, M. 2016. "Ratemaking for the Future: Trends and Considerations." Presentation to the Midwest Governors' Association, St. Paul, MN, July 14.

Whited, M. 2016. "Performance Based Regulation." Presentation to the NARUC Rate Design Subcommittee. September 12.

Whited, M. 2016. "Demand Charges: Impacts and Alternatives (A Skeptic's View)." EUCI 2nd Annual Residential Demand Charges Summit, Phoenix, AZ, June 7.

Whited, M. 2016. "Performance Incentive Mechanisms." Presentation to the National Governors Association, Wisconsin Workshop, Madison WI, March 29.

Whited, M., T. Woolf. 2016. "Caught in a Fix: The Problem with Fixed Charges for Electricity." Webinar presentation sponsored by Consumers Union, February.

Whited, M. 2015. "Performance Incentive Mechanisms." Presentation to the National Governors Association, Learning Lab on New Utility Business Models & the Electricity Market Structures of the Future, Boston, MA, July 28.

Whited, M. 2015. "Rate Design: Options for Addressing NEM Impacts." Presentation to the Utah Net Energy Metering Workgroup, Workshop 4, Salt Lake City, UT, July 8.

Whited, M. 2015. "Performance Incentive Mechanisms." Presentation to the e21 Initiative, St. Paul, MN, May 29.

Whited, M., F. Ackerman. 2013. "Water Constraints on Energy Production: Altering our Current Collision Course." Webinar presentation sponsored by Civil Society Institute, September 12.

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Resume updated February 2021